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ABSTRACT
One of the most challenging problems for high technology firms in an
increasingly global marketplace is the effective utilization of intermediated sales channels.
As product development cycles shorten, there can be a scenario where the rate of product
and solutions development and introduction to the market out-pace the manufacturer's
ability to sell, service, and support the new products and solutions. There are many
challenges to be overcome in providing a third party organization with the knowledge,
skills and tools necessary to successfully propose, implement, operate and support high
technology products and solutions designed, manufactured and marketed by another
company. As firms both large and small look to indirect channels to expand their
coverage in existing markets and or to penetrate new markets, significant investments in
channel support infrastructure and best-in-class channel management techniques are
increasingly a necessity to achieve success in a global channel network.
The objective of this thesis will be to closely examine the enterprise data
communications equipment market segment to develop an understanding of how
successful firms effectively utilized intermediated channels to attain remarkable market
share at the expense of competitors who were not able to do so. From this understanding
generalizations will be drawn that will provide a number of management practices that
guide other high technology firms in design and implementation of their intermediated
channel programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry Birdseye Weil
Title: Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1: Introduction
For many businesses today the ability to effectively market and sell their offerings
to the largest possible number of consumers globally at the lowest possible cost of sales
is a paramount concern of all executive management. The traditional direct sales means
such as a captive direct sales force, telesales and direct mail selling and even the
relatively new direct channels enabled by the worldwide Internet and e-commerce have
inherent limitations. Assuming the goal is to reach as close to 100% of the addressable
market as possible, sales and marketing efforts initiated and managed by the company
creating the offering itself on its own behalf may not be sufficient. Many potential
opportunities and customers are neither identified through direct sales channels, nor are
those opportunities adequately pursued and hence, sales are lost to competition or
customer needs are left unsatisfied. In the increasingly global economy, traditional direct
sales methods can run into significant obstacles, cultural and logistical, resulting from the
lack of a regional sales and fulfillment capability. Simply put, it is increasingly harder for
a single organization to have the required competencies and global reach to sell and
market to all potential customers for its offerings the world over.
As a convention throughout this paper, the words 'vendor' or 'producer' are used
interchangeably to refer to firms originating or producing an offering consisting of goods
and in some cases, goods and services. An 'offering' as it is used in this paper refers to
some good, service or combination of both offered for sale by a producer or vendor. The
offering could be a physical product such as a piece of telecommunications equipment or
a computer, software, or a service, or a bundle of any and all of the three. The defining
characteristic is that the vendor originates something that is sold to a market either
directly by the producer or vendor itself, or indirectly through a third party or
intermediary that represents the vendor's offering for sale to end customers either by
itself, or as part of a larger solution offered by the intermediary.
For many years companies that develop products or services for sale have turned
to indirect channels or intermediaries to market, sell, and sometimes service their
offerings. In some cases, these intermediaries are used as the exclusive channel to
market-that is the company only provides the offering itself and has no internal sales
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organization that interfaces directly with the customers purchasing and using the offering.
In other cases, intermediaries are used as augment to the producer's own sales efforts
which may include a direct sales force, a telesales force, an e-commerce capability, sales
through retail outlets (traditional and or online), or any combination thereof. Typically in
these "mixed" models, the intermediary channel partners are used to target specific
segments, a vertical market perhaps, or a geography which for any number of reasons the
producer does not feel is adequately covered by its organic marketing and sales efforts.
In addition, the utilization of intermediary channels is typically made through one
of two primary models: single- and two-tier. In the single-tier model, producers market
and sell directly to a number of intermediaries that interface with the end customer. In the
single-tier model, the producer retains responsibility for not only selling and marketing to
its intermediary partners, but also typically fulfillment of product if applicable.
In the two-tier model a specialized intermediary, called a distributor in some
industries, provides services to several different producers in marketing and selling their
offerings to a typically large number of other intermediaries that service end customers.
In the two-tier model, the distributor takes on some amount of the overhead of managing
the transactions with the customer-facing intermediaries including fulfillment and
carrying inventory for the producers. The distributor commands a fee for providing this
service to the producers utilizing its services, typically paid through a markup the
distributor adds when reselling the product to the downstream intermediaries. The
downstream intermediaries in turn add markup over their cost from distribution to the
price they charge the end-customer.
Different companies utilize these models differently: some utilize single-tier
exclusively, others are two-tier only, and a number have some mix, for example relying
on two-tier distribution for intermediaries below a threshold level of sales, and enabling
their largest and most strategic intermediaries to "deal direct" with the producer. Some
companies refer to this latter category of partners as "direct VARs" to reflect the fact that
they purchase directly from the manufacturer. There are many different variations on
these models in use today.
The customer-facing intermediaries regardless of whether they are operating
within a single- or two-tier model are of particular interest in this paper. These
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intermediaries are the "feet on the street" so to speak, which are acting as agents for the
producer of the offering in segments the firm has consciously decided not to pursue
through direct sales. These organizations are marketing, selling and often times providing
post-sales support of the producers offering. In the most simple of cases, the intermediary
is reselling the producer's offering and managing the proposal, sale, possibly the
financing, and delivery of that offering to the end customer, as-is. The intermediary
typically earns a small percentage of the sales price, effectively sharing the margin on the
sale of the offering with the producer as well as the distributor in the two-tier model.
Intermediaries must have some level of knowledge and competency with the
producer's offering to effectively position it and in most cases compare and contrast the
offering with similar offerings from other producers, but that is the extent of the value-
add over and above handling the execution of the transaction if that positioning results in
a sale. The relationship between the intermediary and the producer can be relatively
arms-length, provided some means for communicating the information for positioning,
competitive differentiation, etc. can be extended to the intermediary. This operating
model is particularly well suited to the two-tier model, where the distributor assists the
producer, serving as a point of aggregation for dissemination of sales and marketing
information and basic sales support to a large number of intermediaries. We are all
familiar with this type of intermediary, for example everyone has had the experience of
purchasing a name-brand product from a retailer. The clerk at the outlet making the sale
may or may not have any detailed knowledge of the offering beyond what is immediately
discernible. In many cases, the consumer enters the retail outlet relatively sure of what
they will purchase, and requires little or no human assistance in completing the
transaction. E-commerce has taken this type of sale to previously impossible levels of self
service.
In other cases, the intermediary is adding additional value by including services,
such as design and implementation and or integration of a total solution that includes the
offerings from one or more producers in combination with the services provided by the
intermediary. In the business-to-business space, the solution proposal is part of a larger
consulting engagement beginning with an examination of the underlying processes that
may eventually be automated by some system. The key point of differentiation from the
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first case above is that the intermediary is working with the end customer through various
phases including defining requirements as well as specifying a solution and selecting the
specific components of that solution from amongst the offerings of competitors and
complementors.
This type of intermediary may for example design a data network for a business,
determining what cabling needs to be installed, what network devices are required and
how they will be interconnected and configured, and the management software required
to manage the network system based on the customer's request for providing network
connectivity for a number of given users and devices that will reside on the network. The
design and selection of the producers' offerings, the features and functionalities utilized
to deliver the connectivity as well as the actual services performed are specified in the
intermediary's proposal which specifies in detail what and how the intermediary will
deliver the network connectivity specified in the customer's request for proposal.
The intermediary is typically invited to bid by the end customer because they
have the specialized knowledge and skills required to advise the customer on these and
related matters, and have established a highly favorable reputation locally or globally.
The customer has turned to the intermediary because they don't have the capability
internally or believe the intermediary can deliver the solution more cost effectively than
an internal organization. The customer may or may not have the knowledge internally to
fully evaluate the technical merits or the vendors utilized in the proposed solution-the
customer is putting a great deal of trust and confidence in the intermediary in this case.
Often times for the largest enterprises this trust emerges from a long relationship and
many engagements between the intermediary and the enterprise. The intermediary would
upon award of the business complete the activities above, delivering a functioning
network system while earning not only margin on the resale of the cabling and equipment
and software components, but also for the services required to plan, design, install, turn-
up and test the completed system which in many cases is a substantially greater portion of
the total margin on the sale of the solution.
In this second case where the intermediary is adding significant value in the
delivery of a more comprehensive solution to the end, a far greater level of knowledge
and competency with the offering or offerings from one or many producers integrated in
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the final solution delivered to the customer by the intermediary is required. In general,
businesses that utilize services provided by intermediaries are much larger enterprises so
the scale and scope of the opportunities tend to be significantly larger in terms of dollar
value. However, it is fairly evident that dealing with these types of intermediaries is
significantly different than that required in the simple resale case. These intermediaries
require not only intimate marketing, sales and technical knowledge of the producer's
offerings they represent-they must also be willing to stake their own reputation on the
offerings they propose to their customers. Accordingly, the challenges associated with
managing this type of intermediary are more numerous and complex, and it this type that
this paper will be focused on.
Just as all producers of offerings must compete for end-customer mind share;
those that utilize intermediated channels must compete for the mind share of the
intermediaries that are most capable of achieving the producer's sales goals. This often
entails competing directly for the best of the available intermediaries in each market.
Competition for mind-share within the channel is fierce in high technology where there is
a well-defined upper bound on the number of offerings a single intermediary can
represent. For obvious reasons, it is impossible for the practitioners of the intermediary
firms that perform the planning, design, integration and operation value-add services to
be intimately familiar with the full array of competing offerings from any number of
firms that provide the same or similar functionality. Brand recognition within the
customer base cannot be discounted, which is often blind to the technical merits, features
or even cost-effectiveness of a given offering, but technical competency goes hand in
hand-simply put, an intermediary cannot effectively position, differentiate and
implement an offering its technicians aren't fully comfortable with, regardless of its
technical merits or cost effectiveness. All too often in practice, technical personnel
employed by intermediaries just like consumers choose what they know time and again,
not because it is the best choice at that point in time, but because it is most familiar.
Remember the old saying popularized in the glory days of mainframe computing: "no
one ever got fired for choosing IBM..."
Similarly, the power of brand awareness the manufacturer achieves and maintains
is omnipresent when it comes to attracting and retaining the best intermediaries. Firms in
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the business of delivering solutions are very sensitive to the power of the brands they
choose to incorporate in their offerings. "Selling uphill" is a term often used in the
industry to refer to the positioning and sales efforts by intermediary channels of products
in the absence of brand recognition and effective demand generation efforts by the
manufacturer. As will be explored in this paper, manufacturers that rely on intermediaries
to sell uphill are often unsuccessful in their attempts to utilize intermediated channels.
Many intermediaries will strive to minimize including components in their solutions from
manufacturers with little brand equity and in the absence of demand by their end
consumers. Significant brand awareness and demand generation activities by the
manufacturer are required when using intermediated channels, likely more so than in
direct selling scenarios.
With the establishment of industry standards, and the emergence of de facto
standards many high tech market segments are converging around an increasingly smaller
set of technologies, and complexity is decreasing at an ever increasing rate. As this
convergence occurs and the number of potential solutions to customer needs begin to
decrease, consolidation and the slow march toward commoditization occurs. In an effort
to combat commoditization, vendors often rapidly increase the pace of incremental
innovation and product development cycles and efforts to reinforce their points of
differentiation and uniqueness of their value propositions. As competing offerings from
different producers become increasingly similar, with functionality and feature set
increasingly homogenized through standards and other factors, the ability of
manufacturers to differentiate on uniqueness becomes increasingly more difficult. Prices
begin to converge, and the differences between similar offerings from different producers
become hard for their designers to discern, let alone an engineer or consultant employed
by a channel partner. The flow of new product announcements and positioning materials
from multiple manufacturers can be overwhelming, particularly when the practitioner is
well aware that the technology is maturing, complexity is diminishing and more and more
entrants are offering lower-cost alternatives. Often intermediaries chose to focus on a
smaller number of manufacturers as the technology matures, offering distinct advantages
for the manufacturers that move to intermediated channels first and are able to establish a
long and loyal relationship with the most desirable partners.
12
Through this brief discussion of intermediated channels, it can be seen that the
management of this type of sales channels can be significantly different and often times
significantly more complex than managing a direct sales effort. Increasingly channels
management for high technology firms is viewed as requiring specific competencies and
experience. In the past, many firms attempted the transition to the use of intermediated
channel sales by repurposing their existing direct sales and marketing personnel and
infrastructure to the indirect model and supporting intermediaries. Increasingly however a
new approach including the utilization of specialized channel management personnel and
new infrastructures purpose-built for support of intermediated channels is being pursued
by the firms considered to have best-in-class practices and capabilities.
The enterprise data communications equipment segment of the
telecommunications industry provides the student of intermediated channels an
interesting example for examining in detail how different strategies and tactics in key
areas of their channel programs were employed by the different vendors in this space.
How the companies competing in this market implemented practices and processes in
these key areas and the impact differences had on the effectiveness of the channel
program, which arguably can be measured effectively the metrics of worldwide market
share for targeted product segments and operating margins. Eventually the effectiveness
of any sales effort is measured by these metrics, and every publicly held manufacturer of
enterprise data communications solutions has at some point in its history utilized
intermediated channels as a primary element of its go-to-market strategy. However as we
will see through the thesis, there are often vast shortfalls in sales productivity and
profitability expectations envisioned for the utilization of intermediated channels, and
what is actually achieved in practice. The purpose of this thesis is to explore in depth how
the evolution of the data communications industry as a whole, the evolution of specific
companies within that industry, and differences in their intermediated channel
management practices led to vastly different results in global sales, profitability and
growth of these organizations.
The thesis will summarize briefly the evolution of the enterprise data
communications equipment industry and the development of the channel strategies of two
companies, Cisco Systems, Inc. and Cabletron Systems, Inc. which eventually competed
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head-to-head for share in this market. The thesis will provide an examination of two
interrelated aspects of intermediated channel management, using the data
communications industry and Cisco and Cabletron as specific examples. The two central
questions of intermediated channel management practice to be explored in the paper are 1.
What are the different approaches to the establishment and management of the
relationship between the firm and its intermediated channels, and 2. How has technology
been employed by vendors to enable intermediated channels, to achieve mindshare with
the partners' practitioners and to create virtual integration between the vendor and
intermediated channel? In the process of examining these key areas of intermediated
channels management several other aspects of intermediated channel management by
high technology firms will be explored including the importance of building brand
awareness and its impact on the successful use of intermediated channels. How the use of
intermediated channels is impacted as industries evolve beyond the takeoff stage and into
maturity is also examined. The enterprise data communications industry again provides
an interesting market to study as industry standardization has resulted in a rather
accelerated evolution of the products toward commodity status. How channel
management evolves in the presence of commoditization is a topic to be treated
throughout the paper.
These central questions are very important in the development of a channel
management strategy and its subsequent execution by vendors of high technology
offerings that chose to employ intermediated channels in their go-to-market strategies.
Certainly the management of the execution of a direct sales effort can be a daunting task
in the high technology arena where innovation is rapid and the offerings often technically
complex. However, the additional degrees of separation that exist in the multi-channel
model, the fact that the sales effort is being entrusted in whole or in part to a third-party
over which the vendor can exert limited control, significantly increases the complexity
and level of effort required to effectively and economically manage these efforts and is
fundamentally different. Through the efforts of researching this paper to determine what
the different approaches have been and their associated results, additional insight should
be provided to readers practicing intermediated channels management in high technology,
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and other similar segments of the economy where intermediated channels are used to add
value to the manufacturers offerings.
This thorough examination of these selected elements of intermediated channels
management in the enterprise data communications equipment segment should provide
the student of channels management with several important lessons from the history of
this very exciting high technology market. It is the hope of the author that the reader will
also be left with the conclusion that effective management of intermediated channels was
undoubtedly one of the many areas of execution excellence and core competency that
Cisco Systems utilized to attain domination of a large, complex and to date, highly
profitable market segments. Additionally, there are many characteristics of the data
communications equipment industry such as open standards, heterogeneity in different
market segments and fierce rivalry among competitors that is increasingly the norm.
Through the examination provided by this paper it is hoped that readers are able to take
away useful strategies and tactics for planning their own intermediated channel programs.
A Note to Readers Regarding the Appendices
There are several key attributes of the evolution of the enterprise data
communications market, such as the establishment of open, published standards and the
transition from the mainframe and minicomputer infrastructures to the disruptive
innovation represented by networked PC and client-server infrastructures. The two
appendices included at the end of the thesis beginning on page 146 provide useful
additional context for the reader not familiar with the industry and market.
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Chapter 2: The Strategic Challenges and Complexities of
Intermediated Channels Management
Chapter Introduction
As the introduction stated, the management of intermediated channels is by its
very nature significantly more complex than the management of direct channels which
are under the direct, internal control of the firm. This chapter outlines several of the
major strategic and tactical issues associated with managing intermediated channels both
in general and for the high-technology manufacturer in particular. The purpose of the
chapter is to provide the reader with a more in-depth understanding of the issues posed by
firms expanding their go-to-market strategies to include intermediated channels. The
contents of this chapter are provided in order to set the stage for the focused examination
of the specific intermediated channel management topics provided in the later chapters of
the thesis.
Change Management Complexities
Many high-technology companies with disruptive and or complex offerings often
begin with a direct sales force as the primary component of their initial go-to-market
strategies. Understanding that many high technology startups have founders with a strong
sales background, often times the culture of high technology startups has a strong
emphasis on selling. Particularly for disruptive innovations, first-mover firms have little
choice but to initially utilize a direct sales force, at least until a critical mass of customers
is established and intermediated channels with the necessary competencies eventually
become an option. Existing intermediaries in the general market are typically going to
wait until the market opportunity is established to some degree before adopting disruptive
innovations. At the high end, these intermediaries' reputations are often based on
cautious evaluation and rigorous system-level testing and validation before embedding
new offerings in their solutions.
The firms developing new and potentially disruptive innovations typically first
bring their offerings to the market themselves, fielding typically small teams that often
work autonomously to identify and pursue potential sales opportunities. The early sales
efforts of these companies often take on mythological proportions and are compared to
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small, elite military unit operations due to their reputation for being able to infiltrate and
"take-down" carefully studied potential targets. They are in essence the force that gives
these new entities or new product lines life by proving the offering does in fact address an
unmet need in the marketplace. This is often accompanied by a feeling of ownership of
the hard-won accounts by the sales teams involved, and the relationships that develop
with the decision makers within these accounts held dear to the individual sales people.
The initial customer base for a high technology firm with a novel offering is
drawn from target customers that are known to be the innovators within the target market.
That is, they are willing to try and buy the offering with only limited assistance and
support from the manufacturer, often without a well-developed solutions-oriented value
proposition and rich service offerings available to complement the offering.
Whatever expertise the elite field units involved in initial field sales activities
don't have in their repertoire required to effectively close the first-wave customers, they
have virtually unlimited authority to call in "air support" from headquarters to close
business. They can draw resources from wherever they reside (e.g., the executive team
and investors, design engineering, product management, etc.). In essence for
entrepreneurial firms and large firms that bring a disruptive innovation to market, it is
basically an "all hands on deck" effort to facilitate initial customer adoption and diffusion
of a positive reputation for the company and the offering in gaining early traction and
momentum in the market place. Rapid success and the resulting exponential growth in
sales as adoption of the offering when the addressable market is very broad are both a
blessing and a curse. Amongst many of the difficulties faced by rapidly growing firms is
the need to scale the sales effort, often rapidly. In some markets there is no choice but to
develop a post-sales support force internally to facilitate early adoption in the target
markets. As will be outlined later in the thesis, a large internal post-sales support or
service arm can become a significant obstacle to an intermediated channel strategy as this
organizational capability of a manufacturer can be viewed as a source of conflict by
potential intermediaries.
Inherent limitations to scaling a direct sales force are somewhat intuitively
obvious. For an offering that has a compelling value proposition and addresses an unmet
need in the market, it is quite difficult to get in front of every potential customer with that
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unmet need and the capacity to pay. This is especially the case when the offering and
value proposition is complex and requires careful positioning with customers and sales
cycles are long. In addition, there are also some not-so-obvious implications regarding
the diffusion of the disruptive innovation into the segments beyond the innovator and
initial early adopter segments which are often accompanied in high technology with the
need to evolve the value proposition from point-product features and functionalities,
advantages and customer benefits in a stand-alone model, to positioning it as part of a
complete solution in order to attract customers in the late majority and laggard categories.
It is not only a matter of positioning and selling, often some amount of post-sales service
is required to be bundled with the offering for many customers to even consider adoption.
Unlike the technology-savvy innovators that have the competencies required to design an
implement the solution, the later adopters often turn to the manufacturer or its
representative to assist.
This is very difficult for manufacturers of the offering to do comprehensively on
their own. Understanding that the focus of the organization was primarily on
engineering-proving the technology and building the offering in a cost effective way
then aggressively positioning their offering in the market to get share for the offering,
evolving to thinking about what may likely be a multiple technology, multiple vendor
solution is exceedingly hard if not impossible for most manufacturers. Placing the
competencies aside for a moment, it is also rarely the case that the manufacturer can
assemble the resources required to provide solutions to all potential customers profitably.
In many cases it makes the most sense for the manufacturer to create a solutions
capability for servicing only the largest, most strategic customers which may be serviced
profitably by an internal organization. For many astute growth firms, the realization that
intermediated channels may be a potential solution for both scaling the sales force and
getting the firms offering included in more complete solutions become obvious early in
the development of the firm.
Many high technology markets today, particularly those dominated by open,
public standards, are characterized by demands from potential customers beyond the
innovators to provide not only solutions, but so-called "best of breed" solutions to often
complex, business-driven needs. For the largest enterprises, the preferred method for
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acquiring best-of-breed solutions is through the consultation of a systems integrator or
consultant that professes to be "vendor-agnostic." These firms provide primarily value-
add services and utilize the offerings provided by the vendors of those offerings that
choose to utilize intermediated channels. These service firms position themselves as non-
biased advisors or consultants to the end customers. Although they have relationships
with manufacturers that facilitate the sourcing of their respective offerings, their interests
in positioning one vendor's offering over another's are not totally economic in nature.
Although they make a small margin on the offering that they resell as part of their
solution, those margins are not the primary driver in the choice. Instead the vendor
agnostic intermediary is relied upon to evaluate the merits of the available competing
offerings and chose the best match for the individual customer's requirements.
Manufacturers themselves are viewed for obvious reasons of self interest as being too
predisposed to their own offerings and the technologies implemented therein. Not to
mention many firms take into consideration the phenomenon documented in Clayton
Christensen's book The Innovator's Dilemma among other sources that makes the
argument that even the most innovative firms in the current technology are rarely able to
correctly identify the next disruption in their own markets.' Seeking out companies that
are not necessarily tied to a technology or specific offerings are presumably better able
to design solutions that are truly best-of-breed continually evolving those solutions as
new innovations come to market, regardless of source. Working with service firms that
are vendor-agnostic provides customers not only with the value add services to
complement the offering, but assist in the selection of the best-of-breed components that
provide the most complete solution for the customer. Lastly, many high technology
systems today are by nature multi-vendor. Sourcing a multi-vendor solution can be very
resource intensive and when problems emerge can resultant in finger pointing by the
various constituencies. Intermediaries in information technology and other high
technology segments provide a valuable service for customers by providing the required
assembly of the components of the solution, and more importantly stand behind the
system as whole, effectively providing the customer with "one throat to choke" should
issues with the system arise.
J Christensen, C. (1997). The Innovator's Dilemma. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
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Scaling and the sales effort and providing the value-add services required by
increasingly more demanding customers as the firm grows motivates the decision to
consider adding intermediated channels to the firm's sales mix. One of the most
significant issues posed by employment of intermediated channels is management of the
change itself, to gain acceptance throughout the organization required to support multi-
channel sales operations. Employment of intermediated channels is an outsourcing
decision and is often accompanied with the fear, uncertainty and doubt from within the
organization typically associated with outsourcing. In the case of the implementation of
an intermediated channel strategy, potential concern certainly within the sales function
but potentially extending into customer service and marketing as well is likely and should
be planned for. The potential for policy resistance, both covert and overt is very high. In
the case of firms that have had significant success in the marketplace with direct sales, it
is an exceedingly hard to get the entire organization "into the boat and rowing in the same
direction." This is essential to success with intermediated channels as will be described
throughout the paper, but effecting this change within the culture of an organization can
be exceedingly difficult to manage for the executive leadership of most firms. Like any
major organizational change, the successful execution of an intermediated channel
strategy requires the steadfast commitment of the entire leadership team, especially by
the CEO and senior sales executive to prevent the organization from falling into the trap
of constant evaluation of the potential downsides associated with intermediated channels
and keep the organization focused on implementation and execution of the strategy.
As will be illustrated in the paper, rarely is an intermediated channel strategy
outlined completely upon the decision to included intermediaries, and then simply
implemented and not evolved over time as the offerings, markets and competitive
landscape mature and change. Companies that successfully transition to an intermediated
sales channel find that the program evolves significantly over time, and is constantly
refined and tuned to fit with developments in the market. However, the underlying
principle that the company has made the decision that it is in its best interest to seek out
partners in its go-to-market strategy, and willingness to share in its success is crucial and
must be constantly communicated to intermediaries as major changes are made.
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The Agency Issue
Probably the most onerous strategic issue posed by the employment of
intermediated channels is the relationship between the manufacturer and its intermediary
partners. Agency theory provides a framework for understanding the relationships that
are extremely common in business and other settings in which one party (the principal)
delegates work to another party (the agent) that undertakes that work.2 Clearly this is
precisely the relationship that is entered between manufacturers and intermediaries,
particularly high-end intermediaries in information technology and other high technology
markets. From the perspective of the manufacturer, effectively it is delegating to the
intermediary much if not all of the work associated with selling and supporting its
solution to the customers which the manufacturer will no longer service directly. In effect
it is relying almost totally on the intermediary as its agent to orchestrate much of the
customer experience which may require the intermediary to service the customer over
multiple years for many high technology durables. Unlike in many other industries where
the interaction between the intermediary and customer is limited to a simple transaction
lasting but a few moments, in high technology the intermediary may be the
manufacturer's agent for a set of customers for years. Two problems are associated with
agency reflecting the conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information that are
clearly characteristics of the manufacturer-intermediary relationship: adverse selection
and moral hazard. Adverse selection defines the problem that the principal has in
determining if the agent accurately represents its ability to perform the functions (e.g.,
sales and service of the offering, striving for high levels of customer satisfaction,
protection of the manufacturer's brand equity, etc.) for which it is being compensated.
Moral hazard is the condition under which the principal cannot be sure the agent has put
forth maximal effort. Both problems in the context of the relationship between high
technology manufacturers and their intermediaries are described below.
Adverse selection is a difficult problem to overcome for the high technology
manufacturer selecting intermediaries. Although many of the aspects of a potential
intermediary's ability to sell and service the offering such as the intermediary firms'
2 Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985, February). Control: Organizational and economic approaches. Management
Science, 31, 134-149.
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infrastructure, credit worthiness, customer list, size of and location of technical staff,
training and certifications, etc. can be vetted and then specified in the contract governing
the relationship and monitored, many simply cannot. Recall from the discussion in the
first chapter that the level of service provided by intermediaries does vary along a
continuum, from basic fulfillment only (e.g., handling the sales transaction, delivery and
collection) on the one end, to adding significant value to the offering from the
manufacturer through embedding that offering in a solution that effectively addresses
customer problems at the other end of the continuum. In the short term, the manufacturer
may be in fact selecting intermediaries simply in order to scale the sales effort rapidly in
order to reach as large an addressable market as possible. However for reasons outlined
above and revisited throughout the paper, an intermediated channel strategy often evolves
over time as customer adoption requirements shift with the effort to sell to increasingly
demanding potential customers, and as commoditization makes competing on uniqueness
and technical merits of the offering more difficult in markets dominated by open, public
standards. Selecting intermediaries that do in fact have the competency and ability to
perform what they claim to can be difficult, selecting those that will mature and not only
protect the brand but enhance it by adding significant value can be a difficult strategic
issue posed by adding intermediated channels to the sales mix.
Similarly the moral hazard issue is also a primary concern for manufacturers.
Many intermediaries will establish relationships with one or more direct competitors with
equivalent functionality. One of the key value propositions for the firms that provide
high-end systems integration and consulting services in information technology for
example, is that they represent multiple manufacturers and have a certain degree of
technology and vendor agnosticism as described previously in this chapter. Their
solutions pitches are predicated on the fact that as a neutral solutions company, they look
to multiple technologies and vendors to develop "best-of-breed" solutions, custom
tailored to the individual needs of their clients.
Manufacturers that utilize these firms have a moral hazard problem that is
difficult to overcome through the mechanisms often employed to combat such hazards in
other similar relationships. The manufacturer must evaluate constantly if its
intermediaries are in fact putting the maximal effort into positioning their offering as part
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of their solution in their most strategic accounts. Does the intermediary do what is
expedient for their firm or do they in fact act in the manufacturer's best interest? If in any
given opportunity, the intermediary's proposal raises an objection from a critical decision
maker at the account that is potentially biased about the choice of one vendor over
another for a part of the proposed solution, does the intermediary stick to their original
proposal which presumably was the best choice for the solution, or opt for expediency
and make a last minute substitution (assuming of course there is a relationship and that is
feasible)? In the case where the intermediary's competitor may have already proposed the
offering of the manufacturer's competitor in their original proposal, does the intermediary
make the maximal effort to win the account with its original proposal and vendor
choices? This is practically impossible to manage on a case-by-case basis for every
opportunity, and unlike a direct sales force very hard to combat via direct incentives
without creating a conflict of interest concern.
Similarly for manufacturers that have very solid brand equity and market share or
a potentially disruptive product, there is a high probability of attracting free riding-
attaining an intermediary channel relationship with the manufacturer and simply "passing
the paper" on targets of opportunity customers buying on brand awareness primarily.
Free riders potentially consume resources of the manufacturer and can do damage to the
brand and result in street price erosion which impacts the profitability of the
manufacturer. Mechanisms such as including contractual training and certification
requirements and limiting access to the more complex products can help in combating
free riding but it cannot be eliminated entirely. Some amount of monitoring in the field
by the remaining direct sales force and channel management personnel are required to
identify and deal appropriately with potential free riders.
One of the solutions that have been applied to other very similar circumstances
that result in adverse selection and moral hazard is to tie compensation of the agent to the
profits of the firm. The provision of ownership rights reduces some of the incentives for
agents associated with adverse selection and moral hazard since it ties agent remuneration
to performance, often how much sales volume is generated. However, that is clearly not
the complete answer to solving these problems in the management of intermediated
channels especially when the intermediary is purportedly vendor agnostic. Unlike a
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franchisee who is not viewed by the customer as being unbiased and therefore not
conflicted in directly sharing in the success of the franchisor, the intermediary positioning
it's solutions as vendor agnostic and best-of-breed must be able to maintain at least a
perception amongst its customers that they will not directly benefit from the success of
any one vendor. The vendor-agnostic solution providers propose their solutions in theory
based on what is the best solution for the customer-not because they stand to make
more money if they sell more of vendor A than its direct competitor vendor B.
However as will be illustrated later in the paper this is not entirely the case in
practice-many manufacturers design intermediated channel programs provide direct
incentives such as volume-based discounting to their intermediaries early in the transition
to intermediated channels when the manufacturer may be attempting to attract as many
intermediaries as possible in an attempt to capture market share.3 Different tiers of
intermediary partner certification are designed with the primary criteria for the higher
levels providing intermediaries with the best discounts based on sales volume of the
manufacturer's offerings. As the market evolves however and customers begin
demanding more comprehensive solutions offerings, the rules of the program can be
changed from volume-based criteria to other more qualitative criteria such as technical
training and certifications held by the intermediary, customer satisfaction level, etc.
Shifting the criteria in this manner often provides the manufacturer with the ability to cull
its intermediary base as the market begins to mature and the potential for price
competition amongst its intermediaries accelerating commoditization of its offerings. An
outstanding example of just such an evolution is provided by the case study of Cisco
Systems later in the thesis.
3 It should be noted that these volume-based incentives for intermediaries are often not in plain view of the
market. Manufacturers typically only publish their list or suggested retail price publicly, and as is the case
in many markets with intermediaries between the manufacturer and the end customer, no customer pays
MSRP. The automobile market in the US is a good example. In the data communications equipment
market as another example, the mechanism behind intermediary pricing is fairly straightforward: the
manufacturers agree to provide equipment to intermediated channel partners that buy direct at a set
discount off the manufacturer list price of each SKU which can and does often change with sales volume,
and can be deal-specific in some cases. Intermediaries earn their margin on the resale of the manufacturers
offering via a markup added to their cost of acquiring the equipment from the vendor. The customer is
quoted a "street price" for the equipment in the intermediaries' proposal often at a significant discount off
the manufacturer's list price-how those prices are arrived at is typically a "black box" process for
customers, as is the prevalence of volume-based discounting by manufacturers to their channel partners.
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Potential for Shifts in Market Power
In addition to the agency problems, the manufacturer employing intermediated
channels faces the potential of market power shifting from the manufacturer to the
intermediaries. As aggregators of demand for the manufacturer relying heavily on the
intermediated channel, there is a potential for the intermediary to accumulate power in
the market as it matures. The shift in market power can result in the intermediary having
significantly more bargaining power with the manufacturer in terms of pricing and other
terms and conditions of the relationship. As has been shown in the case of Intel, in high
technology markets there is the potential for the technology leader (real or created
through brand and dominant market share) to counter these forces. Companies have to be
keenly attentive to ensuring that their branding efforts, such as "Intel Inside" are effective
in ensuring that the although the offering may be incorporated in a system or solution, the
end consumer still recognizes the underlying components utilized in that solution. Such
recognition and demand by the customer for specific components is important for
obvious reasons. Whether or not the customer fully grasps the contribution individual
components are making relative to the entire solution, the fact that they request it by
name prevents the intermediary from gaining too much power. Like in so many situations,
huge brand equity and dominating market share can counteract many other forces.
For the manufacturer not endowed with brand equity and requests by customers
for inclusion of its offerings in solutions, preventing the shift in market power can be
more complex. In high technology there are other mechanisms that can be used to build
dependencies on the manufacturer that counteract these forces. Notably the value-add
provided by the manufacturer's technical support, extremely high levels of quality, or the
tools that the manufacturer provides that become embedded in the intermediaries
processes. The manufacturer always retains the right to withhold support to the
intermediary that tries to exercise its market power. The presence of the factors
enumerated above creates a potential switching cost for the intermediary should the
relationship with a manufacturer be terminated.
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Identifying and Recruiting Intermediaries: Competing for "Shelf-
space"
In retail channels such as consumer goods manufacturers compete with the direct
competitors for "shelf-space" at the retailers. The parallel construct in high-technology
intermediaries is "mind-share." High technology manufacturers compete for being top-of-
mind with the customer-facing personnel of their intermediaries to ensure that the
customer-facing personnel position their offering in as many opportunities as possible. In
retail, the intermediary is simply providing the end customer with the opportunity to
easily purchase the goods self-selected from amongst an assortment of competitor's
offerings. In the high technology space, the intermediary in many cases is assisting the
end customer not only purchase, but in addition is assisting the customer in its selection
amongst competing technologies and manufacturers as part of the pre-sales service
components of the solution. The intermediary then services the solution on the customer
premises from installation to obsolescence, often through multiple generations of
technology. To get "shelf space," to provide critical components of a high-end
intermediaries solutions is a far more difficult undertaking for manufacturers who follow
their primary competitors into the intermediated channels. Displacing a competitor that
has had a long standing relationship with the intermediated channel is difficult to do,
more so in the later stages of market maturity when offerings are harder to differentiate.
This strategic issue again is well demonstrated in the case studies provided later in the
thesis.
Closely related to the agency relationship issue outlined earlier in the chapter, it is
clearly in the best interest of the manufacturer to strive to build competencies in
identifying and recruiting the intermediaries that are best able to meet the goals of
providing scale and value-added services to the offering as the market evolves.
Manufacturers must compete not only for end customers but also for the most capable
intermediaries servicing the marketplace. The high-end intermediaries such as systems
integrators and consultants carefully and thoroughly evaluate offerings based on the
potential to add value to those offerings in delivering solutions. For the high-end
intermediaries, their primary competitive advantage is not achieved from the
authorization to resell a number of manufacturers' offering; rather it is achieved through
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the ability to differentiate themselves from their direct competitors via the features,
advantages and benefits of their complete solution. As the technology and offerings
commoditize, and there become multiple avenues for customers to acquire the
components, the manufacturer, through its intermediaries has to minimize competition
based on the average selling price of the offerings which could obviously accelerate the
commoditization process. The more the offering itself and the manufacturer's
commitment to assist its intermediaries in designing and delivering innovative,
differentiable solutions, the more attractive the manufacturer is to high-end
intermediaries.
Intermediaries are also often concerned somewhat with the extent to which the
manufacturer may already have relationships with other firms that intermediary considers
to be its direct competitors. The level of distribution the manufacturer has in the
marketplace already can be a concern in the early stages of evolution of a market. This
concern can be offset to some degree by the ability of the intermediary to wrap services
around the offering to differentiate itself by providing better solutions to customers. This
is the ideal for the manufacturer; some level of competition in the market amongst its
intermediaries is healthy as the market matures as it results in market forces solving the
adverse selection issue raised earlier in the chapter. Just as there is likely to be some
shakeout in the manufacturers, so to will there be in the intermediated channels in the
market. Intermediaries that don't develop the skills and capabilities enabling them to
deliver value-add services are unable to compete. Manufacturers can accelerate this
process by shifting the underlying structure of their intermediated channel program from
incentivizing volume, to incentivizing the intermediary for gaining and maintaining
qualifications, capabilities and customer satisfaction as the objectives of its program shift
from intermediaries providing basic fulfillment to providing true value-add solutions
around the offering.
Beyond these characteristics, intermediaries also pay particular attention to the
basic design of the channel program offered by the manufacturer. One function of the
channel management organization is the definition of the channel program(s), terms and
conditions normally captured in the partnership agreement. The following is a list of
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some of the basic terms and conditions typically captured in these agreements address the
following:
· The specific offerings the manufacturer makes available to the channel (all or
some subset) and how well suited those offerings are to being bundled with the
services the intermediary takes to market.
* What various levels of training and certification are required and for which
products
* Sales volume commitments-how much dollar-volume of committed sales of the
manufacturer's offering is required to attain registration if any
* The discounts provided to the intermediary for purchase of the manufacturer's
offerings which determine margin available to the intermediary on resale of the
offerings.
* Resources the manufacturer provides (e.g., access to online tools, expedited
technical support, joint marketing activities, product return procedures, etc.) to
support the intermediary.
Intermediaries often carefully evaluate and perform additional due diligence on
the following additional critical components of the manufacturer's approach to
intermediated channels:
· How clearly articulated is the manufacturer's strategy for the employment of
intermediated channels, at what level is the company publicly committed? How
consistent has the manufacturer been, and what has its track record been in the
marketplace?
* Does the manufacturer have its own service force, what are the potentials for
conflict between it and intermediaries?
* How much brand equity does the manufacturer have in the target markets? Does
demand already exist, or will this offering have to be sold uphill?
* What is the readiness of the technical staff of the intermediary to support the
manufacturers offering? Can their existing training, certification and experience
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be leveraged or will they need new technical training and certifications? How
widely is that training available, can it be delivered online or through other media
that prevents pulling limited resources off of customer engagements
* What is the readiness of the sales staff to support the new offering? Can they be
trained easily and without impacting their productivity?
* What has the manufacturer done to simplify supporting the offering in the field in
relation to its competitors? Are their potential cost savings for ongoing support of
our solutions enabled by using this offering?
* How easy is it to do business with this manufacturer? Are their systems and tools
going to save time and effort for our staff in preparing quotations, placing and
tracking orders, making payments, etc? Are those tools easily accessible from a
standard laptop or PDA or do they require an investment in new software or
infrastructure in order to integrate with their systems?
* What level of support will the manufacturer provide it intermediaries in the field?
What kind of demand generation activities do the direct sales force and channel
management teams perform on behalf of intermediaries? Are they available to
help close business, assist onsite with technical issues and conduct informal
training in the field?
* If the manufacturer is going to maintain a direct sales force, what are the rules of
engagement between the direct sales force and the intermediaries at various
levels'? How potential conflicts between the two are resolved, and at what level is
the decision made? Are incentives in place to induce the direct sales force to work
closely with the intermediated channel partners?
* Does the manufacturer have an offering roadmap and a reputation in the industry
for driving innovation and frequently refreshing the product line? Is there a
pipeline of new offerings into the future that enable the intermediary to position
frequent technology refreshes, with requisite services that enable continued
opportunities for future revenues from accounts the firm has invested time and
energy into winning and retaining.
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· What is the return on investment the intermediary will have to make to develop its
internal capabilities and competencies to sell and service the manufacturers
offering, do business with the manufacturer and maintain the relationship?
* What is the level of maturity of the quality systems of the manufacturer? Does the
manufacturer have a reputation for high-quality offerings in the field?
Just as there are differences among customer groups in terms of their propensity
to adopt innovative offerings at different points in the offerings life cycle, intermediaries
have varying degrees of internal technical competencies to evaluate offerings and varying
levels of willingness to adopt new technologies and offerings. What manufacturers have a
tendency to overlook in practice is that the value proposition varies somewhat
significantly for the end customer and the potential intermediated channel partner. The
potential customers of an offering are typically concerned with solving their needs and
desires, costs of acquiring and operating the offering, and the return on their investment.
The potential intermediary partner is concerned with those aspects as well as how the
offering complements the value proposition of its own current solution offerings, or
potentially enables new compelling solutions with equally as appealing value
propositions to the intermediary's target customers. First and foremost, how is
establishing a relationship with a given manufacturer and incorporating its offerings into
the offerings of the intermediary going to make the intermediary firm better off in terms
of winning highly-profitable business and growing its customer base for solutions? Much
of that has to do with the value proposition of the solutions offered by the firm-what
existing or new problems faced by its customers can it solve better or with a better ROI
using the offerings of that manufacturer.
If nothing else the reader should be left with the conclusion that this issue of
intermediated channels management is not something that occurs naturally within an
organization, many of these aspects require careful consideration by the firm almost at
inception of a plan to utilize intermediated channels.
Marketing: Selling to and Through Intermediaries
First and foremost as will be stressed throughout the thesis, brand equity for the
manufacturer is one of the key strategic issues posed in the execution of an intermediated
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channel strategy. The intermediary that will evangelize a manufacturer's offering
previous to achievement of significant brand awareness is a rarity. Such intermediary
channels are typically reserved only for the number one, and sometimes number two
market share holders in an industry. Therefore one of the most important strategic
considerations for the company expanding its sales efforts into intermediated channels is
the creation of brand equity that the intermediary will rely on as "air cover" in the market.
The achievement of substantial brand equity and success in intermediated channels
however are often mutually reinforcing, however as outlined above intermediaries are
acutely sensitive to what brands are generating buzz in their target markets. Again, in
high technology companies branding and corporate marketing efforts are often assigned
low priorities early on and that can be a source of difficulties in making the transition to
intermediated channels. In the age of the Internet and the importance of word-of-mouth
awareness, companies need to dedicate some careful focus on the building of brand as
they consider expansion of the sales effort into intermediated channels.
The manufacturer's brand equity in the market place, as well as its market share is
an incredibly important aspect in the quest for intermediary mind share. Often it is as
much or more important for the manufacturer attempting to establish relationships with
the best intermediary partners to have good brand awareness and leading market share as
it is to have leading features and functionality-without the former it is hard in many
cases to get a leading intermediary to even conduct an evaluation to validate the
manufacturer's claims of the latter! It rarely happens that a Power Point presentation is
enough to convince a leading systems integrator or consulting firm of the technical value
proposition of an offering. By nature, the technical professionals of high-end technology
intermediaries are highly pragmatic. Typically it takes weeks or months of testing in the
intermediary's facility with their technical experts supported by the manufacturer's
experts to validate the value proposition. In determining what is best of breed,
intermediaries just like consumers have a tendency to give market share and brand
awareness very heavy weighting in their evaluations of potential offerings to include and
validate in their solutions for obvious reasons. Despite being agnostic to technology and
manufacturers, the reality is such that the number of potential offerings a given
intermediary can evaluate, train on, and stay current with is limited. Market share
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statistics are one rather straightforward way to create a prioritized list of potential
offerings to evaluate and manufacturers to seek relationships with the nature of its
resource constraints often lead to the intermediaries relying on brand as a proxy for
"best" product.
Selling to and through intermediaries requires different skills for the manufacturer
than selling directly to customers. This is another major strategic issue posed by the
employment intermediated channels that the manufacturer has to find channel-focused
marketing professionals that understand the differences and can create the processes,
programs and collateral necessary to market to and through its intermediaries. Often the
investment in channel-specific marketing can be substantial, and in many cases
manufacturers opt for repurposing existing collateral and programs for the channel, often
with less than optimal results. The best results are often attained by the manufacturer that
provides the resources to work with the intermediaries early on to provide targeted
jointly-developed marketing with its channel. The development of these competencies is
the domain of the executive charged with channel management who builds a staff that is
responsible for determining best potential partners, marketing to them and selling them
on the value proposition to signing with and actively working with the manufacturer,
recruiting those partners and maintaining the relationship over time through many high-
touch activities. Maintaining long-term relationships with intermediaries often provides
more opportunities for value creation over time for value-added solutions development.
In addition, joint marketing programs with intermediaries often provide a valuable
avenue for manufacturers to remain in tune with the market place. This information can
be channeled back to product development as input for the product roadmap, and also to
product marketing which can design bundles of equipment that can form the nucleus of a
solutions offering that can be promoted through intermediaries.
Channel Conflict and the Alignment of Incentives
Channel conflict is topic that comes up incessantly in the discussion of the
strategic challenges posed by intermediated channels management. There are several
potential sources of channel conflict that must be understood and planned for as part of
the overall channel strategy. As has been alluded to previously in this chapter at several
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points, channel conflict is not always a bad thing when it results in some competition
among intermediaries.
For firms transitioning from direct sales to a hybrid model, the first source of
channel conflict to be taken into account of course is the conflict between the direct sales
organization and the intermediaries. For reasons discussed later in the paper although it
seems that this can easily be handled through mechanisms such as "channel-neutral"
incentives, it is typically not that straightforward to solve, and can be a source of real
difficulties for companies trying to transition to increasing amounts of its business to the
channel. For reasons obvious that should be obvious to the reader, the direct sales force
often is reluctant to cede account control and resists transitioning existing and potentially
new accounts to intermediaries. This policy resistance can be detrimental to building the
trust with intermediated channel partners, and delays development of self reliance within
the intermediated channel base. In addition to aligning incentives for the direct sales force
so their compensation is the same regardless of whether business is done direct or
through a channel partner, the leadership of the company must do a number of things.
First it must be publicly supportive and provide reinforcement of the company's goals for
transitioning to intermediated channels both internally and externally. Clear rules of
engagement must be established and enforced for the determination of what customers
will remain direct and by what objective criteria. The sales person will look to see if the
company is "walking-the-talk" to ensure that the organization is taking the steps
necessary to build the infrastructure required to support a transition to intermediated
channels. Beyond concern about their compensation, sales people often care deeply about
their customers. They must be reassured that the transition of their customers to
intermediaries has the highest chance of success as measured by continued customer
satisfaction. If they perceive that the transition to intermediated channels is not being
backed up by the firm taking deliberate actions to carefully screen the intermediaries and
arm them with the tools and training to be successful in supporting customers, they will
resist and the transition to intermediated channels will be long and difficult for the firm.
Lastly the direct sales force has to be made to view intermediary channels as a partner in
the sales process, not another customer for the company. Specific steps have to be taken
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to ensure that the success of the company and the ability to sell through channels are
inextricably linked.
Another potential source of channel conflict is that which can occur if the
manufacturer maintains a significant service capability, particularly of the sort often
called "professional services," that provide services above and beyond those necessary to
provide technical support for the fielded offerings augmenting the first line of support
provided by the intermediary. Whether these service organizations are internal to the
manufacturer, or result in substantial investments by the manufacturer directly in third-
party firms that are essentially intermediary channel firms, raises concerns among
intermediaries about the manufacturer being conflicted. 4 Similarly to the first source of
channel conflict, steps have to be taken to define the rules of engagement of these
organizations as well, to ensure the intermediary base is clear on when these
organizations will be brought in by the manufacturer, effectively competing with them
for potential opportunities and reassured that it will be limited to only those
circumstances. A large, capable service organization with P&L responsibilities
essentially at the disposal of a direct sales force raises significant concern by potential
intermediary partners.
Lastly the issue of conflict between intermediaries themselves that can result in
the manufacturer becoming "over-distributed" in a segment of the market resulting in
many intermediaries competing for the same business, with the same offering at the core
of their solution. Different solutions can be brought to bear on this channel conflict
situation, often dependent on the stage of the evolution the intermediated channel
program is in at the time. If the primary objective is to build scale when the market is
immature and multiple competitors are in a land grab for market share, customer
demands for value add are relatively low, the manufacturer may pursue many
intermediaries in order to capture market share initially, then use the previously described
mechanisms to cull the intermediaries so that there are less, more capable intermediaries
working the same markets with similar offerings. Early on the manufacturer using this
4 However, as will be shown in the Cisco chapter, market leaders taking large positions in very high-end
intermediaries such as consultancies (in the case of Cisco, its 20 percent stake in KPMG Consulting in
1998 as an example) can often be overlooked as part of the building of the brand and excused by the rank
and file data communications intermediaries as often they were utilized as subcontractors by the
consultancies.
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strategy runs the risk of alienating the channel and potentially causing earlier erosion of
prices. Two levers can be used to control these potential negative effects however: very
strong brand that drives demand for the manufacturer's product, and close monitoring of
the market to determine when individual market segments are about to tip toward severe
over-distribution such that required action can be taken by the manufacturer before price
erosion begins to set in. Again, channel conflict can be good at times for manufacturers,
as it helps weed-out through natural market mechanisms free riders and low value-add
intermediaries that may be more likely to resort to price competition.
Communication across Firm Boundaries
Another strategic challenge posed by the move to intermediated channels is
potential loss of market information that traditionally comes from a large sales force.
Understanding that in high technology markets the manufacturer often retains a large
field force to support the intermediated channel, some market segments are turned over
completely to the intermediary. Developments in the marketplace and the actions of
competitors and other critical information that in the past may have flowed freely to and
from the field force now requires participation by third parties not in the direct control of
the manufacturer. This can be a hard challenge to overcome and required careful
consideration in determining both the people resources employed by the manufacturer in
the management of the channel program as well as the support infrastructure and
implementation of programs such as intermediary advisory panels and the like to ensure a
free flow of information to and from the field.
The manufacturer has to provide intermediaries with constant flow of information
about its products, its programs and other data. Personnel that need that information
within the intermediary organizations, the sales and technical personnel of the firm often
have limited cycles as they strive for highest amounts of customer-facing and chargeable
time. Information from manufacturers has to be delivered in a targeted manner, via a
number of optional channels both through face-to-face contact with the manufacturers
field force, as well as via electronic means. "Bench time" for the sales and technical
personnel of intermediary organizations is severely limited The manufacturer has to be
innovative and creative in compensating for the fact that a large portion of the people
who deliver the customer experience is no longer a captive audience.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter has attempted to outline for the reader many of the issues posed by
the implementation of an intermediated channel strategy. It is by no means an exhaustive
list. It does however provide the reader some context for the discussions presented in the
remaining chapters of the thesis outlining different approaches to management of
intermediated channels. Many of the issues outlined in this chapter are addressed directly
through the relationship management aspects of intermediated channels, or the support
infrastructure. These two areas of intermediated channel management are covered in
detail in the next two chapters of the thesis. In addition the material outlined in this
chapter is relevant to the detailed comparison and contrast of the execution of an
intermediated channel strategy of two companies in the enterprise data communications
equipment market. The discussion outlines in detail specific differences in the approach
taken by two companies targeting the same market and the same customers essentially.
The issues they faced, many outlined in detail in this chapter, were remarkably similar
however the management of these companies took very different approaches to
intermediated channel strategies.
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Chapter 3: Developing Multi-channel Management
Capability
Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter outlined many of the significant issues confronting the firm
considering the addition of intermediated channels to the sales mix. For the firm
transitioning from direct-only to a multi-channel model, there are a number of
competencies that must be developed across the company that accumulate in a multi-
channel management capability developed by the firm. A great deal of these
competencies is centered on the firm's ability to establish and maintain relationships with
intermediated channel partners. Often the relationship is greatly affected by how, why
and when intermediated channels become part of the go-to-market strategy of a given
manufacturer. The level of commitment and the willingness and ability of the company
to invest in development of multi-channel management capability is tied to the success of
the transformation effort and the goals the firm sets for sales through intermediated
channels. There are also many environmental and cultural influences on how and when a
given firm expands its go-to-market strategy through the employment of intermediated
channels. Among the most important are the state of the target markets, maturity of the
technologies embedded in the offerings and the pace of innovation, and the sales culture
that is predominant within the manufacturer at the time of transition. Ongoing
management of the relationship is important as well for companies that pursue so called
hybrid models in which some customers are still serviced by a direct sales force while
others are relegated to intermediaries. This chapter will outline several of the relationship
management aspects of the effective utilization of intermediated channels, and the
development of multi-channel management capabilities.
After outlining the many competencies that a firm must develop to achieve
multiple channel management capability, the discussion will shift toward an analysis of
the potential internal barriers to achieving the firm-wide competencies underlying the
capability. For firms that have a great deal of success through the effective use of the
direct sales channel, transitioning to the use of intermediaries can be a difficult process.
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Systems dynamics provides a very useful framework for analyzing the underlying
dynamics of the processes involved with a firm making the transition from direct sales to
multiple channels while continuing to achieve sales expectations. The causal loop
diagram presented in this section of the thesis builds upon a generalized process
improvement model to explore the potential sources of issues in making the transition,
and more importantly provides several insights on their root causes so that they may be
managed.
Multi-channel Management Capability as a Complementary
Asset
Throughout the thesis it has been emphasized that intermediated channels provide
a manufacturer with the ability to add scale to its sales efforts and provides a means for
providing value-add services alongside the offerings of the manufacturer. The addition of
value-add services is often required for the purposes of providing the solutions required
by a large number of potential customers, those customers not in the innovator and early
adopter categories. Developing the capability to manage multiple channels can be a
significant complementary asset for a firm competing in markets where open public
standards or other factors make it difficult to maintain uniqueness. MIT professor
Rebecca Henderson identifies two potential methods of capturing the value of effective
value creation, namely "uniqueness" and "complementary assets."' Professor Henderson
describes uniqueness as the most direct way to capture the value created by innovation is
to have no competition. This is achieved typically through strong IP protection. In
industries such as enterprise data communications equipment studied in this paper, the
fact that the underlying technologies were effectively available in public standards made
value capture through uniqueness almost impossible to sustain. The rate of spillover of
incremental innovations from one manufacturer to another was relatively high. This is not
uncommon in many areas of high technology today.
The other method of value capture, complementary assets, is described by
Professor Henderson in her writings and teachings as follows. Complementary assets of
the firm are the things that allow it to sell an offering at a reasonable return despite the
5 Henderson, R. (2005). "Making Money from Innovation," mimeo, Chapter 3 from Strategy and
Technology.
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fact that the offering itself is not unique.6 Effective utilization of multiple channels to
market, to include the employment of intermediated channels and a direct sales force can
meet this definition. As will be illustrated later in the thesis one firm has utilized multi-
channel management as an extremely effective complementary asset in its efforts to
dominate the enterprise data communications market. Through the effective use of
intermediated channels enabled through best-in-class multi-channel management
capability, the company has effectively increased the scale of its sales effort globally and
made available to its customers a rich set of complementary services such that its
offerings are appealing to a wide variety of customers. In the process they have taken
market share from their competitors while achieving superior margins, despite the
offerings themselves becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate as commoditization
occurs.
What is intensely interesting then is the following: if one firm can do it extremely
well, and the relationships with its intermediary partners are essentially voluntary and
non-exclusive, why are competitors unable to imitate and essentially coopt the
complementary asset? Through the research completed for the thesis there appears to be
several reasons that imitation and cooption of intermediated channels in a given market
segment is very hard. As will be described later in this chapter it can be difficult for a
firm to develop multi-channel capability and transition successfully from a single, direct
channel model. Another potential reason is increasing returns gained from significant
experience in utilizing intermediated channels.7 Clearly there are economies of scale and
scope that result from experience in managing multiple channels that accumulates in the
multi-channel management capability of the firm. Managing multiple channels
effectively is inherently more difficult than managing a single, direct sales channel. There
are significant learning curves involved and therefore accumulated experience may give
considerable advantage to the firm that develops the largest reliance on channels and the
capability to manage a large-scale multi-channel effort. "Economies of scale and scope
are at the root of many of the most potent tightly held complementary assets."8 Like
many other processes that a firm can develop such as manufacturing and other process
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6 Henderson.
7Henderson.
8 Henderson, page 10.
expertise, multi-channel management capability can become a tightly-held
complementary asset and a source of sustainable competitive advantage.
Building Multi-channel Management Capability
The process for developing multi-channel management capabilities required to
effectively utilize intermediated channels is not a matter of simply "flipping a switch"
and transforming the firm from selling direct to utilizing intermediated channels. This is
well documented through the research of the enterprise data communications equipment
market completed for this thesis. Chapters five and six of the thesis outline the transition
of two competing firms that had significantly different approaches to this process with
significantly different results, despite being in the same markets and targeting essentially
the same intermediaries. The following sections will outline some key issues regarding
the transition, and then go into specific competencies that must be developed by the firm
to build multi-channel management capability.
Timing Considerations
For high technology firms, the timing of when to pursue intermediated channel
relationships can be difficult. The readiness of the manufacturer's organization to support
intermediated channel sales, gained through the development of multi-channel
management capability as described in this chapter is a primary concern. In addition, the
readiness of the potential intermediaries' technical competencies and capabilities to add
value to the manufacturer's offerings, their reach and productivity must also be evaluated
before a manufacturer forays into sales though indirect channels. The direct sales force
often will find themselves competing in the market with potential intermediaries which
allows for direct observation of their capabilities. However, the firm must take deliberate
steps to have the sales organization look up from selling and objectively evaluate the
intermediaries they encounter in the market.
When there is rapid development of the capabilities and market reach of potential
intermediary firms in a market segment, manufacturers walk a fine line as they consider
whether or not to pursue a multi-channel model including intermediaries. Manufacturers
that choose to pursue primarily direct sales efforts as the potential intermediaries ramp-up,
eventually find themselves competing directly with intermediated channel firms, possibly
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those representing the offerings of their direct competitors that have already begun using
intermediaries. For manufacturers offering some level of services around their own
offerings via an internal service capability, continued competition with the intermediaries
in their space can be onerous. It is not uncommon for manufacturers pursuing a primarily
direct sales strategy to view the intermediaries operating in their space as direct
competitors. For obvious reasons, this can be a potential source of resistance from within
the organizations if at some point the manufacturer determines to pursue a multi-channel
strategy. If a manufacturer's sales force repeatedly finds itself in competition with a
particular intermediary the prospects for future relationship can be damaged irreparably
on both sides. If competitive situations between a manufacturer and intermediaries occur
frequently in multiple locations, that vendor can and will be deemed by the intermediary
channel community as "not channel friendly." The manufacturer's sales force on the
other hand regards the intermediaries they compete for business with directly as the
enemy if the intermediaries are reselling their direct competitor's offerings Once that
label is established in the mind of sales people; it is often very hard to reverse. This is a
potential source of policy resistance when the executive leadership makes the decision to
pursue a multi-channel strategy and seeks to add intermediaries to the sales mix.
The scenario described above can be seriously exacerbated by a vendor making
repeated aborted attempts to utilize intermediated channels before the firm is totally
committed, or ready to make the transition. In researching the companies in the data
communications equipment space, there are examples of firms that "tested the waters" so
tlo speak by partially rolling-out a channel program and engaging with one or more
intermediaries on customer opportunities, but as the deal closes the vendor's field sales
personnel "take the customer direct" and cut the intermediary out of the opportunity.
Similarly manufacturers may pursue relationships with intermediaries with capabilities at
both end of the continuum described earlier in the paper. Often it is incumbent upon the
manufacturer to de-conflict multiple intermediaries competing for a single opportunity.
1-ow the manufacturer approaches de-confliction is observed closely by the intermediated
channel. Through the research it became clear that a manufacturer's reputation for
consistency and its ability to deal fairly with channel conflict within the community of
intermediaries is very important and once damaged, hard to repair.
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That being said, it is probably best to be sure the organization is both committed
to multi-channel operations as well as at the adequate levels of readiness across the entire
company. Another common thread to the interviews conducted was the stress placed on
executive-level commitment to the addition of intermediated channels to the go-to-market
mix. This is clearly a strategic decision for organizations and the management of the
change has to extend to all levels of the organization, including embrace, steadfastness
and visionary leadership by the executive management throughout the transition.
What became clear in the research of the data communications equipment market
is that it can be difficult for firms that wait for a significant period of time to move to a
multi-channel strategy. Especially in cases where competitors that may have significant
market share in the target or closely adjacent markets move first, significant leads in
developing multi-channel management capability by one firm over its competitors are
highly probable. Moving to intermediated channels with a set of offerings that is very
similar to that of competitors that have well-established intermediary channel
relationships is significantly more difficult. It is often difficult to displace a competitor
with established intermediated channel relationships in part due to the fact that the
intermediaries have experience with the competitor's multi-channel management
capabilities. Unless there is an extremely compelling value proposition offered by the
new entrant, perhaps providing intermediaries with the ability to add new and
differentiable services and solutions, it can be very difficult to displace an incumbent.
Transitioning the Sales Force
It is often the case in firms introducing disruptive innovations that the direct sales
force has already taken the innovation and the company some distance up the adoption
curve, in effect becoming the driving force behind the early market successes. In the
process, the direct sales force has undoubtedly won countless competitive battles and
established strong relationships with the decision makers of organizations in the
innovator and early majority categories perhaps over the course of years. When success
has been achieved in the market, the direct sales force are arguably directly responsible
for that success and the growth of the firm to date, and many have been compensated
handsomely for these efforts. Accordingly there is often significant reluctance from the
direct sales force to the concept of utilizing intermediary firms in expanding the sales
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effort, despite the intuitive advantages of more "feet on the street" actively positioning
and supporting the firm's offering. The direct sales force often simply does not want to
give up the account control described above, not to mention the handsome compensation
they have earned in winning business to date.
The very best high technology sales people are often hyper-competitive and
focused on individual results and rewards that drive the early successes in taking a
disruptive innovation to market. Focus on individual goals and achievements are in fact
the characteristics that the successful high technology startup actively recruits in its first
direct sales personnel. These traits however often become significant obstacles to
overcome in making the transition to intermediated channels for many firms. Like many
other organizational changes, the firm making the decision to include intermediated
channels into the go-to-market strategy has to recognize this potential obstacle and plan
accordingly for it.
There are no clear cut answers to dealing with this part of the transition I found in
the research for this paper. The reality is that even in companies that are committed to
channels, there are typically some salespeople that never make the transition to the
intermediated channel model. As with any organizational change of a significant
magnitude, some people embrace it and adapt while others simply refuse and move on, or
worse remain with the organization and resist the transformation. In most organizations
there is the need for some direct sales executives to manage the accounts that are deemed
strategic and not transitioned to an intermediary. These opportunities though are limited.
In many of the interviews I had with practicing channel managers, pockets of resistance
to intermediated channels often remain in even the most effective channel companies.
These managers agreed that it is important to know where the pockets are and to work
around them as necessary while constantly reinforcing successes of the intermediated
channel partners.
Another aspect of transitioning the sales force that received a great deal of
discussion in the research interviews was sales force compensation as the transition to
intermediated channels is initiated. Many firms that pursue a multi-channel strategy,
maintaining some direct accounts while moving much of the business to the intermediary
channel will establish a '"joint" sales target per region. In order to reinforce the behavior
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of utilizing an intermediary as the primary mode of fulfillment, bringing the partner into
the opportunity early and allowing the intermediary to close and fulfill the business,
quota relief for the sales through the intermediary is the same as it is for a direct sale.
Despite there being more points of margin retained by the manufacturer for business that
is taken direct, the compensation for direct business is neutral for the manufacturer's
account executive. Often manufacturers will implement incentives to make doing
business through the channel more lucrative for the sales force, essentially paying the
sales force a bonus for utilizing intermediated channel partners.
Customer and Technical Support
A substantial part of the role of a direct sales force after the sale often includes
acting on the customer's behalf when interacting with the manufacturer's internal
organizations such as supply chain and technical support. In many cases, the level of
customer care provided by the field sales force is significant. The direct sales force can in
many cases compensate for the lack of well-defined processes and systems support and
other infrastructure that the manufacturer has yet to get into place. With a few well-
placed phone calls, the senior sales representative can solve many problems for their
customers often long before the customer even classifies something as a problem.
For the firm that has relied on these interventions by the field sales force,
transitioning customers to an intermediary organization that cannot avail itself to personal
relationships and networks with the internal organizations of the supplier, the level of
customer and technical support the customer has become accustomed to deteriorates
rapidly. Firms considering making the transition from direct sales to intermediaries have
to carefully review their processes and systems underlying their customer service and
technical support It is unreasonable to believe that a third-party, regardless of its level of
training and experience with the offering can make up for weaknesses in these highly
critical facets of the customer experience. Expecting the field force to continue to
intervene in these functions, relying on the intermediary to provide only basic fulfillment
defeats the goal of increasing scale by employing intermediated channels. Like many
aspects of multi-channel capability, the absence of these competencies-providing solid
customer service and technical support via the intermediary channel-can be a factor in
the field sales force resisting the transition. A sales executive being called upon to
44
parachute in and solve customer service and technical support issues for an account
transitioned to an intermediary may lead to the conclusion by the executive that the
intermediary is not capable of supporting the customer. Whether the manufacturer's
systems or processes are at fault for this situation, it likely does not matter. From the sales
executive's perspective, the intermediary is not meeting the customer's expectation. The
sales executive may take this into account the next time an opportunity arises and she/he
makes the decision to include an intermediary.
Technical Training
Another important precursor for a successful transition to successful relationships
with intermediaries is the availability of trained and experienced technical personnel with
the requisite level of familiarity with the specifics of the manufacturer's offerings. The
variety of implementation specifics ranging from features and functionality, user
interface and other technical details for high technology offerings makes it imperative
that pre- and post-sales professionals are available, preferably already employed by the
target intermediaries.
This was incredibly important in the example enterprise data communications
equipment market as was indicated in the research. Like many other disruptive
innovations, as the new computing paradigm initially began to get traction with
customers, there was not an abundance of technical personnel that were qualified to sell
and support the offerings introduced by the manufacturers When the innovation is by
nature highly complex and prior to the technology being included in the curriculums at
the tertiary and secondary levels, the burden falls on the manufacturer to provide training
to the end users of its solutions as well as potential intermediaries. Technical training is
much like marketing in the sense that technical training for intermediaries can have
different requirements than that designed for end customers. Firms that have designed
and built training programs to meet the needs of the end customers often find that the
curriculums have to be expanded to meet the needs of intermediaries, including sharing
information about the offerings that typically might not be required by the end customers.
It is important that the training organization recognizes these differences and addresses
training and certification programs that are customized to the needs of its intermediated
channel partners.
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Establishing a training and certification program that is both widely available and
through word-of-mouth develops a good reputation within the technical community can
be of great value to a manufacturer. If the training becomes the de facto standard for
developing marketable skills whilst the secondary and tertiary educational institutions
catch up, these programs can be a powerful augment to other marketing and branding
activities. People naturally buy or recommend to others the offerings that they understand
best, and have worked with. Vendors that have established their training and certification
programs as the most desirable in the technologies embedded in their products have a
distinct advantage over their competitors when competing for the mindshare of the best
intermediaries. As will be discussed in the next chapter, firms must strive to provide
training via a variety of delivery methods to suit the needs of intermediaries and
customers. Alternatives such as web-based training and other alternative medium are a
necessity for providing a training capability that is attractive to intermediaries.
Brand Awareness and Marketing
The technology embodied in the manufacturer's offerings has to have gained
market acceptance as well as some level of brand awareness for the manufacturer in the
target customer base. For truly disruptive innovations this is typically achieved by some
degree of success in the direct sales efforts to the innovators and probably many of the
early adopters. The more widespread the awareness a manufacturer is able to establish for
its brand early one and the more successful the early demand generation activities, the
more likely that the intermediaries servicing the customer base will be interested in
establishing a relationship with the manufacturer. Reputation amongst competitors and
customers for technology and product leadership is crucial in high technology markets.
Establishing these beach heads is often gained via the early-stage direct sales
efforts, and the establishment of a base of customers that can be referenced. Successes in
critical segments of the market such as those that have influence over buyers in the target
markets generate awareness for the company among potential buyers and intermediaries.
Traditional marketing and communications mechanisms such as coverage in the trade
press also assist in the development of customer demand. With the Internet and email
relied upon so heavily in the IT and technology sectors of the economy, the word-of-
mouth reinforcing loops are highly important for generating interest in the marketplace.
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It became obvious in the course of the research that strong brand awareness and
most importantly the presence of underlying demand for the firm's offering is a necessary
condition for the establishment of relationships with intermediated channels. Simply put,
if potential customers in the marketplace are not asking for a given vendor's offering by
name the value proposition for intermediaries is limited, often in spite of the offering's
technical superiority or better price. In one of the interviews, a seasoned channel sales
manager remarked, "Remember, no one is going to be religious about your products other
than you!" This is a point I heard repeated over and over again throughout my interviews
with practicing channel managers: that the intermediaries' primary role in reselling
product is the fulfillment of demand created through other means in the delivery of
solutions to their customers. Their ability and willingness to "sell uphill" and create
demand or overcome objection by their customers is often limited.
This is a point often missed by companies transitioning to multi-channel
operations, that there is a significant burden retained by the manufacturer in continuing to
maintain and build brand awareness and generate demand for its offerings. The sales and
marketing efforts of the company have to be shifted toward this mode of operation:
generating demand and assisting the channel either directly with support in pursuing
some opportunities and indirectly in assuring that the intermediaries are well versed in
the knowledge and capabilities required for closing business resulting from demand
generation activities. As the technology matures, and the latter stages of the technology
adoption process described earlier comes into play, the more successful manufacturers
assist their intermediaries in offering new and more comprehensive services to increase
the value add. These activities require superb execution in many organizations within the
company, but in the case of the sales organization transitioning from direct to multi-
channel the need for execution is imperative. Typically the majority of the sales
organization is redeployed in order to provide direct support of the demand generation
and intermediary relationship management activities.
Financial and Revenue Reporting
In the course of the research on the data communications equipment segment for
the thesis, several structural considerations that impact the relationship aspect of
intermediated channels management were uncovered. One of these is potentially
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impactful and important to highlight. Cabletron Systems and Cisco Systems implemented
two very different approaches to the recognition of revenues from sales to the channel as
they began to employ intermediated channels, commonly referred to as the "sales-in" and
"sales-out" models.
Oversimplifying somewhat, in the sales-in model the manufacturer reports as
revenue what it is paid by the channel for goods and services at the time of delivery "in"
to the channel for eventual resale to customers. That is, inventories of the manufacturer's
offerings purchased by distributors and direct VARs, and potentially held in stock for a
period of time prior to eventual sale to downstream customers was booked as revenue
when shipped to the distributor or direct VARs. The revenue numbers were eventually
reconciled to reflect what was sold to end users, and what was eventually returned to the
manufacturer.
The sales-out model effectively holds the inventory of the manufacturer
maintained by channel partners on the books of the manufacturer until they are
subsequently sold to end customers. In essence, the inventories held temporarily by the
channel are not booked as revenues by the manufacturers until they are sold to end users.
The sales-in model held the potential for complicated accounting issues around
future returns of product by the channel (should they remain unsold for an extended
period, or become obsolete for example), as well as the potential for abuse commonly
referred to as "channel stuffing." Channel stuffing referred to the purported practice of
some publicly held data communications manufacturers shipping more inventory into the
channel than was needed, typically at the end of a revenue reporting period (e.g., quarter
end) knowing that the inventory would be returned after results had been reported. This
practice obviously had many potentially negative impacts on the relationships with its
channel partners but one stands out as important in this current discussion.
Another conclusion drawn through the research is that the sales-in model also had
a potentially more severe negative impact on the manufacturer in regards to the
relationship with its channel partners. In the sales-in model, inventory in the channel was
effectively viewed by the sales force as being "sold" as it was reported precisely that way.
As such it was easy for the sales force with its laser-like focus on the quarterly total
revenue number to not be as committed to its efforts to assist the partners with clearing
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the inventory in the channel. That inventory in their minds was "sold." Instead, the
account executives could maintain their focus on efforts to support the existing customers
that remained direct, and not work actively with the channel in order to assist them in
generating demand and selling the inventory in the channel. Effectively with the sales-in
model, the channel appeared to the direct sales force as another customer rather than the
extension of the sales force it was intended to be by the designers of the channel strategy.
The sales force did not necessarily feel ownership for the task of moving the inventory
held in the channel.
Although sales-out was more difficult to implement such that accurate tracking of
inventories and point-of-sale data from many different firms in the channel that might
hold inventory collected near real time, the channel appears very differently to firms
using sales-out. The connection of the channel with the sales process, of clearing
inventory by generating demand within existing accounts and gaining new ones, was
much clearer. The sales-out model clearly established the fact that the sale of the
inventory in the channel was a joint responsibility for the manufacturer's sales and
channel management personnel and channel partners. This key difference resulted in a
markedly different tone for the relationship with the manufacturer operating on the sales-
out model with its intermediaries. In organizations where the sales-out model was
effectively employed day one, the relationship with the channel was significantly more
likely to be viewed as a partnership as opposed to simply another way of making quota.
Success in a given sales territory during a period was measured by the combined efforts
of the manufacturer's personnel operating in that region and the efforts of the partners to
grow the business together and contributed to preventing an us vs. them mentality,
potentially even in situations where the intermediary and the direct force may have at one
time competed with one another for the same opportunities. Rather than viewing the
channel inventory as sold, it can be argued that in this model the success of the sales
effort hinged on both direct and channel activities by keeping the customer- and partner-
facing activities of the firm focused on driving channel as well as direct business.
In summary there are many competencies that the firm wishing to transition from
direct sales to sales through intermediated channels must develop in order to develop a
multi-channel management capability. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Many firm-
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level competencies such as achieving excellent quality in their offerings and the
maintenance of technology leadership are vital in multi-channel sales operations as they
are in direct sales only. The focus of this chapter has been primarily on those
competencies that are not directly transferable from one mode of operation to the other.
Much of the required capability not outlined in this section is provided through the use of
technology and the development of automated intermediary support infrastructure. This is
the topic of the next chapter. The main point of this chapter so far has been to address
how the issues outlined in chapter two are managed by the firm through the development
of multi-channel management capability. Although the need for many of these
competencies appears on the surface to be rather intuitive, in practice it is by no means a
straightforward or short undertaking by most firms to develop and evolve these
capabilities in the long term.
The Dynamics of Transition to a Multi-channel Strategy
The chapter thus far has focused on the development of capabilities by different
organizations within a firm that is attempting to transition from direct sales to
intermediated channels. The efforts by the line organizations across the firm accumulate
into a firm-level multi-channel management capability that can result in a valuable
complementary asset for the company as described earlier in the chapter. That
complementary asset of course is the ability to harness multiple sales channels including
intermediated channels to reach the largest total addressable market while providing the
full suite of services many potential customers demand. The focus of this section of the
paper will now shift to analyzing why this can in practice be very difficult for firms.
Firms that can do it very well then often develop a complementary asset that is very
difficult for competitors to imitate.
Systems Dynamics provides a very useful tool for analyzing complex systems
which clearly most high technology and other manufacturing firms can be categorized as.
There are a complex set of dynamics underlying the transition process shift from selling
through the direct channel to the use of intermediated channels.
This section of the paper will adapt a framework developed by the systems
dynamics faculty at MIT and outlined in an article on creating and sustaining process
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improvement to the development of multi-channel capability by a firm.9 The following
analysis relies heavily in the generalized model developed in that publication. In this
analysis the general case causal loop diagram of a process improvement effort is directly
applied to the development of multi-channel management capabilities by a firm, those
described in detail in this and the subsequent chapter.
Often in companies making the transition there is a lack of fundamental
understanding of the underlying dynamics of the transition process. Making what
amounts to fundamental changes in the way that sales are generated by the company can
be a complex process and the extent of the complexity often underestimated by firms at
the outset. Systems Dynamics provides a useful way to illustrate these dynamics through
the causal loop diagram and lead to better understanding of the complexity so that it can
be better managed.
Figure 3.1 below outlines the basic dynamics underlying any process
improvement program as documented in the cited article. The basic model has been
adapted to describe the development of multi-channel management capabilities by a
given firm adding intermediated channels to an existing direct sales capability. This is the
typical hybrid model described in the Introduction that is often adopted by firms that
developed a direct sales capability and later begin employing intermediaries. The process
models the accumulation of the capabilities described in this chapter which the
organization will need in transitioning from direct sales as the primary channel to a multi-
,channel model including intermediaries.
' Repenning, N.P. and Sterman, J.D. (2001, Summer). Nobody ever gets credit for fixing problems that
never happened: Creating and sustaining process improvement. California Management Review, 43(4), 64-
88.
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Figure 3.1: Underlying Dynamics of Developing Multi-channel Management
Capabilities
Output performance of the system is captured by the variable, actual sales
performance, which represents the total sales achieved by the organization by all
channels including direct sales and intermediated channels. The diagram illustrates the
dependency of total sales on two activities of the firm: time spent selling which represents
continuing to pursue sales by the direct channel as supported by the existing
infrastructure of the firm (business as usual), and time/resource consumed on capability
development. This latter variable represents the sum total investments across the firm in
developing the competencies outlined in this chapter which enable the firm to effectively
utilize intermediated channels. These investments include both the application of capital
or labor by the organizations across the firm including the direct sales force in order to
develop multi-channel management capabilities.
Investments consumed in developing the competencies and capabilities within the
firm to support intermediated channels have the potential to achieve results that are more
long lasting as opposed to increased efforts in selling through the direct channel. If it is in
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fact the case that intermediaries can scale up the sales effort and provide the value-added
services required to reach a broader market this should be the case. The ability of a firm
to manage multiple channels successfully has been illustrated to be a potential source of
competitive advantage in the thesis. As such these activities and resulting development of
a multi-channel management capability by the firm is in fact a process improvement
effort in the traditional sense. Increased effort on the direct channel, business as usual,
can undoubtedly improve sales performance in the short run. Relationships with the
installed-base, not to mention the familiarity the direct sales force has with effectively
positioning the offerings can be brought to bear to increase short-run sales performance
in many cases. However, increasing direct selling effort does not address the goal of
adding scale and service capabilities in the medium and long-term. Gaining access to the
scalability and solutions capability of the intermediated channel is assumed to be the goal
of the effort to move into intermediated channels in the first place.
The persistence of the multi-channel management capability built through the
investments of effort and other resources is represented by a stock in the causal loop
diagram that accumulates improvements in the organizations capability to support multi-
channel operations as described earlier in the chapter. An increase in the time and
resources consumed on capability development increases the flow of investment which
results in an increase in the stock of multi-channel management capability.
Efforts to build these capabilities and competencies do not yield results
immediately. This is represented by a delay between the consumption of time and other
resources and its increasing the flow of investment which accumulates in multi-channel
management capability. In addition, multi-channel management capabilities do not have
an infinite shelf life. Because the competencies and capabilities evolve over time, some
amount of constant investment is required to maintain and evolve these capabilities and
prevent them from becoming outmoded. Accordingly there is an outflow from the multi-
channel management capability stock indicating that firms must continue to invest over
time or risk erosion of the capability.
Lastly figure 3.1 models the goal for the process, desired sales performance which
can be thought as the goal for total sales performance from all channels utilized by the
firm at a given point in time. Few operating goals of companies are likely to experience
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more pressure for continuous improvement than the generation of revenues and profits.
For the public company in growth mode, sales and earnings expectations are constantly
moving upward. The addition of intermediated channels to the sales mix is often
undertaken during the growth stage for many high technology companies. There is often
a great deal of focus both internally and externally on the firms ability to achieve its sales
and revenue goals while achieving consistent growth, In the model this dynamic is
captured by the variable sales performance gap, which as its name suggests, captures any
delta between the sales goal and actual sales performance. When a gap between actual
and expected sales emerges, it is highly problematic for companies, those that have
invested capital from outside sources including the public markets specifically. These
gaps get immediate executive management attention and scrutiny and calls for immediate
action to be taken.
As was alluded to above, often the expansion of the sales effort to include
intermediated channels is accompanied by high expectations for growth of the top line by
internal and external stakeholders. The expansion of the sales effort in terms of feet on
the street and the availability of more value-added services to complement the offerings
results in the general expectation that the firm will see growth of its sales beyond what
could be achieved by the direct sales channel alone. Like the implementation of many
process improvement efforts, the expectation is that the effort to expand top line growth
through intermediated channels should yield measurable results relatively instantaneous.
This stems primarily from the belief that more feet on the street are always better than
fewer. Therefore, if gaps do occur it raises significant concern and executive management
attention to determine what can and should be done to close the gap.
There are two basic options captured in the causal loop diagram that provide
levers that management can use to try and close the gap. The first option, which is
extremely tempting considering the acuteness of revenue shortfalls, is to fall back to a
reliance on the channel that got the company where it is in the first place: the direct
channel. For the purposes of this analysis we will refer to this as the "sell harder"
directive. Figure 3.2 below adds this to the causal loop diagram in the form of a balancing
feedback loop, labeled B 1 in the diagram.
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Figure 3.2: The Sell Harder Balancing Feedback Loop
Balancing feedback loops by definition constantly work to balance desired and
actual performance. In this case, pressure to increase sales and eliminate the gap results in
additional time spent selling via the direct sales channel. The process behind the loop
works as follows: upon the appearance of a gap between actual and goal sales
performance, pressure mounts on the internal organization with the most control on near
term performance, typically the remaining sales force. Because of the confidence the
executive team has in the sales force, and the ability of the organization to respond to
such pressure from past experience, they will tend to increase direct sales efforts and
work to win new business, often independently of their new intermediated channel
partners. This is after all the core competency of the sales force, the ability to find
opportunities and close business.
The other option of course is to redouble the efforts to get the intermediated
channels more productive, to increase the amounts of time and resources across the
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company committed to building the necessary multi-channel capabilities. For the
purposes of our analysis we will call this the "sell smarter" option. Smarter in the sense
that effective use of intermediated channels does result in increased scale and value add
services capability for the firm. The sell smarter option is represented as a second
balancing feedback loop, B2, illustrated in the revised causal loop diagram figure 3.3
below:
Sales
mance Gap
Pressure to
Multi-channel
L1_sGoal
(Goal)
Figure 3.3: The Sell Smarter Balancing Feedback Loop
When pulling this lever, executive management signals its commitment to the
multi-channel model. In responding to the gap in actual sales performance from goal, it
increases the pressure on people throughout the organization to increase efforts to build
multi-channel management capability and provide long-term improvements in the ability
of the firm to drive sales performance. This may be achieved via the addition of more
people and resources, or capital investments in IT infrastructure required to build the
capabilities and competencies described herein.
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However, the delay involved in this loop once again comes into play. Increasing
resources and investment to build these capabilities does not result in near instantaneous
improvements as can the use of sell harder loop can provide, at least in the very near term.
Understanding that if the gap is significantly large, and the company has reported results
to its investors, it takes serious commitment by executive management and the board to
commit additional resources to these efforts. It is often the case the expectation for top
line growth by firms moving to multi-channel sales is also accompanied by the
expectation for decreases in operating expenses. It follows that as in any outsourcing
decision, the fact that significant amounts of the sales operation is effectively being
outsourced to the intermediaries, the expectation is often that the company will be
reducing its cost of sales, not increasing it in order to support intermediaries. These
factors combined with the temptation to invoke the sell harder loop which promises near
term results often results in this lever not being utilized, particularly for the firm that may
be in difficulty.
What is more, one of the most often overlooked linkages in these types of systems
that are illuminated by the systems dynamics methodology is that between the selling
harder and selling smarter loops. As outlined in the chapter, among the resources of the
firm that are crucial to the transition from direct to multiple channels including
intermediated channels is the direct sales force. Although the company may continue to
use the direct channel for some customers, the majority of the direct sales force
transitions to direct support of intermediaries. The sales force continues to generate
demand for the manufacturer's offering in the field, working closely with intermediaries
to pursue opportunities which eventually the intermediary will fulfill. The repurposed
members of the sales force play an incredibly important role in the transition in getting
the intermediaries up the learning curves necessary to successfully sell and support the
offerings of the manufacturer. Again, the number of resources in this capacity is fixed
and is sometimes smaller in size then the sales force prior to the decision to move to a
multi-channel strategy. If the sales performance gap rises and the sell harder loop is
invoked by executive management, the sales force has no choice but to reduce the time
and effort spent on its transition activities. As they strive to close the gap they will
undoubtedly work harder only to a point, focusing those increased efforts on closing
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business which directly addresses the gap and reduces pressure emanating from the
executive ranks. Figure 3.4 below adds this linkage to the causal loop diagram.
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Figure 3.4: The Reinvestment Reinforcing Loop
The linkage added results in a new loop being added to the causal loop diagram,
the reinforcing loop labeled R1. This loop is called the "reinvestment loop" in the
Repenning and Sterman article cited earlier. 10 The reinvestment loop is a positive
feedback loop which reinforces that behavior that currently dominates. Accordingly this
loop will create the following process: for organizations that chose the sell smarter loop,
potentially staying the course and making investments on the knowledge that after the
delay, their multi-channel capability will enable them to be more effective in the market
and sales performance will increase dramatically. As the gap between actual and goal
sales performance diminishes, the firm will have more resources to devote to further
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improvement in capability, maintaining and evolving it over time to prevent erosion. By
using the sell smarter lever, the firm can create a virtuous cycle of continuous
improvement of its multi-channel management capability.
For firms that resort to the sell harder loop, the reinforcing loop acts similarly but
in a different direction, with a very different result. As the sales force dedicates more
time and effort to selling and shirks efforts to get intermediaries up the ramp and as the
other organizations similarly continue to focus on "business as usual," the multi-channel
management capability of the firm does not develop, or erodes over time. Intermediaries
observe manufacturers initiating an intermediated channel strategy carefully, focusing on
actions more than words. If at the first sight of sales goal shortfalls, the firm's sales force
abandons efforts to work with the channel in favor of expediting sales, intermediaries
become suspicious of the firm's commitment to making the transition. This can result in a
loss of trust that further exacerbates the erosion of capability. Some intermediaries may
abandon the manufacturer in favor of a competitor which may significantly widen the gap
increasing more pressure to sell harder. In this case the reinvestment loop creates a
vicious cycle effectively stifling the ability of the firm to make the transition to multiple
sales channels.
In the analysis presented in the Repenning and Sterman article, the authors
indicate that through their research they have concluded that is quite often the case that in
improvement programs in general, the reinvestment loop typically worked in the
downward, vicious direction." In an attempt to develop an understanding of why that is
the case, another link is added to the general model. Figure 3.5 below shows the addition
of the final link and the resulting additional balancing loop which the authors designated
the shortcuts balancing loop. 2
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Figure 3.5: The Shortcuts Balancing Loop
The organization cutting time and resources committed to develop multi-channel
management capabilities erodes that capability over time, but the erosion in the multi-
channel capability is not immediate. Even some activity in the intermediated channels
often provides some gains in sales performance. For the operational organizations within
the firm such as sales that are no longer actively pursuing efforts to build competencies
and capabilities for supporting intermediated channels, they now have additional time
available to pursue sales opportunities through the direct channel. This is captured in the
causal loop diagram by the link with negative polarity from time/resources consumed in
capability development and time spent selling. This creates the shortcut loop B3 that
models the following process: as pressure to increase sales is continually increased, sales
people and other individuals involved in the old sales process and transitioning to the new
cut back their efforts to develop the new capabilities. This in turn frees more resources
for selling through the direct channel which again in the near term closes the gap in sales
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performance, hence the third balancing loop added to the causal loop diagram. Because
of the delays in the system described earlier, the multi-channel management capability
stock does not erode instantaneously. The sales performance improves with the increased
effort on the single direct channel at the expense of making the transition to multiple
channels. It is only later that the impact of not making the efforts and investments is
eventually felt by the organization when it becomes evident that the capabilities to
support intermediated channels are still not developed. The shortcuts loop is effective in
closing the sales performance gap only because of the lag in the erosion of the multi-
channel support capability described above.
Figure 3.6 below is a reference mode showing the relationship of total sales to
time, To at the origin is the time of initiation of a multi-channel sales strategy through the
utilization of intermediaries. The line marked "desired" depicts the typical expectation for
sales performance of such a policy decision for a manufacturer. The thinking being that
the employment of intermediaries enables the firm to leverage its sales efforts through
additional feet on the street, effectively adding the ability to reach and service
significantly more customers without additional resources. The line marked "actual"
reflects the effects of the dynamics outlined in the discussion of the causal loop diagram
when the dominant loop is selling smarter. The reference mode depicts a "worse-before-
better" dynamic that reflects the delay in improvement of capability resulting from
investments of time and other resources by the organization. As has been described in
detail in this section the gains in performance from utilizing intermediaries in a multi-
channel strategy is far from immediate, and more importantly requires some amount of
investment significantly in advance of those gains. Short term performance may in fact be
worse. The firm opting for the sell smarter lever might in fact have to weather a period of
declining sales performance in the transition as the field sales force must utilize time and
effort that it typically spent selling to support intermediaries and making them productive.
Similarly other organizations throughout the firm may be committing effort and making
investments to support the multi-channel capability as well. This is of course being is
being managed in the presence of expectations for an increased top line and decreased
operating expense by investors and analysts who are typically not patient.
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Figure 3.6: Reference Mode of Sales Performance: Selling Smarter
Figure 3.7 below is a reference mode illustrating the other case, selling harder.
What is clearly an obvious difference from the prior case is the potential for a "better-
before-worse" dynamic with selling harder. In the immediate term, sales performance
does increase or at the least stabilizes. However as the reference mode indicates, this
performance increase is not sustainable, as the expectation for continued improvements in
sales performance continues but because effort and investment required to build multi-
channel capability has been shirked within the organization, selling harder impacts the
long run ability to achieve expected performance.
In the Repenning and Sterman article, the authors describe the interaction between
the balancing shortcuts loop and the reinforcing reinvestment loop creating a
phenomenon that they call the Capability Trap. 13 The authors go on to explain that the
capability trap phenomenon helps explain why organizations such as manufacturers
trying to move to a multi-channel strategy often find themselves stuck in a vicious cycle
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of declining capability.14 In our example when sales performance of a company receives
so much attention, companies in need of an immediate boost in top line performance are
very tempted to resort back to direct sales. However, the dynamics described in detail in
this section have clearly illustrated how such a move causes the reinvestment loop to
work as a vicious cycle.
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Figure 3.7: Reference Mode of Sales Performance: Selling Harder
Although some of the dynamics may be intuitively obvious they are often
overlooked in practice. These dynamics can be troublesome for companies trying to
effectively implement a multi-channel strategy and must be well understood by those
entrusted with managing the execution against that strategy. For the executive
management team, a solid founding in these dynamics is essential when formulating
expectations for the move to multiple channels. As tempting as it may be to believe that
the investments in effort and other resources to build multi-channel management
capability are minimal, and that the ramp-time is short, these dynamics suggest caution.
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14 Repenning and Sterman, page 73.
Management teams have to be careful in managing the expectations of external entities
such as analysts and investors. In some scenarios such as a firm being late to move to
intermediated channels behind competitors, it had best be prepared to articulate carefully
the "worst-before-better" dynamic and how the firm is attempting to minimize it while
staying the course to ensure an effective transition. This probably is amongst the most
difficult challenges facing the high technology manufacturer making the transition from
direct to multi-channel operations.
Chapter Summary
The chapter outlined a number of specific requirements related to relationship
management of intermediated channels and the need for organizations to develop
capabilities and competencies required for moving from direct to a multiple channel
strategy including intermediated channels. This objective of this discussion was to
address overcoming many of the strategic issues posed by such a shift outlined in Chapter
Two of the thesis. The fact that many of these capabilities and competencies are required
in order to enable a firm to make the transition is somewhat intuitively obvious. The
management problem then becomes how to develop them in practice. For the firm that
has been successful with a direct sales model, making the investments in effort and
resource can be difficult without strong leadership. More importantly perhaps is that the
organization is effectively making significant changes to its revenue generating function
in flight. This is often fraught with difficulties in the real world. In the final section of the
chapter a systems dynamics model is presented that enables analysis of the underlying
dynamics of the transition process and illustrates why it can be a daunting task for the
manager. Through the analysis of this model several important underlying dynamics are
uncovered that speak to many of the management challenges associated with the
transition phase and through this analysis, several potential courses of action are outlined
along with their implications.
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Chapter 4: The Role of Technology in the Management
of Intermediated Channels
Chapter Introduction
This chapter will provide an exploration of the expanded role technology is now
playing in the management of intermediated channels. The use of the Internet for
enabling new business-to-business applications has enabled a previously unattainable
level of virtual integration between a firm and its partners. In the case of intermediaries
where the flow of information between the manufacturer and its channel partners on a
just-in-time and highly customized basis is crucial, these applications have and will
continue to drive improved productivity for firms that have been able to fully exploit
them. From the promulgation of targeted marketing materials, training, to simple order
and account management there are potentially many applications of Internet-based tools
that can improve effectiveness and productivity while decreasing the cost of sales through
intermediaries. In this chapter, experience of different companies and their respective use
of technology for this purpose will be examined to explore this assertion.
What started as partner-specific web sites or portals and EDI links between
vendors and their channel partners has expanded significantly today. The enterprise
software market has added yet a new application area complete with its own acronym,
"PRM" or Partner Relationship Management. Firms such as ChannelWave, Comergent
and many others offer purpose-built PRM packages while others such as SAP and Siebel
have leveraged their order processing and accounting expertise to offer PRM modules to
their enterprise applications. Consulting firms specializing in PRM have emerged, and
have naturally become intermediaries for these software firms. Clearly technology has a
role in modern intermediated channels management and the purpose of this chapter of the
thesis is to explore this topic in depth and again to determine based on the experience in
the enterprise data networking hardware segment how the employment of technology has
or has not been related to success in the channel.
It is important to stress that although a strong support infrastructure can
significantly enhance a high technology firm's ability to effectively manage
intermediaries, it is by no means a replacement for the other aspects of intermediated
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channels management such as those discussed in detail in the last chapter. Like many
other automation tools, partner relationship management software and sophisticated
online tools cannot compensate for a weak channel-management strategy and poor
execution of that strategy by the firm. However, the objective of this chapter is to outline
what tools are available and illustrate how they may be used to enhance execution of
some of the more challenging aspects of channel management such as vendor-partner
cross communication and information flow. As was outlined in detail in the last chapter,
managing the relationship with intermediaries is difficult and challenging for both parties.
Utilizing technology has enabled manufacturers to gain several significant advantages
including managing more intermediaries with fewer people, increasing end customer
satisfaction and most importantly building stickiness with the best intermediaries.
Defining Partner Relationship Management
In recent years there has been a great deal of interest and activity in the Customer
Relationship Management space from a business strategy and process standpoint and the
emergence of enterprise CRM software companies such as Siebel Systems and others.
The emergence of these solutions is resultant in part from the renewed emphasis on
customer-centric business strategies, and the need for automation to support these
strategies. CRM solutions however are primarily concerned with providing a company
with tools to support direct relationships with its customers, and not the more complex
case of supporting indirect relationships with intermediaries and their downstream
customers.
In essence then partner relationship management or PRM systems are software
systems purpose-built for the management of indirect channels including intermediaries.
At the top level, these systems are implemented by companies utilizing multi-channel
strategies for streamlining the recruitment, indoctrination, management of their indirect
channels for maximum return. Effective intermediated channel support systems are
designed to address many of the challenges of managing intermediated channel partners
by providing the manufacturer managing intermediated channels with systems solutions
for collaborating with intermediaries and providing them with the services and support
they need to drive business for the manufacturer. A more effective intermediated channel
implies that the support of the manufacturers offering for the end-customer should be
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enhanced as well-this is one avenue that the manufacturer does have available to it to
ensure the quality of the customer experience when selling through intermediaries. The
quality of the support infrastructure can also drive loyalty as well as productivity among
the intermediary community and certainly last but not least, can be an effective
mechanism for a manufacturer to lock its competitors out of the most productive
intermediaries. It is one very effective mechanism to be used to make use of the
intermediated channel an inimitable complementary asset of a firm. Figure 4.1 below is a
functional block diagram that illustrates how partner relationship systems integrate with
other common enterprise software.
Figure 4.1: Enterprise PRM Functional Block Diagram'5
It is extremely important to keep in mind that the relationship between
intermediated channels and manufacturers described in the previous chapter is a
voluntary relationship for both the manufacturer and the intermediaries. Although there is
some level of desirability for intermediaries to partner with a manufacturer that has
achieved a high level of brand awareness and demand for its offering within the markets
the intermediary targets it is important to recall that the intermediaries margins on the
product portion of each opportunity for the intermediary is somewhat limited. For
example, in the data communications equipment space there may only be six to eight
15 Figure adapted from a ChannelWave whitepaper, What is Partner Relationship Management (PRM) and
Why is the ROI so High? ChannelWave, Inc. 2002.
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points of margin available to the intermediary on hardware such as LAN switches. That is
the markup that the intermediary can add to the selling price to the customer in
competitive bids is only six to eight percent more than the cost the intermediary can
acquire the equipment for through distribution. Beyond having a good relationship with
the manufacturer, the discerning intermediary is intensely concerned about the level of
effort required to position, sell, deliver and support the manufacturer's offering in the
solution delivered to their customers relative to the margin they will earn on that part of
the opportunity. Primary currency in these relationships are sales and leads and beyond
the relationship aspects outlined in the last chapter, the overall ease of doing business
with a manufacturer is a very desirable attribute for the sophisticated intermediary
partners, those that are often most capable of truly adding value to an offering. One of the
primary concerns in the management of channels for manufacturers is the "stickiness" of
the relationship with the most capable and desirable intermediaries in the target markets.
Again, although there are agreements that govern these relationships they are by their
very nature at-will for both parties. There is a natural agency problem for the
manufacturer inherent in these relationships. Effectively some portion of the revenue
generation engine for the company is no longer under the tight management and control
of the firm. There are naturally a number of carrots and sticks that manufacturers rely on
to attract and retain the intermediaries that can drive business for the manufacturer.
Competition for the best channel intermediaries is intense between manufacturers.
Clearly brand awareness and demand in the market are very important differentiators of
manufacturers considered by intermediaries when selecting which partnerships they will
consider and undertake. Except in the cases of total domination (as measured by market
share) of a segment by a single manufacturer which can override the ease-of-doing-
business concerns, a rich intermediary support infrastructure is necessary for recruiting
and retaining the best intermediary channel partners.
So beyond having strong brand recognition, generating primary demand in the
field and generating qualified leads that are willingly handed over to the intermediaries
by a supportive field organization, the manufacturer of high technology offerings has to
be equipped with a support infrastructure, typically with a high degree of automation that
specifically addresses the ease-of-doing-business concerns. For manufacturers that have
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achieved good brand recognition and demand for their products in the market, this
requirement is often overlooked. If the company's direct sales channel has been
successful navigating the company's systems and processes that are required to position
and deliver offerings to customers successfully surely all that is needed to support
intermediated channels are a few minor modifications to the existing systems and the
processes the thinking goes. The solution then when intermediated channels are added to
the sales mix is providing the intermediaries with a website or partner portal dedicated to
their needs (often just repurposing some previously internal-only materials) and possibly
implementing some basic EDI or automated order entry and management capabilities.
This approach by the manufacturer overlooks the complexity of the intermediary partner
relationship management problem and often results in the lack of traction with
intermediaries especially those that can really make a difference in the market place.
They simply cannot afford to get fully onboard with a manufacturer that requires more
cost and effort to do business with, even if the manufacturer's offering itself is
compelling or offers even superior functionality, better margins or opportunities for
exclusive access in specific market segments. This is especially the case as technologies
mature, and differentiation between offerings from different manufacturers on features
and functionality is difficult.
Another very important consideration for the manufacturer to consider making the
investment in a capable support infrastructure is countering the shift in market power
from the manufacturer to their intermediaries. There is of course the potential for market
power to be transferred from the manufacturer to the intermediary resulting from the
aggregation of demand, and the account control shifting from the manufacturer to the
intermediary. One mechanism available to manufacturers to keep that in check beyond
the access to their offerings is through the support tools and infrastructure it makes
available to its intermediary partners. That is, by creating a support infrastructure that the
intermediary comes to rely upon can be a source of stickiness and have a balancing effect
on the transfer of market power. Essentially the intermediated channel becomes
somewhat reliant on the tools provided by the manufacturer in retaining as much of the
available margin as possible in each opportunity the intermediary positions and sells the
manufacturer's offering as part of its own solution. Many times these systems can
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provide functionality that the intermediary could not cost effectively replace, or offset the
loss of efficiency should it become unavailable. Even in industries such as data
communications equipment that has experienced marked decreases in complexity with
the convergence toward Ethernet and IP, designing a network infrastructure for a large
campus is complex but maybe made less so through the use of sophisticated and mature
tools. This can be likened to the use of calculators for long division-even though most
of us have were taught to do long division by hand the tendency at this point is to reach
for the calculator or spreadsheet when we have to do it. Not having that calculator or
spreadsheet makes us uncomfortable and more importantly, slows us down. Once an
intermediary develops competency and experience with a manufacturer's tools, those
tools become engrained in the intermediary's processes much like the calculator.
The time and resource that the intermediary does not spend on doing business
with the manufacturer and including the manufacturers' offerings in the solutions it
positions and delivers to its customers is time and energy it can focus on its components
of the overall solution. Not only do these components generate more potential margin for
the intermediary, they are the intermediaries' primary means of competition with its
competitors-potentially other intermediaries that may be positioning the same offerings
as part of their solutions. The manufacturer that differentiates itself through the support it
provides to its intermediaries is able to use this dependency in ongoing bargaining with
its most valued intermediary partners. Solid support infrastructure that enables effective
partner relationship management can be both a carrot and a stick used to manage the
relationship with intermediaries.
Through the research completed for this paper on the data communications
equipment market it became clear that intermediaries can in fact become dependent on
the tools provided by a manufacturer. For example if the tools provided by a
manufacturer enable intermediaries to shorten the time required to build a configuration
and bill of materials quickly and accurately so that the time required to respond to an
RFQ is shortened, the intermediaries desire to maintain the maintain the relationship with
its manufacturer partners for the long term-even in the presence issues with the
manufacturer. As mentioned above, time and effort not spent on working with
manufacturers is time that can be spent on differentiation, as well as to competing for
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more business. There is typically an investment made by intermediaries as they learn to
work with a new manufacturer and hence a switching cost associated with support
infrastructure for the intermediary that becomes very tangible when considering moving
from one manufacturer to a different competitor for a particular part of their solution that
extends far beyond the competitive differentiation. There are indirect network
externalities that are created by developing competencies within an intermediary's firm in
terms of accumulated training and experience of its personnel in supporting the offerings
of the manufacturers it chooses to partner with. This observation suggests that not only is
their an advantage of developing superior support infrastructure for intermediary partners,
it also suggests that there is a first mover advantage for the manufacturer that
complements its channel program with solid infrastructure early as the channel is
developing. This can be potentially a source of lock-in of the best intermediaries by the
manufacturer; it is preferable to lock-in those intermediaries that offer the most value add
and can drive the most business in an identifiable segment, market or vertical effectively
locking out competitors.
Components of an Effective Support Infrastructure
Much of the research for this chapter of the thesis consisted of examining the
types of support infrastructure provided by several example firms in the data
communications equipment marketplace. Although in principle these systems are
intended to provide similar functions for the intermediated channel partners, there are
vast differences in implementation and effectiveness. At the top level manufacturers look
to these systems to provide an ROI via the following means:
1. Enabling the company increase revenues derived through intermediated
channel partners through greater effectiveness.
2. Reducing the costs associated with managing intermediated channels.
3. Improving the scalability of the channel management effort-build a
larger network of intermediated channel partners without increasing
staff and or other infrastructure.
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4. Creating "stickiness" with the preferred intermediaries by adding a
compelling ease-of-doing-business argument to complement brand
awareness and demand in the markets.
Manufacturers have a number of choices for creating this infrastructure. Either
they create their own custom software solution, often modifying existing systems or
creating new ones purpose-built for intermediated channel support automation. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are now a number of specialized enterprise
software companies that offer off-the-shelf PRM solutions, as well as offerings from
industry leaders in CRM such as Siebel. The claimed value proposition of the off-the-
shelf PRM solutions is that they are more cost effective and potentially provide more
functionality than custom-built solutions. Clearly there is potentially a sizeable
investment required in the design, implementation and operation of these systems
regardless of developed internally, purchased or outsourced. The cost of a configuration
and quoting application for example that utilizes rule-based systems to verify valid
configurations (e.g., verifying a given blade is compatible with a chassis, etc.) as the user
develops a bill of materials can be very expensive to develop and maintain. For
companies that offer thousands or tens of thousand of SKUs16 and multiple generations of
products with varying levels of backward and forward compatibility can easily reach a
cost of several millions of dollars. Unfortunately, these tools which are invaluable for
many high technology offerings are often not well suited to customization of off-the-shelf
e-commerce and PRM offerings. Such an outlay is often difficult to justify as a multiple-
channel strategy is in the early stages of execution as the sales through intermediaries are
typically low. However for the reasons outlined earlier in the discussion, it is important
for a company seriously considering including intermediated channels in its go-to-market
strategy to make the investment in these tools as early as practical. Clearly there are
advantages for the firm to begin going down this path well before moving beyond direct
sales. These tools are equally as useful to a direct sales force as they are to an
intermediary, however many firms wait to make the investment until they are faced with
16 A relatively recent Cisco pricelist contained nearly 65,000 individually priced hardware, software and
service parts!
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the challenges outlined in this chapter as they look to third parties to sell and support their
offerings. As is often the case with the development of inimitable complementary assets,
the firm often has to make significant investments as well as moving quickly.
Regardless of whether they are bought or built, increasingly these tools are made
available to intermediaries through web-based applications and interfaces, and are
designed to address the functionalities outlined briefly below:
· Bi-directional communication between the manufacturer and its
intermediary partners. Often this is one of the most difficult challenges
in managing a network of intermediaries in a scalable fashion as the
network grows larger and becomes global in reach. The manufacturer
must communicate product and promotion information, sales collateral
and other information necessary to enable its intermediaries to sell and
service its offerings effectively, including getting new intermediaries up to
speed as they are recruited. Similarly, the intermediaries need an effective
way to communicate feedback from the field and customer base utilized
for a variety of reasons from product development to services management
to the manufacturer. A good system goes beyond reliance on "pull"
technologies such as partner-specific websites that rely on the
intermediary to pull the information they require, to utilize "push"
technologies that deliver customized and relevant communications to
individual intermediaries.
* Lead management. Lead management is a daunting task for most
organizations including those that utilize only the direct channel. It is even
more complex for the multi-channel sales operation. Effective lead
management requires strong process as well as a unified system that
enables the management of leads through the various phases from initial
identification to closing regardless of channel. This often requires close
integration with the existing CRM system used for managing leads for the
direct channel such that leads can be effectively moved from one channel
to another. Automation can be very effective in ensuring that leads don't
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fall through the cracks, that they are pursued until the customer is closed
or until it is determined to be an opportunity no longer worth pursuing.
Forecasting and demand planning. This goes hand-in-hand with the
previous function outlined immediately above and pertains to ensuring
that the manufacturer has visibility into the sales pipeline to ensure the
right offerings are available on demand. Demand planning and forecasting
are incredibly important functions in the modem manufacturing
organization. Supply chain virtualization and the desire by the
manufacturer to maintain very low inventories is significantly more
complex when a significant portion of the sales of a company are made by
entities not under the direct control of the firm as is the case with the use
of intermediated channels. System functionality that assists the SCM
function with forecasting demand coming from direct partners and
distributors in two tier models is an essential functionality provided by
PRM systems.
* Configuration and quoting. This is of particular significance to high
technology manufacturers. It is not unusual for manufacturers of high
technology offerings to have thousands or tens-of-thousands of SKUs in
its product line which in some cases are standalone, or are combined in
various different configurations to create a system. It is often a daunting
task to start from a paper or online catalog of part descriptions and
numbers and a general knowledge of the required system-level
functionality and develop a bill of materials that is valid (i.e., the
individual parts all interoperate) and meets the desired functionality. This
is the function of online configuration tools or "builders" that walk the
user through the process of configuring a valid system configuration, a bill
of materials, and last but not least a quotation for that bill of materials that
utilizes the pricing rules applicable to the user (typically specified
contractually based on the user's organization) and taking into
consideration any special pricing considerations in effect for the order
such as limited time promotions, etc. Often intermediaries are required to
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complete certain requirements such as having a number of technical
personnel with certifications, or reach a predetermined level of sales of the
manufacturer's offerings to get access to the higher end products. A
pricing tier structure is defined that specify for each partner level the
discount level for each product or product class. These tools have several
benefits that are obvious especially for very complex offerings. One that
might not be seen immediately is the potential to significantly increase the
accuracy of orders coming from intermediaries. As will be discussed later
in the chapter, these systems in practice often provide significant increases
in order accuracy over orders placed by phone or FAX that ultimately
directly impact end-customer satisfaction. For a customer that schedules a
complex new installation or upgrade project requiring careful planning
and execution in accordance with a tight timeline, there is nothing worse
than having the equipment show up on time, but then have the
intermediary firm performing the work determine that the equipment
received cannot function in the specified configuration. The intermediary
looks bad and undoubtedly blames the manufacturer for not making the
configuration rules crystal clear. This component of the system is not only
a timesaver for the intermediary reduces the amount of person power
required from the manufacturer to assist its intermediaries in configuration
and quoting, it is another mechanism by which the manufacturer can
directly improve the customer experience from behind the scenes. In the
research completed for the thesis, this is one of the most consistently cited
components of critical support infrastructure.
Order entry, order management, and intermediary self-service. Every
consumer that has experienced Internet commerce is familiar with the
powerful self-service mechanisms that have become common place.
Similarly, intermediaries expect that manufacturers include in their
support infrastructures much of the process beyond the creation of the
BOM via the configuration tool: the creation of an order, placing the order,
making payment, determining scheduled delivery date(s) and tracking the
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order from placement to delivery can be done electronically via the
Internet, at any time of day or night. It is not unusual for an intermediary
in the large enterprise space to be simultaneously managing many projects
for their customer base. They are in almost constant need of real-time,
accurate information regarding product availability, shipping status, etc.
that is used for management of their own schedules as well as
management of customer expectations. Automating these functions to the
maximum extent possible through integration with the back office ERP
and SCM systems enables manufacturers to provide an end-to-end view of
the entire supply chain providing the visibility that intermediaries need
from anyplace with an Internet connection, at any time 7x24x365.
* Training. Another important and useful function of these systems is the
delivery of training either through live and or recorded "webinars" and
other alternative e-learning medium. This can be a highly effective
mechanism for the promulgation of sales training as the corporate-based
experts on the manufacturer's offering can deliver the training once, from
their primary location without travel and reach a very large audience to
deliver the training when and where the sales forces across the network of
intermediaries is able to get time for training.
* Management of special programs. Very often manufacturers use various
incentives to promote new products or to move ageing inventories through
their channels including intermediaries. These may include rebates, future
discounts on selected SKUs after a threshold volume of sales is achieved
by the intermediary, the award of marketing development funds for the
firm and or spiffs for the intermediary's sales team. Incentives programs
of this type often require registration of qualifying transactions including
information about the individual wins. Processing these via the web, at the
convenience of the people involved in the activities results in better
participation and the collection of more detailed data on the opportunities
which may be analyzed by the manufacturer and used in the design of
future incentive and promotion programs.
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This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential applications provided by
partner relationship management systems that are in place today. A common thread
throughout all these functionalities is their contribution to the scalability of the partner
management effort. When these systems are designed and implemented properly, they
enable a manufacturer to increase the size and scope of their intermediary base without
adding additional personnel or fixed assets. As such, the development of these systems is
a critical part of the development of a multi-channel management capability described in
the previous chapter. This is essential in really achieving the "force multiplier" effect that
is the driving force behind multi-channel strategies for manufacturers. However I have
found in my own experience and research for this paper that these systems often suffer
from underinvestment, as well as lack of prioritization and executive level involvement
and commitment. This can be a factor in performance from intermediated channels
significantly underperforming expectations, especially when other manufacturers have set
the bar high with their systems. As we will see in the example provided at the end of this
chapter, investment in the infrastructure to support these systems can be very large, and
their implementation often takes years. Firms hoping to attract and retain the best
intermediaries have to be prepared to invest and start building-out these systems early in
their growth phases.
One final note, when looking at this list of capabilities the reader may question
why many of these functions could or should not be exposed for use by end customers
directly. In fact, many manufacturers including those in the data communications
equipment market do provide some of these functions for self-service by end customers,
effectively bypassing the intermediaries for some purchases. Recall that the value
proposition for the intermediaries at this stage of maturity of this market is primarily in
the bundling of their own value-add services with the product and service offerings from
the manufacturers they partner with. "Handling the paper" as it is referred to: effectively
handling the fulfillment of an order for product and services without any value add is not
the most profitable activity an intermediary can utilize its time and resources for. An
example of where this comes into play is a customer adding spare equipment for
replacement of failures. If the manufacturer provides the customer with the option to
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simply order and fulfills these orders directly (likely through a distribution partner
ultimately), this is not necessarily viewed as conflicting by higher-end intermediaries.
An Example Intermediary Support Infrastructure from the
Research
Cisco Systems employment of information technology, including its own products
and the widespread use of the Internet and leading-edge applications has received
accolades from many constituencies. There are at least five Harvard Business School
cases written on Cisco's strategic use of IT, including the development of its very
sophisticated web-based partner support infrastructure. Beginning in 1994, the same year
it began the extension of its product line beyond routers, Cisco Systems undertook a
major redesign of its back-office legacy systems with the overarching principle of
utilizing Internet Protocol and the web as the primary interface. In doing so, Cisco
effectively "ate its own dog food" but in the process became a case-study for its
customers and partners on how these technologies could be used to effectively create
competitive advantage. In the case of the utilization of IT for creating virtual linkages
with its supply chain partners via linkages with its own ERP and SCM systems, Cisco has
assumed a leadership position in the effective and efficient management of a virtual
supply chain utilizing the Internet and IP. Cisco manufactures only a small portion of its
offerings, relying on a number of strategic component suppliers such as IBM, and
manufacturing partners such as Flextronics in several geographies to manufacture its
products. By 1997 Cisco began direct fulfillment with several of its manufacturing
partners shipping finished goods directly to distribution partners and onto customers
without Cisco ever taking physical possession of the products.
Cisco Systems has invested heavily in its IT infrastructure, the core upgrade of its
ERP system, web-enablement of its applications an upgrade of its computing
infrastructure to a low-cost/high-value architecture came at a 3-year initial investment of
about $115M, including $15M for the foundational Oracle ERP system which at the time
it was approved by the board constituted the single largest capital project approved by the
company. ' 7
17Nolan, R.L, Porter, K.A. & Darwal, C.L. (2001). Cisco systems architecture: ERP and web-enabled IT,
Case Study, Harvard Business School. Cambridge, MA, p. 7.
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The return on that investment is hard to measure, although there is some hard data
in the literature concerning measurable results that Cisco has achieved with these
systems:
1. Cisco's order accuracy rate for orders placed via fax or telephone is one
order in four has an error in pricing or configuration. For orders placed
via the website utilizing the Cisco Configuration Tool, the error rate
drops to one in one hundred. 18
2. By allowing entitled customers and partners to download software and
firmware upgrades via the Cisco website, avoids as much as $25M a
month in shipping and administration costs associated with shipping
software and documentation via mail.1 9
It is also important to note that these results and the return on the rather hefty
investment by Cisco did not happen overnight, it was not a matter of flipping a switch or
installing several applications. A summary of the major steps beyond the implementation
of the ERP and web-enablement begun in 1994 is as follows 20:
* 1996: Pricing, configuration and order status viewable on line.
* 1997: Configuring, pricing and ordering online.
* 1998: Cisco's CRM system integrated with their largest direct customer's
purchasing systems.
* 1999: Market-specific tools available for customers and intermediaries
tailored to service provider, small and medium enterprises, large firms and
intermediaries.
· 2000: Integration with selected partners to enable the ordering of related
third-party products for ordering multi-vendor solutions.
By 2001, Cisco's network of intermediaries had grown to 36,000 in number and
spanned the globe. In a paper written in about this time frame21 , the then Vice President,
8 Wiell, P. & Vitale, M. (2001). Place to space: Migrating to eBusiness models. Boston: HBS Press. p.227.
'9 Ibid, p. 228
20 Ibid.
21 Mitchell, T. (2001). Cisco resellers add value. Industrial Marketing Management, 30, 115-118.
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Worldwide Channels, wrote about how Cisco was assisting its intermediaries in
transitioning from selling standalone network products and basic integration services, that
were experiencing declining margins due to commoditization, to selling a broader end-to-
end solution to include applications. Cisco was effectively urging its base of resellers to
continue move up the value chain by adding more value-add services to their repertoire
which dovetailed into Cisco's product strategy that was moving into voice, video, storage
and security solutions. The partner support infrastructure has played a central to the effort
to help their network intermediaries make this transition. Cisco provided a number of
tools to assist their partners with first evaluating their readiness (through a web-based
"Value Readiness Tool"), and then makes available resources such as the "Value
Compass," another web-based e-learning tool that enable its intermediaries to train their
staffs.
Essentially Cisco has continued to evolve its support infrastructure to offer new
and more value-added services to its intermediaries. Many of Cisco's direct competitors
are still struggling to this day to implement many of the basic e-business intermediary
support functions described earlier in this chapter. Having the advanced and feature-rich
partner relationship management infrastructure and integration with the back-office ERP
and SCM processes and systems that Cisco possess has been and continues to be a source
of competitive advantage for Cisco in the enterprise and service provider data
communications equipment markets. Like the Cisco-proprietary features it was able to
include in the operating firmware of its routers early on, the services it provides for its
intermediaries through its support infrastructure such as the Cisco Configuration Tool
have resulted in indirect network externalities. The technical and sales staffs of many of
the best intermediaries in the field have developed so much experience with these tools as
they evolved, staffing and processes have been built based on the efficiencies, accuracy
and cost structures the Cisco support infrastructure enables. Therefore, there would be a
significant switching costs associated with moving to an alternate supplier. The switching
costs combined with Cisco's dominating market share in most segments of the market
leaves essentially no choice but to establish and maintain a relationship with Cisco. Cisco
has effectively achieved a lock-in of the intermediaries in the enterprise data
communications equipment space, locking-out many of its competitors especially at the
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high-end of the market where the majority of revenues and only real opportunities exist
for taking noticeable market share.
In several of the interviews for the thesis, many of the industry practitioners I
spoke with related how much power Cisco has in the channel. Many of the best
intermediaries are simply not willing to upset Cisco by establishing relationships with
other manufacturers that Cisco may view as a competitor, and risk being cutoff by Cisco.
This is often excruciatingly apparent to small, startup firms that may have a very exciting
and compelling offering finding they may in fact be denied access to the channels they
need to move beyond the innovators. This is an extremely powerful competitive
advantage for Cisco. An advantage is arguably sustainable even as the ability to
differentiate offerings becomes more difficult as convergence, industry standards,
merchant silicon and software continue to drive the equipment towards greater and
greater commoditization. Considering the current trends toward outsourcing of non-core
functions, and the relatively high complexity of the technologies required to implement
and maintain an enterprise network infrastructure in the foreseeable future, it is hard to
imagine a disruption that effectively resulted in the obsolescence of the intermediary in
this space. Cisco's domination of the intermediary channels for enterprise data
communications equipment is due in large part to its sophisticated and feature-rich
support infrastructure. The execution of the company strategy through making substantial
early investments in a scalable, highly-integrated and universally accessible back-office
infrastructure that could eventually provide the foundation for these front-office
applications is truly noteworthy. The people directly involved with the project recount the
fact that presenting the proposal for the initial ERP implementation that again would be
the largest capital project the company had undertaken to date was not a matter of a cost
avoidance justification22--it was more a matter of matching the corporate strategy of
focus on the customer and the use of technology to achieve it at a level the competition
would be unable to match.
22 Nolan, R.L, Porter, K.A. & Darwal, C.L., page 7.
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An Illustration of the Importance of Intermediary Support
Infrastructure
In my own professional experience with Cabletron/Enterasys I experienced first-
hand the reality of Cisco's lock-in of the channel facilitated in part by the rich support
infrastructure they provide. One specific case is illustrative of just how powerful this
lock-in can be, and how incredibly difficult it is to overcome at the operational level. In
the latter part of the 1990s as Cisco began expanding its offering into the voice over IP
space for the enterprise, it found itself suddenly in direct competition with several of the
incumbent Private Branch Exchange (PBX) companies including Siemens ICN
(Information and Communications Networks). Siemens, unlike its direct competitors
Nortel, Lucent and Alcatel that entered the data communications equipment market via
acquisition in the 1990s, had taken a more conservative approach to entering the
burgeoning data communications market directly deciding instead to remain focused on
voice communications and its broad enterprise PBX offerings and gear provided for the
telecommunications service providers. Instead of developing or acquiring its own data
communications equipment offerings, Siemens partnered with a number of companies
including Cisco Systems to offer its large enterprise customer base a data
communications solution including integration services which Siemens ICN provided
with its large network of regional sales and service offices with notable strengths in the
European marketplace especially. Siemens rapidly grew to be among one of Cisco's
largest intermediary channel partners achieving annual sales of Cisco equipment and
services of several hundred million dollars and in the process, seeded Cisco enterprise
data communications equipment into Siemens coveted customer base!
The reader can imagine the concern in Siemens ICN headquarters in Munich that
arose when word of Cisco's foray into enterprise IP PBX, first intimated via several
acquisitions of small startups in the space, culminating soon after with announcement of
Cisco's new AVVID strategy which featured an end-to-end Cisco infrastructure for IP-
based voice, video and data for the enterprise! Siemens was developing its own IP-based
solutions that enabled its widely installed-based of traditional TDM PBX enterprise
customers to take an evolutionary approach to the migration to VoIP, as opposed to the
rather revolutionary approach that Cisco was advocating. This put Siemens relationship
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with Cisco in an odd place-two companies that were in the previous moment
complementors were now almost overnight competitors. By placing Cisco gear in many
of their most coveted accounts, Siemens effectively had pushed the Trojan Horse past the
threshold and into the inter sanctum of their customers that were hitherto fore locked-into
Siemens TDM voice offerings that had yielded handsome margins on parts and ongoing
related services over very long periods of times. Unlike many other devices, enterprise
PBXs had relatively long depreciation schedule, and once installed were going to stay in
place and generate a very attractive annuity stream for the manufacturer (consider that an
enterprise desktop digital phone sold for about $800...) Amongst the largest and most
strategic of these customers, Cisco had provided some level of direct customer support
enabling the development of relationships between the Cisco representatives and the
customer's staff. This made for a very precarious position for Siemens as the reader can
imagine-one that would many would say called for an almost immediate and radical
change in strategy direction.
Many of Cisco's competitors, Cabletron included saw this as a golden opportunity
to replace Cisco at one of its most productive and capable intermediaries with significant
market power in several geographies. The catch phrase going around Cabletron at this
point was the old adage; the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Siemens needed to be able
to provide Ethernet/IP infrastructure to provide the network infrastructure their new VoIP
solutions would utilize-the "plumbing" so to speak. The primary requirements of these
networks were fairly straightforward: Ethernet LAN switches, routers that provided wire-
speed performance and preferably provided some mechanism for Quality of Service. By
this juncture, every major vendor of enterprise data communications equipment included
in their offerings equipment that arguably could match or exceed the similar Cisco
equipment in the key attributes required to construct an Ethernet IP network quite capable
of providing simultaneous support of voice, video and data and often utilized a Cisco-like
command line for configuration. Arguably Cisco offered a much wider array of
equipment with varying capacities, particularly at the very high end. Regardless the Cisco
competitors like Cabletron that had remained focused on infrastructure others had very
compelling offers to allow Siemens ICN an avenue for extricating themselves from the
bind they now found themselves in described immediately above.
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Many trips to Munich followed for the teams from Cabletron and other vendors,
often with their respective CEOs in tow, for presentations to the Siemens ICN executives
and the various groups that managed alliances and partnerships for the entity. After
presentations on how the vendor's solution could match or was in fact far better than
Cisco's for supporting the Siemens VoIP offerings, hard bargaining sessions followed to
discuss terms of a potential relationship, primarily the discount Siemens would get on the
equipment it would purchase from the vendor in the event it was chosen as the
replacement. Regardless of the impetus for these discussions in the first place, the sheer
volume of business that Siemens could bring to the chosen vendor was such that they
retained a significant amount of bargaining power. In many cases, the vendors vying for
selection as the altemative-to-Cisco offered very lucrative volume-based discounting
schemes that would in principle allow Siemens to get significantly more margin on the
equipment (despite the overall trend of declining margins on equipment driven by
commoditization and intense competition), as well as commitments to provide significant
field support to get Siemens field force ramped-up. There were a whole host of
bargaining chips that came on and off the table, and as I reflect back on the experience of
the negotiations, it was hard to discern which party was more eager at many junctures.
The point of relating this story is more from the experience that occurred once the
negotiations were completed. Siemens in fact chose not one but many vendors as
alternatives to Cisco and the real work began. Global purchasing agreements were put in
place, and efforts began by the vendors to start transitioning Siemens opportunities in the
field from Cisco equipment to an alternative in part due to the Siemens ICN executives
desire to stop the infiltration of Cisco into its accounts as it began to compete overtly for
the voice business. As is traditional in these situations, there is a quid pro quo or "priming
of the pump" as it is often called in the industry. The selected vendors offered up
qualified leads or even established customers in various regions to the local Siemens ICN
office to gain some momentum in the Siemens field operations in keeping with the
principle that the currency of these relationships is leads and sales. Often this
transitioning of leads or existing accounts came at the expense of relationships with
another intermediary that either had been working the lead or account previously, and
now sale the vendor introducing a competitor into the account. This can be very tenuous
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indeed for a manufacturer that does not have 80-plus percentage of the market, but the
stakes were high: any significant portion of the Siemens business held the potential for an
immediate up-tick in sales. Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!
It was very soon after the stage of beginning the field roll-out that the reality of
the lock-in Cisco had attained with intermediaries, Siemens and others, became brutally
apparent. Although at the executive level and several layers down the management chain
Siemens knew it was in its best interest to stop the advance of its Cisco into its customer
base to protect its enterprise voice business that was not universally embraced at the level
of the field sales and technical force. Through my experience and the research I
completed for the thesis I believe that there were a number of pertinent factors that led to
significantly less than expected results for Cabletron and the other contenders in
converting a large portion of the Siemens Cisco data communications equipment
business.23 Having worked on these efforts directly, I have concluded that one of the
primary factors in why it was difficult to see an immediate conversion of the business
despite the drivers discussed was the support infrastructure that Cisco had in place. For
the operational people on the ground responsible for the sales and post-sales efforts, the
support provided by the Cisco web-based tools was difficult to abandon. When the field
staff was faced with putting the new partnership into operation the expectation was that
there would be functionally equivalent tools such as the network configuration tool and
quote builder, and e-learning facilities. In the absence of these tools, the new vendors
were faced with having to compensate for the lack of systems with people which were of
course, impossible to scale. Actual sales through this once very lucrative intermediary
were far below initial expectations, and accordingly less and less resources were provided
to support the effort.
23 It is important to note that this is a story still unfolding today. With the traction that enterprise VoIP has
seen in the past 1-2 years there is a potential for a significant increase in the upgrade of enterprise networks
as companies move from traditional TDM PBX to IP PBX-the realization of convergence within the
enterprise space. It will be interesting to see which vendor if any benefits significantly from the relationship
with Siemens ICN. Although the Siemens Enterprise Networks US page no longer makes mention of the
relationship with Cisco, stating instead that its primary infrastructure partners are now Enterasys and
Extreme Networks, it would be intensely interesting to know the revenues generated today for each of these
players, especially having the knowledge of the dollar amounts of business Siemens once generated for
Cisco as one of its key global intermediaries.
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I am certainly not arguing that the tools were the only factor involved in the slow
ramp of sales through Siemens; clearly there were many causal factors involved as it is a
very complex system. First and foremost among them was the fact that the field
personnel had made a very nice living selling Cisco equipment and had kept many
customers satisfied-they knew the equipment inside out, what it could and more
importantly could not do and they positioned solutions accordingly. New offerings and
lack of experience could and did result in projects that did not go well initially. Although
the margins were increasingly thinner, the field force was knowledgeable and confident
about where and how to win competing with other intermediaries. The fact that Cisco had
such dominant market share and demand was high, often the level of effort required to
win was relatively low compared to having to position a competitive solution. Although
Siemens was able to maintain it was expanding beyond Cisco to maintain its vendor
agnosticism, that veil was somewhat thin for customers who saw the competitive playing
field changing. Field teams had become reliant on standard Cisco configurations and had
template proposals that enabled them to participate in more opportunities, and despite the
low margin per deal necessitated on primarily competition for this business primarily on
price still make quota and get their bonuses. The support that Cisco's channel and direct
field sales force provided Siemens previous to the change in competitive posture between
the companies was also a major factor-strong relationships in the field continued long
beyond the pronouncement from on high to minimize the dependency. Siemens also as a
matter of strategy began deemphasizing a lot of the infrastructure business it had done in
the past at the height of the Cisco relationship. Much of that business had been low value-
add, simply providing the fulfillment function with little opportunity for Siemens-
provided services included in the deal. As competition in the space became more intense,
and margins began to decrease, Siemens made a conscious decision to not compete for
that type of low-value add data communications equipment business focusing its
resources on higher value-added, higher margin services farther up the value chain.
In closing, this anecdote helps illustrate several important points that were raised
in this chapter. First among them is that intermediary support infrastructure matters on
several levels. It can be a very important factor in making the successful use of
intermediated channels both scalable and inimitable for the manufacturer of high
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technology offerings in markets where standards or other factors make product
differentiation difficult. Locking-in the best channels and locking out competitors' access
to those channels can be an effective strategy for sustaining competitive advantage over
time. More than anything this story reinforces the timing aspect for companies that
potentially will need to consider utilization of intermediated channels. Move aggressively
to implement the infrastructure required for a multi-channel strategy which today
undoubtedly requires a scalable, low-cost/high-value infrastructure that supports best-in-
class front- and back-office applications. Such an IT infrastructure is increasingly
necessary to "hook the big fish when they are hungry" so to speak, to attract and retain
the best intermediaries long enough for the indirect network externalities to become
embedded in their organizations. This of course is the precursor to successful lock-in of
the intermediated channel and lock-out of competitors that can be one potential source of
long-term competitive advantage.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided the reader with a detailed overview of how the
utilization of technology can be an integral part of addressing many of the challenges of
employing intermediated channels. Web-based technologies enable the extension of a
firms own systems to create virtual integration with its partners including intermediaries.
The chapter outlines the fact that the development of these systems requires an early
commitment to building a foundation of IT systems that can be effectively extended. The
example of Cisco Systems presented in the chapter suggests that there is often a
significant investment in getting the systems in place that serve as the foundation for an
intermediary support infrastructure. The reader is reminded of the systems dynamics
analysis presented at the end of the last chapter. The investments required to build a
multiple channel management capability within a firm can include a large investment in
IT infrastructure.
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Chapter 5 - Case Study: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Chapter Introduction
The paper thus far has covered many aspects of the management of intermediated
channels pertaining to the enterprise data communications equipment market segment
and other similar high technology markets. This chapter and the following chapter will
compare and contrast some major differences in the execution of an intermediated
channel strategy by two example companies in the enterprise data communications
market, Cisco Systems, Inc. and Cabletron Systems, Inc. (now known as Enterasys
Networks, Inc.) Particular attention will be paid to the relationship management and
partner support infrastructure aspects of their intermediated channel management
execution outlined in the two previous chapters. Although these companies had
somewhat similar origins and by 1994 were competing head-to-head for dominant market
share in several product areas, their respective execution of an intermediated channel
strategy varied significantly. Although Cabletron, 3Com and Bay Networks (SynOptics)
had significant market share in a segment it helped to create, the equipment used to create
enterprise LANs, Cisco aggressively entered that space via acquisitions timed perfectly
with the introduction of the highly disruptive LAN switching technology. Cisco used the
opportunity afforded it by the disruption to take substantial market share and eventually
eclipse not only Cabletron, but 3Com, Bay Networks and several other firms. Cisco's
domination of the enterprise data communication equipment segment continues to this
day with Cisco taking a leadership position in the next wave in the industry, the migration
by enterprises to VoIP.
The highly effective employment of its intermediary channels has been one of the
primary driving forces in the success of Cisco Systems. Through this careful evaluation
of the two companies, the objective will be to outline some of the specific differences in
the companies' management of a multi-channel strategy and the effective employment of
intermediaries in an effort to uncover potential root causes of success and failure in the
execution of multi-channel strategies. In so doing there may be several important lessons
for intermediated channel management that are applicable to high technology markets
such as data communications equipment, that were characterized by rapid evolution and
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most importantly open public standards. Competing in markets where the differentiation
of offerings on uniqueness becomes increasingly more difficult over time as standards
drive features and functionality toward homogeneity, and the offerings themselves
commoditize at a rapid pace require management focus to uncover alternative means of
value capture. Firms in these types of markets must capitalize early and aggressively
acquire or build complementary assets that provide opportunities for sustainable
competitive advantage. Through this chapter the paper will examine closely how two
direct competitors approached the development of one complementary asset, the
development of an inimitable effectiveness in the use of intermediated channels, to
successfully reach the largest total addressable market, take and retain market share while
:maintaining superior operating margins.
As has been outlined earlier in the paper, at the time of this writing, Cisco
Systems appears to have successfully dominated this market space, leveraging its control
of the router and WAN markets into domination of virtually all segments of the enterprise
data communications equipment market, effectively displacing the incumbents from their
previous leadership of the LAN space. Companies such as Cabletron, 3Com and Bay
Networks which arguably had a significant lead in the LAN connectivity space lost
significant market share to Cisco, even as the market itself dramatically increased in size.
As we will see in this chapter, one of the key tenets of the Cisco strategy to dominate the
enterprise data communications segment has been the incredibly effective management of
its intermediated channels and superb execution of a complex multi-channel strategy.
Company and Product Origins: Cisco Systems, Inc
The appendices at the end of the thesis outlines the evolution and dynamics of the
enterprise data communications equipment market provide a relatively good
understanding of Cisco's roots as a single product, technology-focused firm that played a
crucial role in the development of the foundational technologies of the IP-based Internet.
The reader unfamiliar with the data communications equipment market is referred to the
appendices for additional background.
Cisco Systems began life as a company in 1984. The founders, a husband and
wife team were members of the computer science department at Stanford University and
had been carefully following the evolution of the Internet. They left Stanford to start
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Cisco Systems and later received venture capital funding from one of the leaders of the
high technology venture capital community, Sequoia Capital. The founders led Cisco
until its successful initial public offering in 1990, when they were driven out by the
management team brought in by their financial backers led by CEO John Morgridge.
Morgridge. Morgridge was a seasoned computer industry executive and he immediately
began to assemble and build a professional management team. That team included John
Chambers who was hired in 1991, and then replaced Morgridge as CEO of the company
in 1995 and continues to lead Cisco to this day. Morgridge has continued on throughout
the period since as Chairman of the Board of Cisco Systems.
The professional management brought into Cisco included vast information
technology experience gained at Honeywell and IBM at the most senior levels of the
company. These were professional managers and strategists with an impressive track
record of execution, having learned very valuable lessons about managing the growth of a
public high technology company. They were especially proficient in managing the scale
of the sales and customer-facing activities. I believe that their collective experience also
engrained in them some important principles of competition in high technology markets,
and the introduction of disruptive innovations as outlined earlier in this paper. They were
well aware of the challenges in positioning innovations to the more risk averse, the
segments of customers to the right of the technology adoption curve. Clearly they were
well aware of the importance of brand as their marketing and branding efforts were well
underway early. Due in part to the influence of the venture capitalists, the company
transitioned quickly to a company with mature and capable management that very early
on became focused on overcoming the difficulties of managing a company experiencing
phenomenal growth rates.
The founders of Cisco Systems initiative to solve several problems with
connecting the disparate networks on the Stanford campus provided them with a
significant technical lead in the design and marketing of the special-purpose devices that
essentially direct packet traffic over the core of the Internet. In parallel to Cisco Systems
work on the Internet backbone, it successfully leveraged its technology to develop
solutions that enabled enterprises to construct private wide area networks over the service
provider networks. Essentially these private WANs were much smaller versions of the
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Internet that larger enterprises used to interconnect the local networks of their own sites
and potentially to connect with selected partners. These private WANs utilized the same
technologies as the Internet as, but access to these networks was controlled by the
companies that created them for essentially their own use. In addition to support for
multiprotocol routing in its products, Cisco very early on provided equipment for
connecting the legacy IBM environments that utilized an IBM proprietary technology
called SNA (Systems Network Architecture) that enabled the largest enterprises to bridge
the legacy computing infrastructure with the new, client-server infrastructures bypassing
the need for purchasing equipment from IBM to do it.
During the early stages of its evolution as a company, Cisco Systems sales
activities were fairly concentrated on the service providers and on primarily the largest
enterprises that utilized routing for building private WANs to connect locations over long
distances and complex intranets. This was not a very large set of customers to call on, and
their level of technical sophistication and experience with information technology was
typically quite high. The problems they were trying to solve with routing were
concentrated as well in comparison with other companies such as Cabletron and
SynOptics which were providing the wiring hubs that large enterprise were using to
build-out their enterprise LANs.
The dominant role played by Cisco routers in the build-out of the infrastructure of
Internet backbone and private WANs combined with the relationship it was able to
develop with the service providers was very important for Cisco Systems in the rapidly
expanding enterprise data communications equipment market. Enterprises that were
connecting to the service provider networks to construct private WANs saw Cisco routers
in use with the service providers almost exclusively (to this day it is still estimated that
over 80% of Internet traffic is forwarded at some point by a Cisco router), and this had a
large influence on the equipment these enterprise customers chose for their end of the
connection, often referred to as CPE, (Customer Premise Equipment.) The service
providers were incredibly important influencers for a large number of enterprises
downstream of their POPs for many reasons including guaranteeing interoperability,
access to Cisco proprietary extensions, and leveraging the growing number of Cisco IOS-
literate technicians on the technical staffs of the service providers.
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The move within large enterprises, global multinationals in particular, toward
standardization on a single vendor for routing technology and vendor by enterprises
occurred much earlier as well. Because of the high complexity and the need to leverage
training and expertise of rare, router-literate technical staff, IT departments found it
desirable early on to mandate a single vendor for routers across the company. This is an
example of indirect network externalities that can exist even in the presence of public
open technology standards. Also it is important to recall that the technology was new,
highly complex and the standards ratification often lagged what the manufacturers with
the engineering expertise and field experience could add to their products while the
standards were in process. Cisco engineers were often driving innovation of features and
functionality based on their own experiences and input they were receiving in the field
that enabled them to add Cisco-proprietary extensions to the Cisco Internetworking
Operating System (IOS-the operating firmware of their routers) often far in advance of
the standards. These proprietary extensions, delivered through the operating firmware
added useful features to the Cisco offering that did not violate or break the standards,
adding very desirable features and functionality ahead of the standards process and ahead
of their competitors. Cisco has always been "committed to standards" but when the
opportunity presented itself, Cisco-proprietary features were added and positioned with
customers experiencing the problems these features were designed to address. While
these features were compliant with the standards, they were Cisco-proprietary and
typically non-interoperable with the features other vendors had implemented, and often
not forward-compatible with a standard that later emerged. Combined with the move by
most large enterprises toward standardization of a router vendor, the reader can easily see
how Cisco was able to achieve somewhat of a customer lock-in with its routers early on
via the indirect network externalities and "soft standards" it created with its proprietary
features. The selection of routing protocols and features, vendor, and management of the
routed infrastructure was often dictated from corporate headquarters. Cisco Systems had
achieved leading market share in routing of over 50 percent by the early 1990s, the
number two manufacturer, Wellfleet had a mere 15 percent.
The paper has stressed the fact routing is by its nature amongst the most complex
of the technologies used in enterprise network infrastructures today. Throughout the early
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1990s, much of the functionality provided by routers was provided via the operating
firmware which not only provided the user interface, but also the applications that
provided the services that routers performed on the network such as the routing protocol.
The routing protocol provides the primary function of the router, intelligently routing
packets from one logical network to another, often through a series of intermediate hops.
It is important to understand that in order to be compliant with the constantly evolving
standards; the applications in the routing firmware had to meet certain specifications in
order to enable a basic level of interoperability with other standards-compliant devices.
As outlined in the appendix, compliance with open, public standards was one of the most
important dynamics driving the data communications equipment industry. However, it
was completely feasible to design equipment that complied fully with the standards and
also included vendor-specific and proprietary enhancements to the standard applications,
proprietary new applications and user-interface/manageability options.
Through the 1980s and early 1990s the public IEEE and IETF standards were
primarily centered on standardization of the required protocols and their basic
functionality and interoperability-there were not many options or "bells and whistles"
addressed in the standards at this time. In many cases these kinds of features and
functionality were added to the standard over time, but in most cases long after a vendor
or vendors had already implemented and deployed a similar proprietary solution in the
field. A good example of this is a Cisco proprietary interior gateway routing protocol it
called IGRP, (Interior Gateway Routing Protocol) which it developed to address some of
the scalability and other issues with the IETF standard protocol at the time known as RIP
iRouter Information Protocol). The routing protocol is used by the routers to determine
the routes used to forward IP packets (via other routers) to a destination. For larger
enterprises, RIP had some significant limitations that resulted in slow convergence times
if a failure occurred and provided no way to make qualitative decisions about alternative
routes. The IETF had set about developing a next-generation protocol which became
known as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) but that process took a significant amount of
time as it utilized an entirely new approach (link state vs. distance vector). Cisco, while
working with the IETF on OSPF created an entirely new routing protocol that was
proprietary to Cisco called IGRP that addressed many of the shortcomings of RIP but
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retained the distance vector algorithm and introduced it in the IOS significantly ahead of
OSPF. Many of Cisco's customers adopted IGRP routing of IP on their networks because
it addressed the problems briefly outlined above and generally worked well. There was
only one caveat: within a given intranet the IP routing protocol had to be consistent on all
routers-in essence, enterprises that chose to run standard IP networks and utilized IGRP
as the routing protocol had to use Cisco routers, or routers from an IOS licensee.
The customers which adopted these proprietary features were often times caught
off guard. In many cases they did not realize until it was too late that a specific feature
that solved a problem for them and they had become somewhat dependent upon was a
Cisco-proprietary solution that would only work with other routers that ran Cisco's IOS.
Cisco Systems and every vendor for that matter publicly and loudly claimed its
commitment to standards and the active role many of its best engineers had in the
standards bodies and processes. And after all, the products that had these proprietary
features embedded within them were completely standards compliant-it became
difficult to discern which features were standards-based and which were proprietary
extensions at any one time. At the end of the day in most cases, it did not matter. Often
the proprietary features provided functionality that was in need, so the choice for
customers was often to be a either purist and wait for a standards-based solution, or
accept the fact that they may in fact be going to a path toward lock-in via a soft standard.
Understanding the pressures that most IT organizations were under at the time to simply
makes things work, it is not all that surprising that many opted for the latter.
Cisco had developed a large and growing base of Service Provider and large
enterprise customers that often pushed the Cisco routers to their design limits and were
constantly demanding leading-edge features and performance. Recall discussion earlier in
the chapter about the hierarchy, router people at the top. Cisco engineers got good input
directly from their customers; they undoubtedly received a great many customer requests
for functionality that converted well into of opportunities for customization of the IOS to
solve problems through enhancements. Enhancements which were in essence "soft
standards" got implemented and were standardized on resulting in local lock-in.
These facts are indicative of some very effective positive feedback loops that
were responsible for the rapid dissemination of Cisco brand and its dominance in the
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routing space. The Service Providers created a strong base of customers/users that
provided a solid reference for the Cisco offering to potential enterprise customers. The
Cisco-proprietary IOS extensions were acceptable initially because they were still
technically compliant with the standards although once customers began to use them and
become dependent on them, they needed to stay with Cisco routers. As will be discussed
later in the chapter, Cisco embarked upon a very aggressive technical training program on
its products and the fundamental technologies of the Internet, wide area networking and
routing. As the Cisco training and certification programs were established as the de facto
credentials for knowledge in this space, many enterprises utilized these training programs
to educate their technical staffs on the technologies but in addition were indoctrinated on
the Cisco implementations, command line languages, and workflows which undoubtedly
influenced their choice of equipment. As enterprises standardized their routing
technology and vendors, the presence of indirect network externalities and soft standards
positioned Cisco extraordinarily well. The presence of these loops provides a very
plausible explanation for the total domination of the enterprise router segment by Cisco
Systems that continues to this day. Much of the functionality provided by routers in the
early 1990s and before was accomplished primarily via software such as Cisco IOS; the
hardware was not overly specialized and therefore was not a driver of costs. More
importantly, customers understood that the functionality was provided in the software and
accordingly the IOS, the "brains" of the router was priced separately from the hardware.
Cisco was able to partition the feature set in the IOS and accordingly had several levels of
functionality with corresponding price points. Because IOS was software, the margins
were high (essentially 100% as IOS became distributed primarily via the Internet) across
the line but for the high-end functionality needed for large enterprises and service
providers, the margins were exceedingly good. The routing business overall enjoyed very
high margins, and with market leadership and its domination of the service provider
markets Cisco generated a great deal of cash early in its history that it was able to utilize
for skillful marketing, developing its infrastructure and assembling a war chest that it
would eventually utilize to embark on an ambitious program of product line expansion
through acquisition.
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Lastly in this discussion of the Cisco evolution as a router company, it is
important to go back to the point regarding the hierarchy within IT organizations which
clearly put those members of the staff responsible for the routing at the top. LAN
equipment was by its design relatively simpler in function. Most of the functionality of a
wiring hub was provided in hardware and was essentially "plug and play." Although
wiring hubs evolved to include management functionality provided through the firmware,
enabling and configuring management of these devices was considered to be optional.
Prior to the introduction of LAN switching, among the hardest task associated with LAN
installation was the installation of the cabling, and the installation and configuration of
NICs in hundreds or possibly thousands of PCs, often of multiple types from any number
of manufacturers. Installation, configuration and operation of enterprise LAN equipment
(e.g., wiring hubs) was relatively straightforward in contrast to the efforts required for
routed infrastructures. I would suggest from my own experience in the field that installing
and operating LANs was considered to be more "blue collar" while routers and WANs
were considered to be more of the domain of the intellectual. The routers provide the
connectivity to the outside world: customers and suppliers as well as linking the critical
internal business systems of the enterprise. Accordingly the routing team received more
incentives, and one of the incentives they received was participation in company-
sponsored technical training and certification programs. The end result that is pertinent to
this discussion is that the router engineers and technicians were typically in higher
positions, had more influence in purchasing decisions and were far fewer in number-
easier to reach via influencers, sales efforts and marketing. Selling to the router group of
an enterprise's organization was essentially selling to the technical elite and Cisco made a
key decision early in its history to recruit highly technical sales people. This enabled
Cisco to go-to-market in a very different fashion while it was a one-product company.
The nature of its concentrated sales effort enabled the company to go to market with
small, relatively autonomous field teams consisting of an account executive and sales
engineer, relying on the call center for post-sales support. Beyond being responsible for a
sales quota, Cisco account teams managed many of the functions around qualification,
proposals, and pre- and post-sales customer service from the field without reliance on
additional resources from corporate.
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The processes described above affected not only end customers of data
communications equipment, they also impinged on the emerging data communication
intermediated channels described early in this chapter. Many of these firms had recruited
and hired technical staff from the service providers and enterprises that had deployed
large, routed internetworks and because of the hierarchy, often recruited the most
knowledgeable, experienced, trained and eventually certified technicians which were
highly likely to have worked with or nearby Cisco products at one time or another. This
rather incestuous connection to the enterprise data communications equipment channels
was important for Cisco for obvious reasons.
As is outlined in the appendix, routing although incredibly important in the
enterprise was but a small part of the total opportunity for data communications
equipment manufacturers. The somewhat less complex equipment that was providing
connectivity to devices in enterprise LANs had created another market niche that was
growing exponentially. Cisco Systems had grown in parallel with companies such as
Cabletron Systems, 3Com and SynOptics which battled in the LAN equipment space
providing equipment such as wiring hubs that enterprises used to construct the enterprise
LANs that Cisco routers were interconnecting. For Cabletron and SynOptics, their
primary offering consisted of the wiring hub, the devices that provided connectivity for
the end stations connecting to the LAN. In 1992, the revenues of Cabletron and Cisco
were roughly even at $180M. At the time, Cabletron and SynOptics shared roughly 50
percent of the wiring hub market. Innovation in the LAN space was moving rapidly as
companies demanded more bandwidth and capacity to support the voracious appetites of
enterprises for connecting more and more devices, and the need for greater speed as new
client-server applications were implemented. New transport technologies were being
positioned such as FDDI and even ATM, not to mention higher-speed variants of
Ethernet were being proposed and pursued by the established companies in the space,
startups and the standards bodies.
In the 1993, several startups were working on a new, potentially disruptive
technology that could potentially change the way endpoints were connected to the
network. At the time the technologies used for LAN connectivity including the
increasingly popular standards-based Ethernet technology had a serious drawback. The
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Ethernet technology designed at Xerox PARC by Dr. Metcalfe and his small team
effectively required devices connected to the same network segment to share the
available bandwidth, which at the time was 10Mbps. Up until this point of time, the
wiring hubs being offered by Cabletron, SynOptics, 3Com all utilized shared-bandwidth
technology.
To solve this limitation a variety of startups were already in existence pursuing
solutions to the problem of shared access hubs, and providing increases in available
bandwidth. One of the most promising approaches was leveraging technology originally
developed at Digital Equipment Corporation that allowed the interconnection of LAN
segments utilizing a method that operated at a lower level of the OSI stack than routing,
but at a slightly higher level than repeating. That technology which became standardized
in the IEEE provided functionality called bridging. Unlike repeaters that simply
forwarded packets received on one interface out all other interfaces on the device, bridges
made an intelligent forwarding decision. Initially implemented in software, the bridging
algorithm examined each packet received on an interface and only forwarded packets out
the interface it believed the destination end station resided on. This was superior to
repeating in that it provided segmentation of traffic. Many innovative engineers saw the
potential to utilize this technology to create a device that utilized this algorithm on every
port to effectively provide a dedicate segment for each station and end the need to share
the available bandwidth. That type of device however would have to have the processing
power to run the algorithm on every port, at wire speed. Accomplishing this with a
general purpose CPU and software however presented significant limitations.
Several advances in silicon technology had resulted in a new category of
integrated circuits called ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) and the
introduction of the RISC processor had made possible the engineering of a device that
could potentially handle the intelligent forwarding of packets on a per-port basis. Several
startups were formed to pursue the application of a hybrid RISC-ASIC solution to
develop what would be called a LAN switch. LAN switches would be capable of
applying some very basic forwarding logic per port, while maintaining the line-rate speed
of a repeater on several ports simultaneously. LAN switching presented the classic
technology disruption scenario for the wiring hub vendors. The first LAN switches were
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limited to workgroup functionality, not having the capacity to compete directly with the
wiring hub for the wiring closet space. However, the evolution of LAN switching
technology evolved very quickly to come up from below the wiring hub technology, and
eventually overtake and obsolete it as LAN switching improved and the capacities
expanded rapidly.
Cisco was watching the developments in the LAN space intently and I surmise
that it clearly saw the potential disruption and the opportunity it might afford to penetrate
the LAN equipment space. While others argue that Cisco was primarily acting to protect
itself from the competitive threat to routing posed by the LAN switching technology and
direct competition from the startups that had begun to compete for LAN connectivity
business.24 Many sources cite that Cisco was increasingly encountering the LAN
switching startups in its customer base but LAN switches competed primarily with wiring
hubs and not the routers that Cisco was offering at the time. I believe that Cisco was in
fact exploiting an opportunity to take share in the wiring closet business which was
becoming increasingly more lucrative as PC internetworking began to be pervasive. I
believe that Cisco was on the offensive and not acting defensively as some have
suggested. Specifically it was being opportunistic in seeking an opportunity to displace
Cabletron, 3Com and SynOptics lead in the wiring hub segment of the market. Doing so
would obviously enable Cisco Systems to compete for the entire enterprise connectivity
market which had grown to approximately $6B by 1994.
Despite the debate that was raging in the industry regarding the role of routing in
enterprise LANs, it was clearly evident that routers as they were implemented in this time
frame were not going to be utilized to provide LAN connectivity-they had neither the
performance nor could they achieve the price-performance ratios required in order to be
attractive for wiring closet connectivity. To maintain the stunning growth Cisco
stakeholders had become accustomed, Cisco had to expand the reach of its product line
into the LAN and wiring closet connectivity segment of the market.
The disruption afforded by the LAN switching innovation provided a unique
opportunity. In September of 1993 Cisco Systems made the first of what would be a very
24 Gawer, A. & Cusumano, M. (2002). Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft and Cisco drive industry
innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 167-168.
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long list of acquisitions that it would use to broaden its product line and attack every
conceivable segment of the enterprise and service provider data communications
equipment market. At this time it acquired a Sunnyvale, California-based startup called
Crescendo Communications for $89M in Cisco stock. The sixty person startup was
developing high-speed LAN switching solutions for workgroups, and with this
acquisition Cisco was established in the LAN switching business, clearly targeting
companies such as Cabletron, 3Com, and SynOptics for the lucrative and coveted LAN
connectivity business dominated at the time by wiring hub products offered by those
companies. Crescendo as it turns out brought to Cisco both a working high-speed LAN
switch product, but also valuable technology leadership in a new variant of Ethernet that
offered a 10x increase in performance which became to be known as Fast Ethernet.
In October of 1994, Cisco moved again in what some have called a preemptive
strike to acquire a company called Kalpana, Inc. another small startup that was working
on Ethernet switching products. Purportedly Cisco swooped in and closed the deal with
Kalpana over a weekend while IBM, which was also in negotiations to acquire the
company, was conducting environmental testing at Kalpana's office building in
determine if it was in compliance. 25 What was even more interesting to the discussion of
intermediated channels was this quote from then EVP of Cisco Systems John Chambers
in the official Cisco press release announcing the acquisition of Kalpana:
"Kalpana provides great value because their products are both cost-effective and
high-in-performance. Additionally, because Kalpana markets and supports
products worldwide through distributors, value-added resellers and systems
integrators, their well-established, indirect channels of distribution complement
Cisco's existing sales channels," said John Chambers, Cisco's executive vice
president." 26
25 Segil, L. (2000, August 21). Alliances: Preemptive Alliances, Industry Week Online. Retrieved April
2005 from http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticlelD= 1998
26 Cisco Systems, Inc. Press Release.(1994, October 24). Retrieved April 2005 from
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/1994/corp 102494.html
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Cisco Embraces Intermediated Channels
It is intensely interesting to note that Cisco Systems timed the expansion of its
sale efforts into intermediated channels concurrently with the expansion of its product
line in order to compete for the LAN connectivity segment of the enterprise market. I
would characterize this as a deliberate "one-two" combination punch that Cisco Systems
conceived of and executed to knock-out its primary competitors in the LAN connectivity
space. Specifically targeting those that had been dominant in the pre-LAN switching era,
the wiring hub vendors such as Cabletron, SynOptics and 3Com, Cisco seized the
opportunity to position itself as the dominant supplier of enterprise data communication
equipment and to achieve that through primarily an intermediated channel strategy.
Oddly enough, prior to the 1993-1994 timeframe Cisco had actively established
relationships with the wiring hub vendors it was now clearly targeting in order to add
Cisco routing functionality to their offerings. In an interesting twist of fate, the very
vendors that Cisco began targeting in 1994 were among Cisco's first intermediated
channels! In 1992 in fact, Cisco had established a relationship with SynOptics that
potentially included joint development, but failed within a year due to irreconcilable
technological differences.27 Before and after the failed agreement with SynOptics which
later merged with a Cisco competitor, Wellfleet Communications in October 1994, Cisco
had relationships with most of the hub manufacturers servicing the enterprise markets:
DEC, Cabletron, LanOptics, Optical Data Systems, and Chipcom (eventually acquired by
3Com). One wiring hub vendor, UB networks not only incorporated Cisco technology but
began reselling Cisco's router products in a true intermediated channel relationship. 2 8
In the interviews conducted for this paper, it was stated that at this point in time
the primary driver in the decision to utilize intermediaries was purely a matter of rapidly
scaling the sales effort upward. As a router company, Cisco Systems focused initially on
a market that required far fewer field resources: namely the service providers and the
large enterprise customers that were interconnecting campuses and utilizing Cisco routers
to implement private WANs. The fact that routers were deployed in a smaller number of
physical locations, and that they could be managed effectively remotely led to different
27 Bunnell, D. (2000). Making the Cisco connection: The story behind the real internet superpower. New
York: John Wiley and Sons.
28 Ibid.
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requirements for the scale of customer-facing sales and technical support forces while
Cisco was a single-product company. Its primary sales channel up until 1994 was its
direct sales force, augmented with a few relationships with telecommunications service
providers to facilitate the build-out of the Internet backbone and private WANs, some
high-end intermediaries particularly in markets outside the US, and the relationships with
the hub vendors described immediately above.
In fact in my research I discovered these account teams prior to the 1994
expansion of the Cisco product line into the LAN space this is precisely how Cisco
Systems managed its customer-facing force: the account executive and sales engineer
were responsible for a territory and performed all of the pre and post-sales functions for
their assigned accounts, including assisting the customers with installation, configuration
and troubleshooting when necessary. There were of course large and strategic customers
that might have a team of Cisco employees dedicated to their needs possibly onsite with
the customer, but this was an exception. As the number of Cisco customers and
opportunities for new business grew in a region, a new team was brought on and the
accounts in the region divided. This was a fairly straight-forward method of scaling the
sales force, even as the company expanded into international markets. It was possible in
large part due to the highly centralized nature of the target customers and markets for
routers.
This landscape began to change dramatically in 1994 at Cisco. In addition to the
comments made by John Chambers at the time of the Kalpana acquisition which
incidentally, were made immediately preceding Chambers taking the reins as CEO of
Cisco Systems, Cisco embarked upon execution of its efforts to shift its primary go-to-
market strategy from direct sales, to intermediated channel sales. This is reflective of a
statement made earlier in the chapter referring to the experiences and backgrounds of
Chambers and Morgridge learned earlier in their careers, that companies often have to
utilize alliances to extend the reach of a company without impairing its ability to focus
and best serve its customers. John Chambers has asserted that Cisco learned early on that
it was better to form partnerships and share revenues with partners, including an
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intermediated channel, than to do everything itself.29 This was in stark contrast to the
philosophy of some others in the industry as will be examined in the next chapter.
There are some other important developments in the market and internally within
Cisco described in the appendix and the previous chapter that are worth revisiting. The
reader should recall that the 1994 timeframe was also when the Internet and the
Worldwide Web really exploded onto the information technology landscape. This is the
time period in which Netscape emerged and the browser wars began, and the commercial
applications of the Internet such as e-commerce and virtual supply chain integration
really became possible through "Internet-powered" applications that began to abound at
the time.
This is also the timeframe of the major overhaul described in the previous chapter
of Cisco's own internal information technology system including the move toward using
web-based applications both internally and for connection to its manufacturing partners,
suppliers, customers and eventually its intermediated channel partners. As was asserted in
the appendix, Cisco Systems had a very clear vantage point for previews of the potential
disruptions afforded by PCs, client-server computing and the Internet. By adopting these
technologies itself it likely developed a unique perspective of how the technology was
going to radically change the use of IT including its own offerings going forward. These
technologies radically changed the landscape for the employment of IT by enterprises and
individuals. The use of IT was no longer relegated to only the largest enterprises that
could expend the large amounts of capital required to acquire and operate mainframes
and minicomputer environments. The new technologies were going to make possible the
employment of IT by virtually every organization and individual on the planet. Trying to
sell and service that total addressable market was simply not feasible, Cisco Systems was
focusing at this time on how to get the market share and margins required in this new
model, while constantly keeping its eye on technology development.
Cisco was not the first of the major enterprise data communications vendors to
move to intermediated channels. Before the Kalpana acquisition by Cisco in 1994 as it
began communicating its intention to utilize intermediated channels for its branch routers,
its direct competitor Wellfleet had been in the channel for approximately three years
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29 Bunnell.
before and had increased its indirect sales to 55% from 10% around the time of the
inception of its own channel program. 30 3Com had a long history in the channel as well,
moving to indirect channels in the early 1980s to successfully scale distribution of its
network adapter cards for Intel-based PCs which was the engine of that company's
growth. As well as announcing plans to begin offering its low-end routers through two-
tier distribution in the fall of 1994, Cisco also initiated a major alliance with Hewlett-
Packard that extended far beyond the standard inclusion of Cisco routing in HP's hubs.
That relationship grew in the following year when HP became the first Cisco
intermediary channel partner to both resell Cisco equipment and service its equipment.31
Cisco provided the HP field technical staff with training which provided Cisco with a
much needed worldwide 24-hour support capability. Even at this early juncture, Cisco
was already girding itself for the increase of buying from segments of the market other
than large enterprise, spurred primarily in the emergence of the Internet. In an article in
September of 1994 announcing plans to utilize indirect channels for its low-end routers,
John Chambers was quoted, "This part of our business [sales to small and medium
businesses] will grow two to three times faster than our sales to large companies." 3 2
Like all companies with a large direct sales presence, these announcements by
Cisco in 1994 were received with due caution by smaller network VARs. In their
estimation Cisco had avoided the channel in the past. The concern was shared not only by
the small VARs that were the target intermediaries for these products, but the small
cadre of established high-end channels Cisco utilized for its most complex router
offerings not currently being made available to the channel . For obvious reasons the
small VARs were concerned about potentially being displaced out of deals by the direct
sales force, and the high-end integrators were concerned about confusion in the
marketplace over the expanding range of products. In reality, most of these concerns
were allayed by the forces described at the end of the last paragraph. Many in the
industry did not foresee the rapid expansion of the market made possible by the huge
demand that emerged from the small and medium business segments for routers, and
30 Dunlap, C. (1994, May 16). Cisco alters approach, taps channel for help. Computer Reseller News, 2.
31 Bunnell.
32Willett, S. (1994, September 26) Cisco turns to channel to boost low-end router sales. Computer Reseller
News, 597, 3-4.
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soon for LAN switching solutions for new installations in the case of the small and
medium segments, and in the case of the large enterprise, technology refresh of the
shared, hub-based infrastructures that had been installed in the first wave of LAN build
outs.
Not surprisingly, Cisco communicated several deliberate actions it was taking to
build confidence in the intermediary channels it was targeting as it announced its
intention to utilize intermediated channels for its low-end routers in 1994. Specifically it
provided electronic technical support on the Internet for its intermediated channel
partners as described in detail in the last chapter, significantly ahead of its rivals. It
initiated agreements with major distributors to enable VARs and dealers to purchase
Cisco products through distribution and avoid having to maintain a direct relationship
with the company. It restructured its internal indirect sales and marketing organizations to
better support potential intermediated channel partners interested in reselling the Cisco
branch routers and remote access solutions. 33
By the middle part of 1995 Cisco Systems announced a bold expansion of its
channel programs to include its high-end gear, including its routers and LAN switching
products acquired in the previous years. It had hired away from one of its chief rivals Bay
Networks (formed by the merger of Wellfleet and SynOptics in the fall of the previous
year) a top channel executive that went on to become Cisco's VP of worldwide channels.
It put into place additional relationships with distributors that would further enhance the
effectiveness of its two-tier model which was the mainstay of the VARs and dealers
working in the small and medium business markets. As it turns out, the acceleration of
buying by the small and medium business segment did not really materialize until the
1997 timeframe, but in the meantime Cisco Systems was having great success in getting
its intermediated channel machinery up and running. More importantly for Cisco, the
transition within large enterprises from shared hubs to LAN switches was in fact
beginning as it was hitting its stride in the channel.
In Cisco System's fiscal year 1996 which ended in July of that year, Cisco
Systems had succeeded in transitioning the company from approximately 10% of its sales
33 Willett, S. (1994, September 19). Cisco rides with HP to sell routers through the channel. Computer
Reseller News, 596, 102.
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through intermediated channels five years before, to an incredible 70% that year.34 The
VP of worldwide channels commented: "We have become more and more a reseller-
oriented company. The channels we have are helping us grow at 88% year over year."3 5
Cisco's onslaught on the hub vendors with its acquired LAN switching products and the
close linkages it was claiming between its routers and switches was gaining significant
traction. In an industry poll conducted that year, twenty-three percent of respondents at
large corporations claimed to have Cisco switches installed.36 The remaining members of
the big four, Bay Networks, 3Com and Cabletron, had 11%, 9% and 5% respectively.
Cisco had masterfully recognized a potential market disruption and capitalized on it using
an intermediated channel strategy to unseat the incumbents in the LAN connectivity
space. While the wiring hub companies were slow to introduce their own LAN switching
products, instead relying on "bigger, better" generations of shared technology, Cisco was
able to enter and take market share. I would argue that it could not have accomplished
this feat with the LAN switching technology alone. It was the one-two punch of the
disruptive technology combined with the very successful execution of its strategy to
engage and dominate the enterprise data communications intermediaries.
This early success in the LAN switching space gave Cisco another critical
advantage: economies of scale. Cisco was selling such volume of LAN switches it was
able to adjust its prices downward significantly which resulted in a price war in the
beginning of 1997.3 7 By the end of 1997, for the first time in its history, Cisco Systems
was generating more of its revenues from its non-router products than its routers.3 8 Cisco
had successfully transitioned from a one product company, to the preeminent source of
data communications equipment for the enterprise worldwide. As is often left out of the
many articles and books about Cisco, a significant factor in its achievements in the
marketplace was the company's superb execution of an intermediated channels strategy.
In 1997 the connectivity explosion that was predicted to coincide with the spread
of Internet technologies to small and medium business finally began to materialize. Cisco
at first tried to pursue these down-market opportunities by creating a new line of products
34 Calderbank, A. (1996, September 16). Cisco grabs switch honors. Computer Reseller News, 39.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Bunnell.
38 Ibid.
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called Cisco Pro, targeted for distribution and the dealers and VARs. This turned out to
be a mistake. Essentially taking their enterprise products and stripping out features and
functionality and creating new form factors designed to better suit the needs of these
customers at the required significantly lower price points was not well received by the
channel. However, Cisco learned from the experience and had the necessary resources at
its disposal to make rapid corrections.
Through its acquisitions of technology, abundant resources, and its ability to
partition its IOS and port it onto other devices, Cisco was eventually able to create a
broad and compelling product line of offerings that met the requirements of essentially all
of the segments of the enterprise market. Through skillful marketing it convinced the
world that IOS had been the "glue" that enabled it to integrate the many products it added
to it line via over nearly 100 acquisitions, despite the IOS having multiple "branches" by
the year 2000. Despite its marketing claims to the contrary, the original router IOS and
the IOS used in its LAN switches (called Catalyst IOS) are very different. Cisco was
committed to utilizing its growing channel of dealers and VARs to service these new
customers with the new offerings and specialized packages it was creating. Accompanied
with targeted marketing, new training offerings Cisco began to target burgeoning
opportunities in the small and medium segments targeting 3Com specifically which had
consistently been strong in that segment of the market. Like Cisco, 3Com added LAN
switching to its portfolio via acquisition, acquiring a small startup called Synernetics in
1994 and another hub/switching company, Chipcom Corporation in 1996. Going into
1998, that pressure began to mount on 3Com which contemplated making some its high-
end large enterprise routers and LAN switches previously available to only its high-end
intermediaries, its Advanced Solution Partners, available to more VARs. Cisco on the
other hand was distributing shares of Cisco stock to VARs as an incentive for selling its
products through two-tiered distribution in an effort to increase the pressure on 3Com.3 9
The challenges from Cisco combined with 3Com's $6.6B merger with US Robotics was
causing strain within 3Com internally at the time. Not the least of which were the channel
issues the company faced trying to reconcile its heavy reliance on a large network
39 Presti, K. & Rosa, J. (1998, February 23). High-stakes networking battle to empower VARs. Computer
Reseller News, 777, 1-2.
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intermediaries at the low end of its product lines, the overlap in those channels resulting
from the US Robotics merger, and the reliance on a small number of high-end integrators
for the large enterprise offerings.
Soon after making these changes in the small and medium enterprise segment,
Cisco began working on several initiatives to solidify its control of the large enterprise
via the highest-end intermediaries: the technology consulting firms. Late in 1998 Cisco
announced the formation of an Internet Business Solutions Group, or "IBSG." In the
press release announcing the formation of this group Cisco explained this group as being
formed specifically for sharing its internal experiences with deployment of Internet-
powered solutions with customers and the business consultancies such as Cambridge
Technology Partners, Ernst and Young and KPMG who would be the first participants in
the pilot program. As was outlined in the previous chapter Cisco had "eaten its own dog
food" and converted its infrastructure to Internet-powered technologies very early on
developing many best practices. Through the IBSG Knowledge Transfer program Cisco
would share its best practices with these consultancies about its own internal Internet-
based business processes and applications. In return the consultancies would utilize Cisco
equipment in their own offerings. 40 Later in that year, Cisco purchased a 20 percent stake
in the KPMG consulting arm41, the first of a number of alliances and ventures it would
enter with consultancies. By this time, Cisco's internal IT infrastructure had earned a
great deal of acclaim and it successfully leveraged that acclaim and its market share to
attract the intermediaries that offered the company the ability to effectively penetrate the
remaining late adopters and laggards amongst the largest multi-national and global
enterprises.
In 1999 however, Cisco announced by far one of the most important coups in the
high-end segments of the enterprise data communications equipment market segment.
After being rebuffed several times throughout the 1990s by industry stalwart IBM which
had tried in vain to stem the tide of IP adoption and clung stubbornly to its own
proprietary SNA technology, Cisco and IBM announced an alliance in August 1999.4 2
40 Cisco Systems Inc. Press Release. (1998, December 15). Retrieved April, 2005 from
http://newsroom.cisco.comldlls/fspnisapi922b.html
41 Bunnell.
42 Bunnell.
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The announcement outlined how IBM would utilize Cisco equipment in the delivery of
its e-business solutions through its Global Services unit, and that IBM would begin the
migration of its switching and routing customers to Cisco equipment.43 Even the mighty
IBM had yielded to the dominance of Cisco in the Internet generation of networking
technology.
In only six short years, Cisco had substantially built from scratch an incredibly
powerful intermediated channel capability in both the large enterprise and in the small
and medium business segments, making intermediated channels the primary sales vehicle
for the company. By 1999, the company was generating 84 percent of the company's US
sales and 95 percent of its worldwide sales through its intermediated channels.4 4 In the
process of this remarkable transition (recall the starting point in 1994 was less than 10
percent of revenues through other-than-direct, and that figure was probably overstated)
the company had grown annual revenues from just under $2B in 1995, to over $12B in
1999.4 5 The growth in Cisco revenues while occurring in a rapidly growing market did
come at the expense of some of Cisco's competitors. After continued difficulties in the
large enterprise space, 3Com Corporation announced in early 2000 its departure from the
large enterprise space, discontinuing its high-end routers and LAN switches and
impacting 2,500 to 3,000 employees.46 Cabletron had announced its plans to split into
four new spin-off companies, the parent company but a shadow of its former self after
posting increasingly wider losses in 1998 and 1999. Bay Networks was acquired by
Nortel Networks in mid-1998 as VoIP and converged voice and data networks clearly
became the next major industry disruption on Cisco's radar screen. It still remains to be
seen if the combined company resulting from the merger of Nortel and one of the "Big
Four" data communications equipment companies will weather the impacts of the
bursting of the Internet bubble and Nortel's accounting scandal. In essence, the face of
the industry had been changed forever by Cisco's execution in a number of areas, not the
43 IBM, Cisco Ink Alliance. (1999, August 31). CNNMoney. Retrieved April 2005 from
http://monev.cnn.com/l 999/08/3 /technology/cisco.
44 O'Hanlon, C. (2000, February 7). Cisco's channel champion abandons post. Computer Reseller News,
.880, 5-6.
45 Historical financials retrieved April 2005 from www.hoovers.com.
46Duffy, Jim. (2000, March 20). 3Com exits enterprise network stage. Network WorldFusion, Retrieved
April 2005 from http://www.networkworld.com/news/2000/03203exit.html.
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least of which was its ability to build a commanding presence in intermediated channels
that is very much a factor to this day. Despite attempts by its competitors, established and
new entrants alike to unseat Cisco, its grip on its intermediated channels is very strong
and remains so to the current day.
Building Brand and Technical Training
Beyond the efforts described thus far that Cisco engaged in while making its
transition from direct to intermediated channel sales were the highly complementary
branding and marketing activities the company engaged in. One of the primary
requirements for manufacturers attempting to employ intermediaries is the development
of strong brand awareness for the company, both with end customers and potential
intermediaries. The association with the Internet and the service providers was a distinct
advantage for the branding of Cisco. Having a legitimate claim on the invention of
multiprotocol routers and such a dominant share of the routers used in the Internet
enabled Cisco to utilize the connection to the benefit of its brand. While the LAN
connectivity providers struggled through simplifying their messaging, Cisco was able to
rely on the facts that their equipment provided the core of the Internet, and their
equipment was used to connect more enterprises to the Internet than any other
manufacturer. This was an incredibly powerful message in the mid-1990s when it
mattered most as companies really began to explore the power of this new phenomenon.
Cisco made expert use of its branding efforts to strengthen ties with its
intermediated channels. Cisco's first major branding campaign in mid-1997 targeted
resellers and service providers that utilized Cisco equipment in their data networks. If the
network met Cisco-specified guidelines regarding content of Cisco equipment, the
intermediary was able to use the "Cisco-Powered Network" logo in its own advertising. 4 7
Essentially this was Cisco's attempt to build consumer brand recognition and association
with quality and dependability much the same way that Intel had done with its widely
known Intel Inside campaign. 4 8 In 1998, Cisco launched a new ad campaign directed
toward consumers with the goal of making Cisco a household name. The "Are you
ready?" campaign reinforced with consumers the fact that Cisco routers powered the
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47 Bunnell.
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Internet and the Internet generation. Cisco paid upwards of $30M for primetime exposure
for these consumer-focused advertisements intended to augment the Cisco-Powered
Network campaign before it.49
I was privy to the results of a 2003 brand study that tabulated aided and unaided
awareness of Cisco Systems as well as positive or negative association with the Cisco
brand. The results of that study were incredible in terms of positive, unaided awareness of
the Cisco Systems brand. In comparison with the other data communications equipment
manufacturers clearly Cisco had evidently done a much better job at branding the
company. More impressive was the sheer positive association of the brand. Despite its
dominance of its market, similar to that of Microsoft and Intel, the number of people that
indicated negative association to the brand was half that of Microsoft and Intel. Cisco is
still to this day able to command gross margins in the high sixties, despite the leading IT
consultancy for large enterprises writing openly and frequently of the "Cisco Premium"
that many customers pay by standardizing on Cisco and not seeking competitive bids.
The power of the brand is substantial and that has undoubtedly been a critical element of
its success with intermediated channels.
Cisco also made a brilliant move very early in its history by establishing a
comprehensive technical training and certification program that I believe significantly
reinforced its branding efforts. Understanding that the target end customers for Cisco
equipment was primarily other businesses, Cisco needed a way to increase awareness
within the IT organizations of companies across the globe. The internetworking
technologies embedded in Cisco's products and data communications equipment in
general were very new and in short supply especially as the Internet emerged onto the
scene. Cisco launched a comprehensive training program that included training on the
technologies using its own equipment for the practical laboratory exercises. By 1993 the
program was expanded with the offering of a certification on Cisco routers for technical
professionals called the Cisco Certified Internetworking Expert (CCIE), which almost
instantly became one of the most coveted technical certifications for professionals within
large enterprises. From my own experience, in the mid-1990s companies would often
pay for an engineer to attend CCIE training courses and certification testing (originally
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only conducted at Cisco HQ in San Jose), and immediately upon the employee passing
the certification exam be compelled to raise the engineers salary just to retain them! At
the time, a CCIE had almost unlimited mobility and job. Cisco utilized technical training
intermediaries for delivering training it developed internally, and outsourced testing for
certification early on significantly increasing the availability of training for the large
numbers of IT professionals seeking training in the new technologies across the globe.
The quality and wide availability of the training established it as a de facto standard for
the industry very early on in spite of the fact that it was totally Cisco-equipment centric.
The technical training and certification program was yet another positive
reinforcing loop that Cisco exploited masterfully in conjunction with its traditional
branding and marketing efforts. Cisco-trained and certified technicians permeated the
enterprise and service provider customer base. In designing its training and certification
programs to be viewed as having a good balance of both general technical networking
knowledge and Cisco device-specific and user interface (IOS) knowledge. They
effectively bridged a gap in what the secondary and tertiary educational institutions
lagged in filling at the time-the skills for designing, implementing and operating
enterprise and service provider packet-switched data communications infrastructures. In
the process they created a large population of Cisco Systems-literate IT professionals in
many segments, arguably predisposed to Cisco equipment because of their familiarity
with the equipment, and how to design, implement and manage enterprise networks
infrastructures built-out with Cisco equipment. These people permeated into many
different sectors: service provider operations departments, enterprise IT departments as
well as to the VARs, dealers and System Integrators. Cisco places requirements on its
intermediaries to employ a number of Cisco-certified technical personnel to ensure
competency and enhance customer satisfaction as a requirement of their partnership
agreements. To validate how powerful the impact of the training program has been, today
most data communications equipment vendors still competing with Cisco in the
enterprise and service provider market segments provide a "Cisco-like" mode of their
own user interfaces, essentially utilizing the same commands used by IOS. This is done
to leverage the large population of Cisco-trained and experienced professionals and
overcome the objection to adopting the competitor's equipment often raised by potential
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customers as well intermediaries that they will have to retrain their technical staff who
only know Cisco CLI. Most of Cisco's competitors will recognize Cisco certifications
and waive their own technical training requirement and certification for their
intermediaries. Essentially, the Cisco IOS command line interpreter has become the de
facto standard for data communications equipment.
The Cisco training and indoctrination efforts were expanded beyond the
contracted instructor-led training targeted at IT professionals, to web-based and video
training modules that enabled self-paced study during non-working hours, essential for
the technical staffs of intermediaries that are expected to maintain chargeability. In the
later 1990s Cisco created a new training initiative it called Cisco Networking Academy
that it rolled-out to high schools, colleges and nonprofit educational institutions,
ostensibly to teach the vocational skills necessary for high-paying jobs in the IT industry
but also to ensure the next generation is familiar with Cisco.50 Cisco also has its own
series of technical books and training materials, published by the Cisco Press.5 1 A quick
search of an online technical book store lists 293 titles in the Cisco Press series. A glance
at anyone of them will find many references to Cisco products and their command line
interfaces in the example configurations. Many of these books are used as augmentation
to the technical documentation that comes with the products, and technicians have a
tendency to become dependent on these reference guides which constantly reinforces the
Cisco brand.
Recent Developments
Command of the data communications equipment intermediated channels by
Cisco Systems remains strong as this paper is being written in mid-2005. The company's
revenues have continued to soar, Cisco reported revenues in 2004 of over $22B with an
impressive operating margin of 20 percent-significantly higher than it attained during
the boom at the end of the 1990s. Its intermediated channel program continues to evolve
however especially in regards to focusing on the value-add provided by its intermediaries.
Beginning in the summer of 2001, Cisco eliminated volume-based discounts and began
'O Bunnell.
;' Cisco Systems, Inc. Company Web Site. Retrieved April, 2005 from
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac 23/ac220/about cisco cisco press.html.
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rewarding its intermediaries based on their level of expertise. 52 In order to achieve this
Cisco began requiring its intermediaries to achieve one or more of its technology
specialization designations, typically through achievement of technical certifications by a
number of its staff, in order to qualify for the different levels of partner certification that
drive qualification for the various levels of discounting. Cisco also made its certified
intermediaries participate in a customer satisfaction program. Effective with this change
was a decided shift from quantity to quality-previously qualifying for the highest
discount levels was based on sales volume.
This move marked a deliberate effort by Cisco to both raise the bar for its
intermediaries, but also was motivated in part to reduce the sheer numbers of
intermediaries authorized to sell its products. This may be viewed as a maturing of
Cisco's employment of intermediaries. Initially it was about scaling the sales effort, but
as the sales through channels approached 90 percent, clearly Cisco needed to become
concerned about the capabilities of its intermediary partners to deliver increasingly value-
added solutions to its customers. With this shift it began to incentivize training,
certification and customer satisfaction, and deemphasize volume. Considering the power
it had in the intermediated channels at the time, this was an action that it could take. As
part of this chain Cisco also made available to its channel partners its internal customer
service best practices and tools.
It is clearly evident from the abundant press on the subject that Cisco's
intermediated channel programs continue to be a work in progress. Cisco intermediated
channel program is far from perfect, and perfection is a constantly moving target as
commoditization of the equipment continues and there is pressure on margins.
Interestingly enough it seems that the conversation regarding channel conflict between
the intermediated channels and the direct sales force is never ending-as long as they
both exist.
Cisco today generates 92 percent of its business through intermediated channels,
and continues to do so profitability for Cisco for sure which routinely reports gross
margins above 60 percent. Many of its intermediary partners argue that the Cisco
business is profitable for them as well. In the research, channel managers working for
52 Hooper, L. (2001, March 5). Cisco's new game plan. Computer Reseller News, 935, 32-35.
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Cisco competitors repeatedly mentioned the fact that many intermediaries are hesitant to
risk potential retaliation by Cisco that may result from working with competitors. For the
most part, the most successful and capable intermediaries in the enterprise space are
tightly-held by Cisco today. The fact that the company has been committed thus far to a
long-term channel strategy was evident to its intermediaries as well and helped build
loyalty.
115
Chapter 6: Case Study: Cabletron Systems, Inc.
Chapter Introduction
This chapter will outline the execution of another data communications equipment
manufacturer in order to provide comparison and contrast to Cisco Systems execution of
its intermediated channel strategy outlined in the previous chapter. As will be outlined
through this comparison, despite the company's beginning at about the same time first as
partners in adjacent markets, and then competing in the same markets the paper will point
out distinct differences in the management of a transition to intermediated channels.
What is particularly interesting in this analysis is the fact that entities that started out
roughly equivalent in size and revenues in the early 1990s had by the end of that decade
ended up as polar opposites among the "Big Four" data communications equipment
providers. As this paper was being completed in April of 2005, Cisco Systems had
achieved a market capitalization of $111 B, employing 34,000 employees worldwide and
generating profits of $4.4B on annual sales exceeding $22B with gross margins in the
high sixty percent. Cisco Systems generates over 92 percent of its sales revenues through
channels today. In the case of Cabletron, continued loss of market share and declines in
the top line have seen that company reduced to just over $173M in market share,
employees numbering only $1,100 and the company suffering operating losses every year
since 2000.
The paper will outline an argument for how a well planned and executed
intermediated channel strategy was in part responsible for the tremendous success of
Cisco Systems in achieving commanding market share in the most valuable segments of
enterprise data networking, effectively displacing Cabletron, 3Com and Bay Networks
Nortel.
Company and Product Origins: Cabletron Systems, Inc.
Cabletron Systems53 was founded in the 1983 by two young entrepreneurs from
New England. The company was bootstrapped financed-the founders did not accept
53 The reader should note that in August of 2001, Cabletron Systems, Inc. effectively became a new entity
with a new name, Enterasys Networks, Inc. The author uses Cabletron and Enterasys interchangeably in
this chapter and throughout the thesis.
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venture capital financing and held a great deal of animosity for VC-financed companies,
particularly those they competed with directly. Initially the company provided only a low
technology offering and operated out of the garage of one of the founders. The founders
shared President and CEO duties through the company's very successful IPO in 1989 and
into the mid--1990s. One founder remained as CEO until 1999 with a short break in
service in 1997.
Realizing that enterprises were having difficulty finding the thick coaxial cable
used for the initial standards-based Ethernet LANs in lengths that fit their individual
needs (the cable was typically offered by the cable manufacturers on huge spools),
Cabletron's first business was to offer LAN cabling and associated services to enterprises
installing cable plants to support local area data networks. The company's product
offerings grew fairly rapidly with the addition of Ethernet devices: transceivers, wiring
hubs, and eventually its own line of routers through acquisition in 1998. In the process
the Cabletron product line included devices for building and interconnecting enterprise
LANs constructed of just about every standards-based technology: Token Ring, FDDI,
ATM and support for every LAN variant of the Ethernet standard on copper and fiber
optic cabling as well as 802.11 wireless LANs. Cabletron had a large patent portfolio and
was considered a leader in several LAN technology areas.
It is important to draw some important contrasts between Cisco and Cabletron.
Whereas the heritage of the Cisco technology and first target customers were clearly in
the service provider space primarily and enterprise WANs, Cabletron's technology
heritage was LAN equipment sold to enterprises of various types and sizes from day one.
Its focus was primarily on providing the products and services required for companies to
build-out the local are network infrastructures that supported the new client-server
computing paradigm, but primarily within the confines of the enterprise. At one time
Cabletron held leading market share in the wiring hub category ahead of its primary
competitor in the early 1990s, SynOptics. Interestingly enough, Cabletron like most of
the hub vendors, licensed the Cisco routing technology early in the 1990s, and offered
Cisco routing blades and modules that were supported in Cabletron's LAN devices to
enable some limited routing and WAN functionality in their product line.
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As outlined in the previous chapter, Cisco and Cabletron became bitter
competitors as Cisco entered the LAN connectivity market via acquisition of some of the
leading LAN switching companies in 1993 and 1994. The relationship between Cisco and
Cabletron had always been lukewarm for a number of reasons. Cisco continued to
advocate increasing the use of routers and routing as enterprise networks got increasingly
larger, while Cabletron advocated the use of less complex and higher-performance LAN-
based technologies. Secondly, the Cabletron founders were disdainful of venture-backed
companies and were openly critical of acquisitions. The Cisco-Cabletron relationship
came to an abrupt end in the fall of 1996 Cisco refused to renew Cabletron's license
agreement for the IOS in retaliation for a series of advertisements and an aggressive anti-
Cisco presentation at an industry trade show in the weeks prior to the announcement. 54
This came at a time when Cisco's onslaught on the coveted wiring closet business of
Cabletron and SynOptics with its LAN switch technology acquired in 1993-1994 had
swung into full gear, and both Cabletron and SynOptics (now merged with Wellfleet) had
fallen significantly behind the end-around initiated by Cisco.
Cabletron as a LAN company did not have the advantage of direct access to the
influencing power the service providers had on enterprise buyers discussed earlier in this
chapter. LANs are by definition constrained within the bounds of the enterprise and its
workspaces. LAN infrastructure equipment was not used in the service provider "cloud"
in a visible way like the routers that connected enterprise CPE to the service provider
network. Whereas the service provider would often recommend selection (tacitly or
explicitly) of the manufacturer and model for the routers an enterprise might purchase
and deploy, there was no such influence over the LAN infrastructure. The decision
makers for routing versus LAN equipment for a given firm might come from entirely
different groups, groups with different skills and experience levels. Most importantly
access to that decision maker for the purposes of positioning and selling a LAN
infrastructure solution was significantly different than that of routing solutions-closely
related but inherently different. Again, the types of tasks, scale of the tasks, physical size
and dispersion of an organization responsible for the LANs within a large enterprise were
significantly different then those of the organization responsible for routing and the
54 Lawson, S. (1996, October 21). Cisco cuts off IOS for Cabletron. InfoWorld, 18, 43, 47.
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enterprise's WANs. As was mentioned previously, the teams responsible for LANs were
often at a lower level of the IT organization hierarchy, and although extremely
knowledgeable on their pieces of the infrastructure, often do not have the "big picture"
perspective required of the router technicians.
Cabletron's legacy as a supplier of LAN equipment gave it a different perspective
on the marketplace. I will refer to this perspective as the "edge-in" perspective as
opposed to the "core-out" perspective that Cisco arguably had. The argument can be
made that the "edge-in" companies such as Cabletron had a slight disadvantage in
recognizing the disruption the commercial applications of the Internet that loomed on the
horizon in the early 1990s. Much of the characteristics of firms inability to stay atop of
their industries when they confront certain types of market and technological change
described in The Innovator's Dilemma pertained to Cabletron during this period. The
adoption of their LAN equipment was widespread, and accelerating. Cabletron was in the
midst of eventually stringing together over thirty consecutive quarters of revenue growth,
breaking the billion dollars of sales mark for the first time in 1995 with an essentially 100
percent direct sales strategy. The founders were on the covers of several of the leading
business periodicals and the company gaining acclaim as being among the fastest
growing firms in the world. Although the Internet was gaining momentum, and routing
was absolutely essential technology for connecting enterprises to the Internet, Cabletron
did not fully grasp the implications of the Internet on its business and the market for
enterprise data communications equipment.
LAN equipment in the early 1990s was relatively less complex than routing.
Device-level configuration tended to be straightforward and accomplished through a
menu-driven user interface as opposed to the arcane command line interface utilized for
routers. Capacities (e.g., number of ports), performance (expected to be "line-rate" or the
maximum data rate specified by the standard on all ports), and lastly manageability were
the primary points of differentiation for LAN equipment. Differentiation on features was
difficult because the device-level functionality of equipment such as wiring hubs was
dictated primarily by the standards.
Unlike routers, LAN hubs and the early LAN switches did not provide nearly the
opportunities for standards extension-the addition of proprietary features by vendors on
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top of the standards functionality which effectively enabled the creation of soft standards
and local customer lock-in discussed in the previous chapter regarding the Cisco router
IOS. Wiring hubs primary functionality operated at a lower level of the OSI reference
model than routers, thus the services they provided on the network were in many ways
less sophisticated. Before the advent in the late 1990s of the hardware-based switch-
routers that moved much of the support for IP routing into hardware and achieved line-
rate routing functionality, it was generally accepted that routers were lower performance
devices and were relegated to providing WAN connectivity (WAN links at the time were
limited in bandwidth relative to LAN links) and logical segmentation of LANs, and other
core functionality. LAN devices such as wiring hubs provided the high data rates needed
for connectivity of end stations, servers, printers and other devices interconnected within
an enterprise network.
In the first half of the 1990s there was a vast disagreement within the industry of
how enterprise network architecture would evolve and whether or not the use of routing
within those networks would increase and the numbers of routers proliferate. The edge-in
companies such as Cabletron and others argued that widespread use of routing added
significant complexity and cost to enterprise network infrastructures, and that the
relatively low performance of routers created potential bottlenecks and should only be
used for what they were originally designed: as special-purpose gateways that
interconnected high speed networks over relatively lower speed WANs.55 80 percent or
more of network traffic in these pre-Internet days was contained to the local network it
originated on, with only a small portion needing to be routed to other networks. The
"core-out" companies such as Cisco vehemently disagreed, arguing that the intelligent
segmentation provided by routers operating at the network layer of the OSI model was
necessary to overcome the limitations of large, "flat" networks pertaining to the control
of some types of traffic that potentially could impact performance and manageability of
very large LANs without routers at the core.
55 It should be noted that this thinking was not restricted to Cabletron. Microsoft at the time had created the
largest, non-routed enterprise campus network, effectively connecting thousands of users and devices on a
single, flat network with routers only at the Internet connection that was less complex and provided higher
performance.
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Cabletron focused a great deal of its R&D resources on creating LAN devices that
would radically improve the scalability of enterprise networks allowing for the
construction of very large "flat" enterprise LANs that would utilize routers only as
gateways to other networks. The result of this effort was a proprietary technology that
Cabletron called SecureFast Switching which offered an alternative to adding routers to
the LAN in large environments. It was successfully adopted at a number of very large
enterprises such as the University of Southern California, at a large number of GM
manufacturing plants, Goodyear Tire and Rubber and several large multinationals.
SecureFast utilized standards-based technologies such as Ethernet, FDDI and ATM but in
addition it utilized additional software running on the devices and an in-band GUI
management application to provide advanced services that provided segmentation and
advanced security and network management features at line-rate performance. Essentially
SecureFast provided an alternative that provided most of the advantages and benefits of
routing for significantly less cost, complexity and at much better performance.
The major issue with SecureFast however was the fact that it required an
extensive amount of proprietary extensions on top of the standards-based functionality
and that was very visible to many customers that considered it as an alternative to the
traditional router-centric architectures that Cisco and others advocated. The question of
why SecureFast was viewed as being more of a proprietary extension or somehow less
interoperable than Cisco Systems use of proprietary extensions is difficult to answer fully.
It is easy to attribute it to good marketing versus poor marketing, but that does not
explain all of it in the opinion of the author. However, the amount of FUD (Fear,
Uncertainty and Doubt) generated in the market about so-called "Flat" networks was
significant and SecureFast had complexities and limitations. For whatever reason,
networks engineered to utilize SecureFast were considered to be non-interoperable
although they were in fact interoperable with traditional LAN equipment and routers. In
essence, SecureFast was very similar to the Cisco-proprietary router IOS features
discussed in the last chapter in that the special SecureFast functionality could only be
realized using Cabletron equipment. Despite that fact combined with offering many
advantages over the router-centric architecture being promoted by Cisco Systems,
SecureFast never gained significant market traction.
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Probably more importantly it may be argued; the R&D focus on SecureFast
potentially resulted in Cabletron being late in embracing the LAN switching technology
that Cisco eventually used to take the LAN connectivity segment of the market away
from Cabletron and the other hub vendors as described in the last chapter. Cabletron was
arguably late adding LAN switching products to its offerings due in part to the focus on
SecureFast and a very large investment in its second-generation wiring hub. Cabletron
found itself playing catch-up in the LAN switching space exacerbating some of other
strategic choices outlined in this chapter. Additionally, the intense focus on the enterprise
LAN and wiring closet connectivity might have contributed to the delayed realization of
the potential disruption that the Internet held in store for the market. Many have
commented that the rise of the Internet caught Cabletron by surprise as well. Certainly
not having routing and Internet Protocol among its core competencies was a disadvantage
for Cabletron and several similar companies.
It should be noted that in addition to data communications equipment, Cabletron
had also made a significant investment in the development of an advanced, systems
management software application that was used for the management of large enterprise
networks. What was interesting about the product, called Spectrum was that it was a
standards-based, multi-vendor platform that utilized several technologies that were
leading edge at the time and garnered several patents for Cabletron. The product
competed directly with OpenViewTM from HP, and a number of other high-end platforms.
Unfortunately Spectrum was a "software product trapped in a hardware company," a
company that did not necessarily have the competencies to recognize the market potential
for a sophisticated enterprise software application. As will be outlined throughout this
chapter Cabletron was very reluctant to move into intermediated channels which arguably
an enterprise software product absolutely requires to gain traction in the market. Hence
the Spectrum product was utilized primarily by the direct sales force selling Cabletron's
hardware as an instrument to win business for Cabletron equipment. Spectrum was
eventually spun-off as a separate company ostensibly to go public, but an IPO never
materialized and the company was sold to Gores Technology at a fraction of its value
then resold to Massachusetts-based Concord Communications in 2004 for $93M.
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Cabletron Sales Strategy
The selling process for LAN equipment such as wiring hubs was very different
from selling routers in the early 1990s. Rather than enterprises requiring consulting their
service provider for recommendations for customer premise routers, the LAN equipment
manufacturers such as Cabletron or the intermediaries of the channel-focused SynOptics
had to raise awareness of their offerings, differentiate themselves and finally help the
customer wade through many technology decisions in order to develop a bill of materials
and network design. By their very nature LANs extended throughout the facilities of an
enterprise and the equipment was placed in wiring closets if available, anywhere it would
fit if they were not. Rather than being confined to a climate controlled data center, the
LAN equipment was distributed throughout the buildings. Determining where
connectivity had to be provided, in what quantities and across distances dictated what
equipment was required-after the customer had chosen Ethernet or one of the other
available technologies at the time. It was a very advanced pre-sales process, followed
often by an often long and complex post-sales installation project. This process might be
repeated for several different locations of the same company-standardization of LAN
technology and vendor across the large enterprises typically occurred well after routing
standardization as stated earlier.
Throughout most of the early and mid-1990s it was not entirely clear that Ethernet
and IP would become the dominant designs. Early in its history Cabletron's sales effort
were focused on the technical decision makers, at the director level and below within an
enterprise IT organization or in some cases the facilities managers who would install and
maintain the LAN infrastructure.
Cabletron's approach to sales within this target market was to create a large direct
sales capability that included a headquarters-based telesales organization. The corporate-
based telesales organization developed leads through cold calling, direct mail campaigns
and other lead-generation techniques. Early in its history Cabletron was overwhelmingly
predisposed to direct sales. Both founders had come from sales backgrounds, and Bob
Levine who was president of the company through 1996 was an outspoken critic of the
indirect sales model and intermediaries. His open criticism of the intermediated channels
established a reputation in the channel community that Cabletron was anti-channel, and
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the Cabletron direct sales force had earned the reputation in the marketplace for being
ruthless. Part of this was the heritage of the sales force emanating from the reputation of
its leader, the president and cofounder Bob Levine. The popular mythology around Mr.
Levine was that he occasionally would attend sales meetings in combat fatigues wielding
machetes or other weaponry. The legacy of that reputation turned out to be very difficult
for the company to reverse as will be outlined later in the chapter.
Leads were qualified further by a headquarters-based inside sales organization
that made customer appointments for the field-based outside sales representative,
assisting the outside representative with the sales process from end-to-end for an assigned
group of accounts, typically within a geographic area. Cabletron had not only a technical
call center that provided phone support for customers, but had developed other post-sales
service organizations that worked with the sales teams to provide proposals and network
designs, cabling and implementation services. In addition Cabletron had developed an
organization of post-sales support engineers based in the field that assisted customers
with network expansions, upgrades, configuration changes as well as troubleshooting
when issues arose. Understanding the multi-vendor nature of these infrastructures, the
Cabletron field support force became very knowledgeable on a wide variety of equipment
from a number of vendors. In short, there were a number of organizations that Cabletron
utilized to support its customers directly, field and headquarters-based, in sharp contrast
with Cisco's model of small, autonomous account teams that handled most of the
customer needs from the field with limited support from headquarters. The presence of a
fairly large and technically Cabletron service organization created an immediate problem
for an intermediated channel strategy that should be clear to the reader. Not only did
Cabletron's sales force have the reputation for taking deals direct, they serviced these
customers when needed with the Cabletron service organization which in essence
competed directly with the channel. This was another unique attribute of the Cabletron
go-to-market; other manufacturers had very small service organizations that might be
utilized to provide direct support of key customers on an exception basis. At one time in
the early 1990s the Cabletron US Networking Services group that provided proposal and
network design support for the field sales force numbered nearly 100 full time employees.
Cabletron built a fairly large service organization and utilized it to provide extensive pre-
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and post-sales services to its accounts. This in part earned the company a very high
reputation for excellent service amongst a very loyal installed base, due at least in part to
the fact that many of these services were provided gratis by the sales team as a way to
win opportunities.
Having access to a large post-sales organization for the development of network
designs and proposals, assisting customers with installations and troubleshooting created
a much different environment for the Cabletron sales organization. The Cabletron sales
force built strong relationships with its key accounts and would often utilize post-sales
resources to ensure customer satisfaction remained high, often free of charge. In essence,
Cabletron had a much larger direct sales infrastructure, not to mention a corporate culture
that was undeniably predisposed to direct sales. Like Cisco pre-1994, Cabletron's
approach to scaling the sales effort up was very similar: as territories expanded, resources
were added. The difference of course was that scaling outside account executives led to
potentially scaling the size of the proposals group, the inside sales group, as well as the
post sales support groups. As cumbersome and costly as this may have appeared to the
outside observer, the company was committed to growth in this manner and it was
sustainable for some period of time early in the company's history due to the very healthy
margins the company was able to achieve on its intelligent wiring hub products in a
rapidly growing market.
By 1994 the Cabletron direct sales force had grown to approximately 1,600, with
the majority of them based in the US.56 Cabletron's direct competitor in the hub market
which was approaching $3B at the time was SynOptics. [As a point of reference, the
market for routers at the time was approximately $2B, and Cisco had achieved 50%
market share at that time] Cabletron and SynOptics controlled over half the market for
the intelligent wiring hubs used in constructing enterprise LANs at the time. The sales
strategies of the companies could not have been more different. SynOptics had always
utilized an intermediated channel strategy-the entire company at this time was
approximately 1,200 people, less than the size of Cabletron's direct sales force.
SynOptics had built a network of intermediaries reportedly numbering approximately 350
dealers and VARs which resold its hub products and provided the required design and
56 Labate, J. (1994, October 31). The battle for your PC network. Fortune, 130, 9. 189-192.
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installation services; 90% of SynOptics sales were going through the channel at this time.
The number 3 competitor in the space at the time, 3Com Corporation also used a
primarily an intermediated channel strategy. 3Com focused on the lower-end of the hub
market and utilized many of the same intermediaries that SynOptics utilized for its
products.
In July 1994 SynOptics and Wellfleet Communications announced a merger,
combining the hub products of SynOptics with the router products of Wellfleet after the
company began collaborating on a LAN switching product. The new company would be
called Bay Networks. Wellfleet at the time held only 15 percent of the router market, a
distant second to Cisco and both companies were clearly concerned about LAN switching
potentially disrupting the market. The reader might recall from the last chapter that
Wellfleet at the time generated roughly 55 percent of its sales through channels, but had a
capable direct sales arm as well. At least one article from the research claimed that one
consideration resulting in the merger negotiations was enabling SynOptics to access
Wellfleet's direct sales force. The article went onto explain SynOptics flat revenues in the
first half of 1994 in a rapidly growing market were partially blamed on its intermediaries
overestimating demand for SynOptics products and excess inventories. The article
suggested that the Wellfleet direct sales force would "wean SynOptics from its risky
dependence on outsiders." 57 No doubt this is also resulted from increasing competition in
the space from 3Com and Cabletron, not to mention the emergence of LAN switching
that had frozen some hub purchasing decisions as companies evaluated the new
technology.
In summary by 1994, as Cisco had completed its acquisitions of LAN switching
companies enabling it to begin competing directly with the wiring hub vendors and had
announced its own intentions to expand its sales activities into intermediated channels,
Cabletron was the last company amongst the "big four" to retain a near 100 percent direct
sales strategy. By November of 1994, the company had grown through direct sales to be a
$600M in sales manufacturer of LAN hubs and related equipment, posting 22 straight
quarters of earning gains and consistently achieving margins of 60%.58
57 Labate, page 191.
58 Reingold, J. (1994, November 8). Soldiers of fortune. Financial World, 163, 23, 54-56.
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Throughout 1995 Cabletron held firm to its direct sales strategy, and despite the
merger of SynOptics and Wellfleet, several additional acquisitions by Cisco (eight
companies total including Crescendo and Kalpana discussed in the last chapter, including
another LAN switching company, Grand Junction Networks for $350M in stock for a
company with roughly $6M in revenues at the time), and the acquisition of LAN
switching company Chipcom by its direct competitor 3Com in 1995, the company
continued to go to market primarily alone. The founders were very much in control, yet
potential issues had begun to surface with the company and its strategy, including its
focus on direct sales. Cabletron which was the largest of the Big Four in 1990 was now
number four behind Cisco, Bay Networks and 3Com.59 In an interview conducted with
the founders in January of 1996, Bob Levine, cofounder and then President of the
company responded to a series of questions about the executive team's commitment to
the current sales strategy:
"Interviewer: What about your direct sales model? Is there a time when you
could see changing it?
Levine: No. We think it is paramount to have direct contact with our customers.
We need to know what they're doing, what they're thinking and where they want
to be going, so that the products we're developing are for real-world applications.
We need to know where they're looking to be in five years because the
development needs to take place today.
Interviewer: Don't direct sales also limit the market that you can sell into?
Levine: From Wall Street's standpoint, yes. We don't have access to all of the
lower markets, and that is by design. We are known for the best support in the
industry. If we grow too fast and start to get greedy, start to access additional
markets, we can't grow our support infrastructure that fast. So, direct sales is the
governor on our growth that we intentionally employ for the benefit of our
customers." 6 0
59 Nee, E. (1996, January). "Interview: Bob Levine and Craig Benson," Upside (US ed.), 8,1 page 60-67.
60 Nee, page 62.
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Competition for the wiring closet was beginning to intensify upon the entrance of
Cisco and its LAN switching products which by this time were being sold through its
channel. In 1995 Cabletron shipped 160,200 switched Ethernet backbone ports and Cisco
shipped 95,000. However in the first half of 1996, Cabletron shipped 209,000 ports while
Cisco shipped 612,000 ports in the same period.6 1 This reversal was due in part to
strength in the workgroup switch62 space that Cisco had gotten directly through its
acquisitions but was increasingly being leveraged to win backbone and wiring closet
business, previously dominated by Cabletron and Bay Networks. Cabletron was slow to
develop a workgroup switching product, but more importantly potentially was its reliance
on a direct sales force that was experienced in the wiring closet sale and not in the
workgroup space. The primary product that Cabletron was relying on to defend its share
in the LAN connectivity space at the time provided more capacity than a number of
customers needed so the lack of a product to defend against Cisco's onslaught
exacerbating limited channels to market that Cabletron had at the time.
At a well-attended industry trade show in the fall of 1996, Cabletron became the
last of the Big Four to announce an intermediated channel strategy, surprising both
industry analysts and the data communications intermediary channels. Many in the
industry commented that it might have been a little too little, a little too late upon the
announcement. Understanding that Cisco, the second-to-the-last company to move
toward intermediated channels had at the time a two year lead on Cabletron, many
questioned the ability of the company to gain ground. The initial plan announced at this
time spoke only to a single-tier program directed at "high-end integrators" and dismissed
sales through distribution in the near term. Then Executive Director of Worldwide Sales
for the company, notably not the CEO or President, cited "losing deals because customers
wanted integrated solutions" as the impetus for the radical change in Cabletron sales
strategy.6 3 Details of the program itself were rather unclear other than the program was
modeled after what had been deployed by Cabletron in non-US markets earlier that year.
61 Lach, E. (1996, August 26). Cabletron fights for wiring-closet turf. Communications Week, 105.
62 Recall the discussion in the previous chapter: like many disruptive technologies, LAN switching
functionality did not allow it to compete directly with the incumbent wiring hubs immediately. The first-to-
market LAN switching products were modular workgroup products that were eventually scaled-up to
compete directly with wiring hubs.
63 Presti, K. (1996, September 23). Cabletron enters channel as competition intensifies. Computer Reseller
News, 702, 8.
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As an initial target for the mix between direct sales and intermediated channel sales, the
executive specified 60-40 but went on to say that "we probably won't be as indirect as
some of the other major networking vendors."6 4 Again, at about the same time that
Cabletron was making this change, Cisco refused to renew the Cabletron license for
access to the OS, leaving Cabletron without a routing solution and leaving the status of
support for its fielded router modules in question. Although Cabletron was actively
positioning its SecureFast technology at the time which minimized the need for routing, it
still was left without direct access to routing intelligence for its customers. SecureFast
provided no WAN functionality whatsoever. This action by Cisco was part of an overall
escalation of rivalry between the two companies both in the marketplace and in the press
but the end result was leaving Cabletron without a key part of enterprise data
communications equipment.
In August of 1997, Bob Levine cofounder of Cabletron and then President of the
company announced his plans to retire in the fall of that year. As part of the change, the
company announced that an outsider Don Reed a former top-level NYNEX executive
would be taking the role of President and Chief Executive. Reed's stated intentions at the
time of his accepting the role included acquisitions and repair of the reputation of the
company with intermediated channels; however he went on to reiterate what was said a
year earlier that "he does not anticipate Cabletron becoming dependent upon its channel
partners as many of its competitors."6 5 However, things would soon be changing at
Cabletron.
In November of that same year, Cabletron announced a bold acquisition of the
remains of once mighty Digital Equipment Company's networking business for
approximately $430M. The deal was positioned primarily as an attempt by Cabletron to
buy its way into an established network of intermediated channel relationships. The
Digital Networks Product Group had well-developed intermediated channels to market,
including in Asia. The deal was positioned as a net positive for the former DEC VARs as
'4 Presti, K. (19956, October 14). Cabletron looks to channel. Computer Reseller News, 705, 73-74.
65 Anonymous. (1997, November 3). Cabletron. Computer Reseller News, 761, 72.
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it provided access to Cabletron's product line.6 6 Other observers of the market however
viewed it as an act of desperation.
In the next month, the new Cabletron chief executive announced the first miss of
quarterly revenues by the company in its history followed soon after by announcements
of the first large-scale layoff in the history of the company, some 10 percent of the
workforce or 600 people. In addition, the press reported that as part of a planned
restructuring, Cabletron would replace its direct sales model in the face of criticism that
its rivals had captured market share by utilizing intermediated channels.6 7 For the fiscal
year ended February 1998, Cabletron would report a wide loss of $127.1M on sales of
just under $1.4B, its first loss as a public company; in fact the miss in the third quarter of
that year ended the streak of 32 consecutive quarters of the company exceeding analyst
expectations. In their fiscal year ending July 1998, Cisco Systems, by then far and away
the largest of the Big Four, would report net income of $1.35B on sales of $8.5B. Recall
from the last chapter that in 1997 non-router revenues topped router revenues at Cisco for
the first time-the major product category generating the most revenue for Cisco was
LAN switching, the technology that had displaced hubs and Cabletron from the wiring
closets of enterprise LANs.
Cabletron was down but it was not out. In February of 1998 it acquired an
enterprise-class routing solution via the acquisition of a silicon-valley startup called
YAGO Systems. YAGO was one of the first startups to successfully design and
manufacture a new type of router, the "switch-router" that utilized next-generation ASIC
technology to "harden" the routing functionality provided in software in traditional
routers. The switch-router arguably was a major innovation as it achieved wire-speed
routing performance on every port and Cisco was slightly behind in the development of
its own switch router. This gave the company some hope to challenge Cisco's
stranglehold on the router market if the product could gain traction with the
intermediaries such as those Cabletron gained access to via the Digital Network Products
Group acquisition.
66 Presti, K. (1997, December 1). Cabletron buys its way into channel with Digital deal. Computer Reseller
News, 766, 1 0- 11.
67 Maremont, M. (1997, December 17). Cabletron plans plant closings, 10% job cuts. The Wall Street
Journal (Eastern edition), 1.
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Also in that timeframe, Cabletron moved to turn on its initial e-commerce
capability becoming the third of the Big Four to do so. Like Cisco, Cabletron had also
made a significant investment in an ERP system in the mid-1990s. Unlike Cisco however,
the rollout of that system companywide was not yet completed into the early 2000s.
Enterasys' utilization of Internet-enabled IT and next-generation enterprise software
applications internally was not nearly to the degree that Cisco had achieved, and its
extension of its own network to suppliers and manufacturing partners was not nearly as
sophisticated or comprehensive. Its support of intermediaries up until the present day is
still at a level far, far below that provided by Cisco which has had a significant lead in
this area of intermediated channel management over all the remaining manufacturers. At
the time of the first beta release of Cabletron's web-based e-commerce and support
capability, Cisco had generated $2B in revenue in the previous year of operating its own
e-commerce website.68 Bay Networks followed soon after just before it was acquired by
traditional telephony giant Nortel Networks in June of that year.
Cabletron at the same time was trying to accelerate its traction with intermediaries
who now had been working and developing relationships with its competitors for four
years or more. In 1997, the company was able to sign agreements with 25 US
intermediaries, and was hoping to have 75 to 80 by the end of 1998, and eventually
exceeding 50 percent of sales through intermediaries.69 Despite initially planning only a
single-tier model, Cabletron had also signed two distribution partners in the US that
would service VARs and dealers. The recently appointed director of Cabletron's channel
program held up the CEO Don Reed as a "vocal supporter" of channels claiming that
commitment by the new CEO combined with incentives would entice the direct sales
force to work with intermediaries in the field and not take opportunities direct.70 When
questioned what he thought his challenge was in making the transition to a channel-
focused organization work, his reply was "It's all the things you would expect-building
an infrastructure and educating everybody, getting our internal organizations focused,
68 Wallace, B. (1998, March 10). Cabletron to switch on E-commerce site," Computerworld, 32, 11, 24.
69 Dimitruk, M. (1998, March). Cabletron plays catch-up," Reseller Management, 21, 3, 72-73.
70 Dimitruk, page 73.
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getting people to understand how to work with partners, and getting past our history of
channel relationships." 71
In March of 1998 Cabletron CEO Reed was pushed aside as one of the original
founders, Craig Benson, retook control of the company as CEO and appointed a new
channel executive that came to Cabletron in the Digital acquisition. In May of that year,
Benson articulated his own view of the value proposition Cabletron had for
intermediaries willing to defect to its data communications equipment offerings:
"We want the channel to make money. I've found that the other major vendors are
fairly over-distributed in the channel. That means five guys will show up at one
account with the same product, meaning that the lowest margin generally walks
away with the business. I don't think that is helpful to the channel, and I do not
believe it's healthy for the company selling into the channel. We are going to
make sure we don't oversubscribe the channel."7 2
The message that Cabletron was looking primarily for a means for fulfillment of
its products versus providing offerings that could help intermediaries differentiate
themselves in the market was overwhelmingly clear. Most importantly it was indicative
of the level at which Cabletron was operating at the time, that being years behind its
competitors that were clearly already making the transition between basic fulfillment and
a true value-added intermediated channel program. The type of intermediary it attracted
at this time was primarily at the fulfillment end of the spectrum, and the effort by the
company to "prime the pump," by turning over additional direct accounts to the channel
had negative impacts on both the customer base and the sales force. Often times the
channel partner was unable to service the account fully-it simply handled the
transaction (often poorly) and the account team had to come back into assist in order to
retain the customer. The negative feedback loop created by this issue had a large negative
effect on the transition of business to intermediated channels. Despite incentives and
other mechanisms to induce the Cabletron sales force to take business through
71 Dimitruk.
72 Presti, K. (1998, May 4). Cabletron forges new allies. Computer Reseller News, 787, 115-116.
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intermediaries, negative experiences in the field resulted in greater resistance from the
direct sales force.
Cabletron continued to try and woo intermediaries to its side, altering its direct
sales force compensation to be "channel-neutral," essentially paying the direct
representatives equally for opportunities taken direct or with an intermediary beginning
in the first quarter of 1998.73 In addition, it announced plans for a channel marketing
program. However, the channel was still wary as the sales performance of the company
began to flounder. The stock of the company fell from a high in the summer of 1997 of
approximately $45 a share to $8 a share in the fall of 1998. In the process Benson had
seen the value of his remaining 12 percent stake in the company go from $855M to
$152M.74 Cabletron posted another heavy loss in its year ending February, 1999: $245M
on $1.4B of sales. Cisco meanwhile increased its top line to $12. 1B and its net income to
over $2B as the telecommunications boom began. Cabletron did not participate in the
windfalls of the Internet boom to the extent others such as Cisco did, but it likely gave the
company some breathing room in trying to get its channels to market and other issues
resolved.
In July of 1999, Benson stepped down from the CEO role and was replaced by the
founder of the acquired Yago Systems. Benson was credited with the "significant growth
of Cabletron's channel" in his latest fourteen month stint as the CEO of the company,
despite being at the helm for the largest loss in the company's history.75 In the process
Cabletron had lost significant market share in the primary LAN technology of the time,
LAN switching. It was no dead-last among the big four in market share for switching
with 9 percent, trailing number three Bay Networks with 12.7 percent, 3Com with 20.5
percent and new market leader Cisco with 39.5 percent. 76 On a high note, the business
that Cabletron was winning was increasingly going through intermediated channels. Sales
through intermediaries now in 1999 accounted for greater than 50 percent of sales up
from 35 percent the year before.77 In a prepared statement the new CEO outlined his four
immediate goals: expand sales to the Fortune 1000 customers, go after service providers
73 Caisse, K. (1998, August 3). Cabletron looking to boost business. Computer Reseller News, 801, 24.
7 Lyons, D. (1998, October 5). Hub bubble. Forbes, 162, 7, 62-64.
75 Aragon, L. (1999, June 7). Cabletron gets new chief. VARBusiness.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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(a new market segment for Cabletron), spin-out the company's network management
business, and get Cabletron into professional services...78 The spokesman went on to
reassure its intermediated channel partners about the professional services goal, because
it will be careful to continue to support the channel.79 Comments such as these however
did little to convince intermediaries that Cabletron had really become a channel-friendly
company.
Recent Developments
In 2001 Cabletron Systems was broken into four separate and standalone entities.
The largest unit named Enterasys Networks was essentially the original Cabletron,
focused on the enterprise data communications market. It accounted for roughly 80
percent of the company's original revenues of the company, inheriting the majority of the
installed base, direct sales apparatus and the intermediated channel relationships
established in the latter part of the 1990s. In 2002 it was investigated by the SEC after
accounting regularities with its revenue reporting procedures were discovered internally
and self-reported. Subsequent to the investigation, at least nine of the former Enterasys
executives were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges related to allegations of
fraudulently inflating revenues, and four have entered guilty pleas to various charges,
including its former CEO. The company paid $50 million to shareholders in 2003 to
settle claims against Enterasys. 80
The company continues to operate, fighting desperately to maintain its market
share in its core product areas, LAN switching and routing, and continue to get mindshare
with intermediaries at the high-end. The company has to adopted a solutions selling
approach that it calls Secure NetworksTM, described on its web site as follows:
"Leveraging our own technology and thought leadership as well as the strengths of our
strategic partners, we strive to develop flexible, scalable, intelligent solutions that deliver
real-world benefits to customers."8'
78 Aragon.
79 Ibid.
80 Enterasys Networks, Inc., Company Overview, Hoovers Online. Retrieved April 2005 from
www.hoovers.com
81 Enterasys Networks Inc. Company Web Site. Retrieved April 2005 from www.enterasvs.com.
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For the most part, the company continues the work outlined in the comments of
one of its first directors of channel programs in 1998: all the things you would expect-
building an infrastructure and educating everybody, getting our internal organizations
focused, getting people to understand how to work with partners, and getting past our
history of channel relationships... The effort to do just that continues to this day, against
great odds in displacing Cisco from the most competent intermediary organizations. It is
a tough battle. Enterasys has faced adversity from almost day one, emerging in the midst
of the largest downturn the industry had seen, an SEC investigation leading to former
executives convicted of fraud, to a number of restructurings. Enterasys began as an entity
with about 2,600 employees worldwide and was down to approximately 1,100 by the end
of its 2004 fiscal year. Recall that Cabletron once boasted a direct US sales force of
approximately 1,600 people. In its first full year of operations, it generated only $484M
in revenues and posted a loss of $114M. In April of 2005 as this thesis is being completed,
Enterasys released preliminary results for its first quarter ending in March of 2005 was
significantly short of previously provided guidance. This led to a sell-off of the stock the
next day driving the market capitalization of the company to a mere $174M.
Unfortunately for Enterasys, since the miss after 32 consecutive quarters of exceeding
street estimates, quarterly revenue misses had become quite common.
Obviously the company has descended to its current state due to a number of
factors. However, certainly the evidence outlined in this chapter supports the conclusion
that Cabletron's rather late decision to utilize intermediated channels, and poor execution
of the execution of an intermediated channel strategy was among the stronger causal
factors in its loss of market share and general decline of the company. The author
believes that there are several important learning to be gathered from these rather extreme
examples, Cisco versus Cabletron that hold lessons for any company in the high
technology space. The following chapter will provide a synopsis of those lessons, and
hopefully provide guidance for intermediated channel managers in future markets.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
The study of intermediated channels provided in the thesis has focused on the
areas of relationship management and the use of technology to provide a support
infrastructure for an intermediated channel. Through this examination of these topics, it
has covered many of the most difficult issues faced by channel managers. The case
studies of Cisco Systems and Cabletron Systems presented in the thesis have provided
two examples of implementation of intermediated channel strategies. These cases are of
interest because they are taken from one of the most rapidly evolving high technology
markets in history. The domination of open public standards in that market made value
capture through uniqueness difficult for both companies. They were forced to consider
the development of complementary assets such as superior channels to market as a
primary method of value capture. Their approach to the development of this
complementary asset was radically different.
At the time of the writing of the thesis, Cisco Systems has emerged as a dominant
leader in virtually all segments of the market. Cabletron Systems, known today as
Enterasys Networks has been relegated to a distant last in the enterprise data
communications equipment market in a relatively short period of time. Despite the fact
that the underlying technologies utilized in the offerings produced by both manufacturers
were subject to open standardization making technical differentiation difficult, one
company has captured dominant market share while achieving relatively rich operating
margins. One of the many factors of the success of Cisco Systems to date has been the
tightly-held complementary asset referred to throughout this thesis as multiple channel
management capability. A comparison and contrast of the execution of the transition to a
multi-channel model by these two companies offers the opportunity for learning for
managers in future high technology markets.
The objective of this last chapter of the thesis is to summarize the key takeaways
from the study of these two cases outlined in the thesis. Rather than a generalization
about what might be best management practice in this area, reviewing the differences in
the execution of a transition to intermediated channels by competing firms is likely to
yield much more practical information for managers facing similar situations.
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The characteristics of competition in high technology markets driven primarily by
open and public standards require focus by companies that compete in those markets to
begin the accumulation of complementary assets very early on in the life of the firm.
Without the benefits of intellectual property protection firms are unable to compete based
on the uniqueness of their offerings for an extended period of time. Innovations both
incremental and disruptive (such as LAN switching became for the wiring hub vendors as
described in the thesis) provided only fleeting opportunities for firms to capture value
through uniqueness. These innovations were rapidly incorporated into the standards
which enabled firms to catch up quickly. The number of experienced engineers in the
industry increased and standards evolved to encompass both "on the wire" and intra-
system interfaces and protocols, spillovers of technology were increasingly more rapid.
The thesis illustrates that one of the most valuable and inimitable complementary
asset a high technology firm can develop is expertise in the management of intermediated
channels. Outlining a strategy to launch from a base of customers won through a direct
sales channel to implementing a multi-channel model including intermediated channels
can be a very effective way for a high technology firm to gain large and profitable share
of a new market. The paper however has outlined how difficult the execution of such a
strategy can be. However if one looks to the case of Cisco Systems outlined in the paper,
it can be one means to win in an essentially winner takes all market even when open,
public standards prevent proprietary lock-in of customers. Essentially Cisco Systems has
accomplished a level of mastery of the multi-channel model similar to what Dell
Computer has done with the direct channel for personal computers. Essentially what both
companies have done in the development and management of their respective channel
management capability appears on the surface to be somewhat imitable. Yet neither Dell
nor Cisco has faced a successful challenge by their respective competitors to coopt their
respective channels, even in the face of commoditization of the offerings themselves.
Trying to understand precisely how Cisco Systems overcame the challenges outlined in
the paper to become extremely successful in managing the multi-channel model should
be of interest to any high technology company pursuing future high technology markets
with similar characteristics.
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Amongst the most important takeaways is that timing is often critical. Making the
decision to move to intermediated channels is a critical decision. Ascertaining the
readiness not only of the company, but of the intermediaries themselves is a key concern.
In cases of very immature technology markets, at the bottom of the S-curve in the
ferment stage, the companies in the space are hard pressed to look up from the business
of trying to get to the point of exponential growth to think about sales channels other than
the direct channel. However, once the exponential growth occurs and the company and
industry are in take-off it can be much harder to make the transition to the employment of
intermediated channels. This may be where having an experienced and disciplined
leadership team can be of particular importance to the firm. Taking stock of where the
company might be on the S-curve and its implications on which sales channels it chooses
to employ at a given time can be crucial.
Reviewing the case studies of Cisco Systems and Cabletron Systems presented in
the thesis it is interesting to consider the industry landscape in the 1993-1994 timeframe.
Especially in the case of Cabletron, the company and its sales force had to have had a
very clear view of the developments in the market, including the capabilities that the data
communications equipment intermediaries were developing. Cabletron's primary
competitor SynOptics Communications relied totally upon intermediated channels, as did
the number three competitor in the wiring hub segment 3Com Corporation. Cabletron
was clearly making a strategic choice in building a service organization and maintaining
its focus on building a direct sales capability and the infrastructure to support it. The
executives of the company were outspoken supporters of their near 100 percent direct
sales model, dismissing the strategies of their competitors and the industry pundits.
Trying to determine what the underlying logic of this management decision to pursue
primarily direct sales provides some interesting insights. The reader may recall the
quotations of the executive team in the press at this time. Those comments suggested that
the primary reasons for this commitment to Cabletron's direct channels was founded in
the belief that a direct sales force could maintain a closer connection to the customers in
order to sense trends in the market, and that the direct sales model provided a "governor"
on the growth rate of the company. Based on the fact that Cabletron largely was
blindsided by both the LAN switching disruption and the emergence of the Internet
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driving the need for routing solutions in its portfolio, the first of these arguments seems
especially weak.
Cisco Systems clearly benefited from the trials and tribulations its primary
competitor, Wellfleet Communications had in its own hybrid model of some
intermediated channels and some direct. At that point, Wellfleet was only able to achieve
roughly 15 percent market share to be the distant second to Cisco. The 50 percent market
share it retained in the router market through its primarily direct sales model at the time
probably provided Cisco Systems with several advantages as it contemplated the
employment of intermediated channels. The relationships it had with both Cabletron and
its competitors clearly provided it some insights into what was happening in the first
adjacent market Cisco had targeted for expansion. The Cisco executive team clearly
decided the channel was ready and focused its efforts on internal readiness, most notably
the overhaul of its IT infrastructure. Of the Big Four, Cabletron clearly had the lowest
level of internal readiness. The Cabletron executive team had clearly made the decision to
stay the direct sales course, regardless of what was happening amongst their competitors
or in the market. There is perhaps another lesson in that part of the case that is worth
considering. Even if the firm makes the conscious decision to maintain a direct-only
strategy it is probably prudent to maintain as positive a relationship with intermediaries
as possible, and not attempt to alienate them through direct criticism or through criticism
of the competitor's choice to utilize them.
The significantly late entry by Cabletron into the multi-channel model, attempting
to repair and forge productive relationships with an intermediary channel after all their
major competitors had done so, undoubtedly left them in a very precarious position. The
reader will recall that the company announced its intentions to start employing a multi-
channel strategy including intermediaries at the time of its first quarterly miss of revenue
projections, and first net operating loss in thirty-two consecutive quarters of operations.
As the reader will recall, there were also early indications of loss of market share as the
Cisco workgroup LAN switching products began to take off. When viewed through the
lens of the systems dynamics model presented at the end of chapter three, the potential
for the vicious cycle result of the reinvestment loop is quite clear in this example. There
was tremendous pressure both externally and internal to the company to deal with the
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revenue shortfalls and profitability. This potentially resulted in the sales force not being
able to commit to transitioning to support intermediaries, and the company being unable
to make other needed investments in order to build multi-channel management capability.
This could be a plausible explanation for why the company failed to navigate the
transition.
In addition, the company was late with both LAN switching and routing in their
product portfolio and lacked a comprehensive small and medium business solution which
was a growing sub-segment of the market at this time. Intermediaries considering
defecting to Cabletron were faced with a number of concerns: prior reputation of the
company as being channel unfriendly, a product line with substantial deficiencies, limited
brand awareness outside the Cabletron customer base and a very immature support
infrastructure. Although Cisco at the time may have been approaching over-distribution
and intermediaries were seeing pressures on the equipment portions of their margins, it
may in fact have been too little, too late for Cabletron.
As was outlined in the paper at several junctures execution of an intermediated
channel strategy requires comprehensive support throughout the leadership structure of
the company. As changes go, making significant changes to the revenue generating
machinery of a firm-working on the engine of an airplane in flight so to speak-is a
significant change. The commitment to seeing the change through, not to mention all the
change management tools and techniques need to be brought to bear. As was described in
the systems analysis evaluation of this process in the third chapter, there is the very likely
potential of a worse-before-better tradeoff to be experienced in the firm's transition. The
executive team needs to be well prepared for this eventuality and prepare the company,
investors and financial community as well so patience is afforded the company through
the transition.
Drawing from the case studies, this is precisely what Cisco did. The mandate for
the expansion from direct sales to intermediaries was directed from the top. Unlike
Cabletron, the Cisco executive team had decided and spoke publicly about their decision
to not try to do it all. At the time, Cisco Systems was broadening its product line and the
market for routing as a whole was expanding rapidly as the power of the Internet for
enterprise computing became apparent. Growing revenues in the router market which
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Cisco dominated at the time may in fact have provided time for the transition to
intermediated channels without an interruption in the revenue stream. Expectations for
the new LAN switching line could have been tempered by the fact that it was a new
market segment. Such conditions obviously make a transition to an intermediated channel
somewhat less impactful. This may have provided the opportunity for Cisco Systems to
capitalize on the virtuous cycle with the reinvestment loop outlined in the systems
dynamics analysis presented at the end of Chapter Three. By continuing to grow their
routing revenues as both the intermediated channels and LAN switching business ramped,
this may have prevented the company from experiencing the vicious cycle effect of the
reinvestment loop.
As outlined in Chapter Four, a significant factor in the accumulation of the
capability to manage intermediaries and multiple channels is having the IT infrastructure
in place to support the intermediaries. The state of enterprise software models facilitated
by the Internet has made such capabilities practically the status quo today. However,
firms must ensure that the architecture that is being implemented supports
interconnecting the company virtually to its partners in the supply chain including
intermediaries as described in the chapter. These architectural concerns need to be
addressed at an early stage of the firm's development and can require significant
investments far in advance of potential returns.
Cisco arguably may have had a significant advantage here given its privileged
view of how, internetworking and the Internet were likely to change this aspect of
business. The company also made a rather large investment in these nascent technologies
on faith that eventually gave them competitive advantage in the marketplace and with
intermediaries. The takeaway is that just as innovative firms have to be vigilante for
disruptions that potentially impact their products; they must be also on the look out for
technology disruptions that have the potential to impact their processes. Certainly the
evidence of firms being able to do either or both notably well is not good, but the lesson
remains valuable regardless.
Brand equity and the presence of demand for a manufacturer's offering are very
important determinants of success in intermediated channels in high technology.
Intermediary firms depend on the air cover the manufacturer's brand equity and
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marketing provide for them. Understanding the relatively small margins that the
intermediary earns on the product portion of its revenues, the high-end value add
intermediary especially, the effort they are likely to put forth to evangelize for a
manufacturer is limited. The awareness of the offering and demand for it in the market
have to be established to some degree. What this suggests for high technology
manufacturers of course is that branding is important. A strong intermediary channel will
help build the brand, assuming the quality of the intermediaries is maintained, however
the channel cannot start from a position of too little brand awareness. Cisco Systems has
been extremely effective in this aspect as well. While other firms have not been as
aggressive in establishing and maintaining positive brand awareness, Cisco has taken
steps to ensure that its brand is maintained. By continuing to brand aggressively Cisco
has effectively prevented the accumulation of market power by intermediaries.
Customers still request that the solutions delivered by their chosen intermediaries are
"Cisco-powered."
Lastly, the management of an intermediated channel strategy must be viewed as
an evolving process that is capable of being tuned and re-tuned to meet changing market
conditions. Flexibility is a necessary attribute of channel program and channel managers.
Although intermediaries look for consistency in their manufacturing partners at the
strategic level, they appear to be somewhat willing to accept changes at the tactical level
as long as they are justified and communicated early. Being able to manage the
relationship on this basis establishes the atmosphere of a partnership which is absolutely
the key in these relationships. Frequent and seemingly arbitrary changes from the
manufacturer can impact the stability of the relationship and loyalty of the intermediaries.
An example of this from the cases comes from Cisco Systems which has made
significant structural changes to its channel programs in the last several years. In shifting
from volume incentives to more qualitative incentives, it signaled the channel that the
market was maturing. Cisco was effectively placing its intermediaries on notice that the
expectation was that their intermediaries move up the value chain, and others might have
to move out. Being able to deliver such a challenge is an indicator of its dominant market
share and its mastery of the intermediated channel. For such a message to be received
unaccompanied by defections to the competition, the intermediaries have to believe that
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the support that Cisco provides will enable those intermediaries willing to make the
investment will move up the value chain and continue to be successful. This is validation
of Cisco Systems vast multi-channel management capabilities.
What will be interesting to watch in the near future is how this story progresses,
how the evolution of the management of intermediated channels by the dominant player
in the data communications equipment space continues-or potentially ceases. One
potential outcome is that the hardware and software continue to commoditize until the
point that the margins force a radical change in the business model. It is not
inconceivable that an IBM-like evolution occurs that results in Cisco shifting its primary
focus from "iron" to services, ending or significantly reducing the need for its indirect
channels it developed through the 1990s and into the current period.
The convergence of the many types of digital communications beyond data
toward IP and wired communications networks towards the Ethernet family of
technologies creates some interesting dynamics in the entire telecommunications sector.
As the appendices have outlined, there are many strong commoditization forces afoot
today in the enterprise data communications market. There is new competition from
overseas, most notably the entry by Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. Data
communications equipment offerings coming from Taiwan and other regions are
increasingly appearing in the market. Enabled by open standards, merchant silicon and
software, and the proliferation of engineering knowledge into many regions of the world,
new entrants can offer very similar functionality at significantly lower cost points.
Convergence creates both opportunities and challenges for Cisco, the remaining data
communications equipment providers as well as the legacy telecommunications
equipment manufacturers such as Lucent, Alcatel and Siemens. How the role of
intermediaries evolve, and more importantly how the ultimately successful companies
evolve their go-to-market strategies over this period should be intensely interesting.
Cisco has unseated incumbents and challenged stalwarts of the industry before,
however it remains to be seen how Cisco continues to fuel its growth and profitability in
the face of increasing commoditization. Certainly IP telephony is one potential area, as is
the storage space. But the ability to differentiate itself solely on the technical aspects of
its offerings has always been hard and will get increasingly so in the next few years.
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Regardless of what the future holds, the past and present of the data
communications equipment market clearly provides several important lessons for those
leading the formation and execution of go-to-market strategies for high technology
companies in the future. It is the hope of the author that this thesis has highlighted many
of the strategic and tactical challenges posed by including intermediated channels in the
go-to-market strategy of the high technology firm, and more importantly some practices
that proved successful in meeting those challenges.
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Appendix 1: The Data Communications Equipment
Market, Past and Present
Introduction
In an effort to understand the market for enterprise data network equipment, it is
important to have a basic understanding of how the technology and markets for it have
developed and evolved, and the trends that will drive its continuing evolution into the
future. The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader unfamiliar with the data
communications equipment industry with an introduction to this rapidly evolving market.
It is important to realize that this market is relatively new despite its very large size. The
evolution of the technology and the market are inextricably linked to the development of
intermediary channels and the management of those channels by the data
communications equipment manufacturers such as Cisco Systems and Cabletron.
Origins of Standards-based Local Area Network (LAN)
Technology
The invention of standards-based, high-speed Local Area Networking (LAN) is
often credited to Dr. Robert Metcalfe. This technology and the industry it spawned
accelerated rapidly with the invention of the PC and Internet to become one of the
primary enablers of the client-server, Internet-enabled enterprise architecture that has
become predominant today. Dr. Metcalfe, a graduate of MIT and Harvard, was a
researcher in the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center ("PARC") in the early and mid-1970s
at the time of this extremely important invention. In 1976, Metcalfe and his assistant
David Boggs published a paper titled, Ethernet: Distributed Packet-Switching for Local
Computer Networks. While at PARC, Metcalfe had been working with what would later
come to be known as the first personal computers, the Xerox Alto. He and his small team
were assigned a project to develop a local area networking solution to interconnect
several hundred of these computers to another recent Xerox innovation at the time, high-
speed laser printers. The goal of the project was to develop a relatively high bandwidth
and scalable local area networking technology for connecting many computers to a
common network to share these new page-per-minute laser printers. Consider that
hundreds of small computers in one building alone was an incredible innovation at that
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time-connecting them together with what grew to be an open, non-proprietary, simple
and relatively high-speed and low-cost packet-based network was completely
revolutionary! This feat was accomplished, based on an expansion of work Dr. Metcalfe
had done for his Harvard PhD paper in 1973.
Robert Metcalfe left Xerox in 1979 to promote the use of personal computers and
local area networks (LANs) not to mention become one of the most famous MIT
entrepreneurs in recent history. He successfully convinced Digital Equipment, Intel, and
Xerox Corporations to work together to promote Ethernet as a standard, and license the
technology for a fairly modest fee. In 1980 Metcalfe formed the 3Com Corporation
which became the first startup in the fledgling data communications equipment market
focusing on standards-based Ethernet equipment. 3Com capitalized on Metcalfe's deep
knowledge of Ethernet and reluctance by PC manufacturers to integrate Ethernet
interfaces into their PCs. The original business plan of 3Com was to design, manufacture
and sell Ethernet controllers and other equipment required to connect computers and
other devices to standards-based Ethernet LANs. Now an international computer industry
standard that has evolved through several iterations, Ethernet is the most widely installed
LAN technology today by far. Dozens of companies were spawned to pursue
opportunities created by the adoption of Ethernet LANs and complementary as well as
competing technologies. In 2003 over 184 million new Ethernet connections were added
worldwide, generating $12.5B in manufacturers' revenues.
The Internet Emerges
Simultaneously to this development of the data communications equipment
business was the latter stages of ongoing development of what has become to be known
as the Internet. 82 Most histories of the Internet trace its origins back to 1962 and a series
of memos J.C.R. Licklider of MIT discussing his "Galactic Network" concept. In those
memos, Licklider described a global interconnection of computers and the interactions
that would be enabled through it-very similar to what we know some 40 years later as
82 Much of the description of the evolution of the Internet provided in this section was adapted from an
online article entitled A Brief History of the Internet, by Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D.
Clark,Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch,Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts, Stephen Wolff.
Retrieved April 2005 from http://www.isoc.org/internet/histor/brief.shtml.
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the Internet and World Wide Web. Licklider's insights long ago of the technologies
which have revolutionized many aspects of the conduct of business and our personal lives
over the last 10 years are truly uncanny.
At about the same time another MIT researcher Leonard Klienrock was
researching and writing about communications using packets as opposed to circuits
which was a foundational technology for computer networking and the basis for Ethernet.
By 1966 many of these concepts had been forwarded within the US Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA) and quickly culminated in a paper outlining the
architecture for the first iteration of what eventually became the Internet, the
"ARPANET," a network that would link the computers of several of the most prominent
research universities and government research laboratories. In August 1968 the DARPA
funded community had refined the overall structure and specifications for the
ARPANET; an RFQ was released by DARPA for the development of one of the key
components of the network infrastructure, the packet switches called Interface Message
Processors (IMP's). The IMP RFQ was won in December 1968 by Bolt Beranek and
Newman (BBN).
Due to Kleinrock's early development of packet switching theory and his focus on
analysis, design and measurement, his Network Measurement Center at UCLA was
selected to be the first node on the ARPANET. All this came together in September 1969
when BBN installed the first IMP at UCLA and the first host computer was connected. A
project on "Augmentation of Human Intellect" at Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
provided a second node. One month later, when SRI was connected to the ARPANET,
the first host-to-host message was sent from Kleinrock's laboratory to SRI. Two more
nodes were added at UC Santa Barbara and University of Utah. Thus, by the end of 1969,
four host computers were connected together into the initial ARPANET, and the budding
Internet was off the ground.
In October 1972 a large and very successful demonstration of the ARPANET was
held at the International Computer Communication Conference (ICCC). This was the first
demonstration of this new, wide area network (WAN) technology to the public. It was
also in 1972 that the initial "killer" application, electronic mail, was introduced. In March
an engineer at BBN wrote the basic email message send and read software, motivated by
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the need of the ARPANET developers for an easy coordination mechanism. In July, the
utility of email was expanded by the writing the first email program to list, selectively
read, file, forward, and respond to messages. From these relatively modest beginnings the
email application took off as the most important networked application for over a decade,
setting the stage for the many client-server applications that followed.
During my own undergraduate work in computer science completed from 1982 to
1986, many of these developments were occurring somewhat under the radar and
certainly had not made their way into the mainstream computer science curriculum at
most universities in the United States. These two incredibly disruptive technological
innovations-Ethernet LANs and the Internet-were rapidly gaining momentum and
approaching critical mass as I graduated and entered the military service in 1986. Apple
Computer had of course gone public in 1980, and Tim Berners-Lee completed a project
while consulting at CERN later that year that is often cited as his first contribution to
what would emerge ten years later as the World Wide Web. The PC and home computer
was emerging rapidly (I was a proud owner of one of the first affordable home computers,
the IBM PC Junior), but enterprise computing was still very much dominated by the
time-sharing mainframe and minicomputers through "dumb terminals" and time sharing
operating systems.
The transformation that occurred in the period from 1986 when I completed my
degree, and when I re-entered the industry in late 1993 after completion of my military
service was incredible as I look back on it! Microsoft Windows version 3.1 was released
in 1992 and had become the de facto standard operating system for the IBM PC and the
plethora of IBM PC clones that had emerged behind it. With relatively wide support for
graphical user interface office applications from Microsoft and others, PCs were
becoming increasingly more common on the desktops in businesses. Also important at
this stage of the development of the industry was the rapid rise of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) such as Prodigy, America Online and many of the other pioneers that
had brought the power of the networked PC into homes everywhere. Email and relatively
simple access to the very basic online content predating the World Wide Wed facilitated
by the early ISPs had become to a great extent the "killer" applications that personal
computers needed to move beyond the mere curiosities they were in their early,
148
standalone iterations throughout the 1980s.83 The combination of a GUI operating
system and rich, integrated suites of desktop applications had propelled PCs to standard
equipment status on the desktops and increasingly into the homes of the rapidly growing
numbers of knowledge workers world wide.
In the same year I left the military, the acceptable use policy for the Internet was
reinterpreted allowing commercial uses for the first time. This momentous change
ushered in e-commerce and a vast number of other potential commercial applications
enabled by a world-wide packet switching data network. Not quite a year later, Marc
Andreessen and several of his colleagues left NCSA taking their Mosaic Web Browser
with them to form what eventually became Netscape. What occurred between that time
and the burst. of the "Internet bubble" has for all intents and purposes become part of
popular culture in most parts of the world.
The Drive toward Open Standards
At some point in his career, Robert Metcalfe formulated what has become to be
known as Metcalfe's Law. Metcalfe's Law states simply that the usefulness, or utility, of
a network equals the square of the number of users. According to one source, Metcalfe's
Law first appeared in an article appearing in Forbes ASAP by George Gilder in
September of 1993.84 Purportedly it was in that same year that the Internet reached
critical mass with roughly 2.5 million host computers connected. By November of 1997,
that number had grown to over 25 million host computers.
Enterprises in all industries across the globe were taking part in the shift to the
new enterprise computing paradigm enabled by the networking of PCs. In the rush to
deploy PCs and servers, and then to interconnect them, a myriad of issues requiring
hardware, software and service solutions not required in the mainframe era were
83 I distinctly remember an internship in the office of the controller in my senior year of undergraduate
studies, circa 1985. The Controller's Office had been assigned a brand new DOS-based Burroughs personal
computer, with an early spreadsheet application I believe based on VisiCalc, and a dot matrix printer. My
assignment for the internship was to "figure out" what to do with the PC-the Controller himself, who
depended on the mainframe-based accounting system to run the college, told me he knew the PC was
important but did not know why quite yet. Clearly he hoped the young, bright-eyed soon to be graduate of
the CS program could help him figure it out.
84 The article by George Gilder, "Metcalfe's Law and Legacy", was first published in Forbes ASAP,
September 13, 1993. Retrieved in April, 2005 from http://www.seas.upenn.edu/-gail/metgg.html.
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emerging behind a steady stream of innovations in networking, computing and software.
The opportunities seemed boundless as firms the world over rushed to usher in this new
age and the opportunities it promised. The birth of a new category of information
technology businesses, the enterprise data communications equipment vendors such as
3Com, Cabletron, Cisco and SynOptics and many, many others were formed in the midst
of the development of what has evolved into a industry that has generated hundreds of
billions of dollars and employed a vast number of people worldwide in the roughly
twenty years of its existence. In the process an entire new category of information
technology services was created and with it, many thousands of new organizations
emerged to service the needs of businesses adopting these new technologies. The services
provided by these firms ranged from reselling the equipment manufactured by the new
data communications equipment manufacturers to building, maintaining and operating
data network infrastructures for enterprises and the telecommunications service providers.
The service providers were rapidly adding packet switching capabilities to the global
circuit-switched voice network in response to the exponential growth of demand for data
transport services.
It is important to note at this juncture that the data communications equipment
market has been divided into two major segments since the late 1990s: enterprise and
service provider. Early in the evolution of the data communications equipment market no
such designation was necessary. Equipment purpose-built for the service provider
evolved over time with the exponential growth in data traffic necessitating a new class of
equipment providing the capacities required for the core of the service provider network
which has evolved into the Internet today. There are other subcategories such as the
relatively new consumer segment which emerged with the service providers delivering
broadband service to households, requiring slimmed-down versions of that had been
previously been enterprise equipment for the purposes of providing premise connection
to the high-speed internet services such as cable and DSL, and increasingly for building
out small home LANs with both wire-line and wireless technologies.
The focus of this paper is primarily the enterprise segment. The enterprise
segment includes the equipment and channels used by firms of all sizes to provide
network connectivity within their facilities (typically called "intranets"), to connect to
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partners and suppliers utilizing private WAN links ("extranets") and of course to connect
corporate networks to the Internet itself. The service provider segment-that part of the
market focusing primarily on the telecommunications service providers that provide long-
haul and last-mile, public and private tariff-based services for individual and business
consumers, forms another very large and important segment of this market. Although
there are many parallels between these two subcategories, there are also many important
differences most notably the types (e.g., capacities and capabilities) of equipment as well
as the channels to these markets. It is important to note that many of the vendors covered
in this paper sold to both the enterprise and service provider segments. Several of the
manufacturers eventually developed different operational organizations including,
product development, service, as well as sales and channel organizations that focused on
the relatively smaller number of partners in the service provider segment and their
requirements. They are not the focus of this paper.
Applications Drive Enterprise Adoption
At the time 3Com Corporation was being formed to bring Ethernet solutions to
market, there were other proprietary network protocol offerings on the market already
such as ARCNet, IBM's Token Ring and Digital Equipment's "DECNet" which at that
time (1982) had evolved Ethernet local area network support as the datalink of choice
with many proprietary extensions. Several companies such as Novel, Xerox, Digital
Equipment and others had introduced specialized software-networking operating
systems (NOS) as they came to be called that enabled file and print sharing over LANs
residing on the first servers which provided file and print services. As was alluded to
earlier in this chapter, probably the most important networked application in this early
stage of the industry was email, followed closely by print and file sharing. Print servers
allowed for many users to share printers on the network. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, Novell's NOS that provided file and print sharing services on PC-based servers
was a tipping point that drove widespread adoption of LANs for the enterprise.
LAN-based file sharing slowly ended the first PC "networking" protocol,
affectionately known to the first computerized office workers as "sneaker-net." That of
course referred to the practice of sharing files by copying them onto floppy disks and
hand-carrying the file to those you wanted to share it with. (Typically the files being
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shared were accompanied by the latest virus, which unfortunately appeared on the scene
very soon after the PC's emergence and the establishment of the precursor of the Internet
as a file sharing medium, dial-up bulletin board systems (BBS)). File sharing was enabled
by the server-side software of the NOS which enabled the establishment of multiple user
"accounts" on the server which provided the user with a standard file structure for storing
electronic files. Other users could be given access to that file structure as dictated by
server policies established by the server administrator. File and print-sharing were some
of the first true client-server applications beyond email discussed previously. The
widespread adoption of the Novell NOS on servers brought businesses an alternative to
the peer-to-peer networking protocols provided by AppleTalk and Microsoft
NETBUI/NETBIOS that allowed some amount of sharing functionality between two or
more general purpose PCs, but were never intended for the client-server model and
application sharing that immediately followed print and file sharing.
Regardless of what NOS and applications were being used in a environment, the
first requirement to take advantages of these new networking capabilities was that the
computers, printers and servers and in some cases the legacy mainframe and
minicomputer infrastructures all had to be interconnected physically via some local area
networking technology. The equipment comprising the physical network infrastructure
providing interconnection of devices consists of non-intelligent and intelligent devices
such as hubs, switches and routers. This equipment and the software that provided
management of network infrastructure was the domain of the data communications
equipment companies such as 3Com, SynOptics, Cabletron and Cisco Systems and
dozens of other entrants. These companies and this segment are the focus of this paper.
For PC and server connectivity, a special purpose card called a "Network
Interface Card" or NIC and additional driver software was added to PCs and Servers to
enable the device to communicate on the network, utilizing one LAN technology
typically (e.g., standards-based Ethernet, Token Ring, etc.) to enable local area
networking with other devices. LANs required the installation of a cable plant within
buildings to support the data network. Cabling for LANs was modeled after the voice
networks already in place in most businesses which utilized a scheme commonly referred
to as "structured cabling." In structured cabling, "horizontal cabling" was used to connect
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devices in the workspaces on a floor to a telecommunications closet (often referred to as
a "wiring closet"). Wiring closets housed the network devices such as a hub or a switch
that provided interconnectivity between the devices on that floor, typically within 100
meters of the closet. In larger and multi-floored buildings the vertical cable plant
provided interconnectivity between wiring closets and floors, and to centralized facilities
such as data centers and server farms.
Very early on battle lines were being drawn in this nascent industry as the
manufacturers of data communications, NOS, PC and related equipment positioned not
only their products, but the LAN and network protocol technologies implemented in their
offerings. As companies the world over rushed to implement LANs and take advantage of
the much vaunted benefits of client-server computing, opportunities to provide LAN
solutions to businesses were abundant. As was alluded to earlier, initially the choices of
technology and manufacturer were few: ARCNet, Token Ring, DECNet and the new
upstart Ethernet standard being promoted by the data communications equipment startups
such as 3Com, SynOptics and Cabletron. Companies that had an IBM, DEC or other
legacy environment often turned to their incumbent vendor for solutions for transitioning
their infrastructures to the new LAN, client-server environments. Other firms that did not
have such a legacy, able to utilize PCs, LANs and client server applications provided
very fertile grounds for 3Com and the other entrants in the data communications
equipment market. These technologies enabled firms of many sizes to begin to utilizing
IT for the first time. Mainframe and minicomputer systems were often well out reach
economically for many firms. Several data communications equipment companies such
as 3Com, SynOptics Communications, Cabletron Systems and Cisco Systems enjoyed
very rapid growth through the 1980s and into the early 1990s.
As is the case around technology generally, sides were drawn by the incumbent
information technology and the new entrants. The participants on both sides strengthened
their arguments with publications from a variety of experts that claimed superiority of
one technology over another. As Dr. Metcalfe half-jokingly suggesting one such paper
enabled the creation of an entire new market segment that became the foundation of the
3Com product line. That paper was written by an influential MIT professor, Jerome
Saltzer. Professor Saltzer co-wrote an influential paper suggesting that Token-ring
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architectures were theoretically superior to Ethernet-style technologies. Ethernet utilizes a
non-deterministic or contention-based technique that does in fact result in less than 100%
utilization of the available bandwidth due to collisions on the shared medium. Token
Ring and other more deterministic protocols result in greater utilization of the available
bandwidth but at the cost of increased complexity and cost. This result, so the story goes,
left enough doubt in the minds of computer manufacturers that they decided not to make
Ethernet a standard feature on their devices early on, and therefore 3Com could
successfully build a business around selling add-on Ethernet network interfaces for PCs.
Similarly, in order to interconnect these network-enabled PCs, Cabletron, SynOptics,
Cisco Systems and several other entrants pursued building the wiring closet and data
center equipment that provided that interconnection. In the case of Cabletron and
SynOptics, these companies focused on the design, manufacture and sale of the devices
that became to be called wiring hubs. Cisco maintained its focus early in its history on
routers which interconnected networks. The combined market for hubs and routers
rapidly grew to become an approximately $6B business by 1994.
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, while Metcalfe was still at Xerox he
organized an effort to reach out to Digital Equipment Corporation and Intel to form a
consortium to pursue standardization of Ethernet. The "DIX" consortium published the
first formal joint specification of Ethernet in 1980, making it publicly available for a
nominal licensing fee. Two years later in 1982, the DIX Ethernet specification was
adopted virtually unchanged by an international standards organization, the International
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, or IEEE. The new standard, IEEE 802.3 becomes
the foundation for the establishment of Ethernet as the global standard for interconnecting
computers on local-area networks.
The literature I have reviewed does not go into great detail about what motivated
Metcalfe to pursue development of Ethernet into an internationally standardized protocol.
Metcalfe's fundamental work in the invention of Ethernet had in fact been patented by
Xerox. Metcalfe was committed however to seeing Ethernet adopted as an open, public
standard that could be implemented by any manufacturer while achieving universal
interoperability. This decision and activism on Metcalfe's part undoubtedly was at least
partially responsible for the widespread and rapid adoption of the technologies, as well as
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the establishment of many companies that both manufacture and service the enterprise
network infrastructures that have been implemented in the last fifteen years as the world
has adopted PC internetworking en masse. Often I hear people introduce Dr. Metcalfe as
the "inventor of Ethernet," or "founder of 3Com Corporation." I think this is a huge
understatement of what he really accomplished through championing the open
standardization of Ethernet and the establishment of the IEEE as the primary standards
body for data communications protocols.
Metcalfe's Law probably provides some insight to his motivations-clearly he
believed in the power of network externalities, and possibly he concluded that the
proprietary model necessarily slowed down adoption. Certainly his position as the
founder of the first company to provide aftermarket Ethernet NICs that could be
promoted as compliant with an international standard endorsed by industry leaders such
as Digital Equipment, Intel and Xerox was also a motivating factor. Whatever the
motivation, Metcalfe was determined to get Ethernet standardized internationally,
purportedly pitching IBM that they should join the consortium and migration to Ethernet.
IBM resisted, and then moved to standardize Token Ring, but as we shall see Ethernet
eventually dominated Token Ring and all other LAN technologies becoming the
dominant design again in no small part due to the open Ethernet standard and the
innovation driven by competition.
The Evolution of Ethernet
The first iterations of Ethernet was via a true bus topology, implemented using a
coaxial cable and devices called transceivers that tapped into the cable and provided
connectivity to the NICs installed in the devices connected to the bus. Like any bus, the
available bandwidth of the LAN was shared amongst the devices connected to that
segment, or length of coaxial cable. As Ethernet LANs began to grow in popularity,
several of the incumbent data communications equipment manufacturers and a raft of
startups drove further innovations in the Ethernet product offerings and the standards.
Infrastructure devices such as multi-port repeaters evolved into the wiring hubs that
enabled interconnection of multiple LAN segments in a single device. Repeaters simply
extended the LAN by repeating packets received on one port out all other ports. Because
repeaters operate at the physical layer and make no intelligent forwarding decision,
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achieving wire speed is relatively easy with little or no software in the forwarding path.
With repeating though the bandwidth of the combined segments was limited to 10Mbps
maximum specified by the standards and was shared among all the stations connected to
the multiple segments.
The desire to move toward topologies better suited for large office environments
led to revisions to the standard that added support for different cabling, most importantly
twisted pair copper which had become popular for telephony applications in office
environments. The use of twisted pair in conjunction with wiring hubs enabled what is
referred to as the "star" topology for Ethernet LANs. Eventually the star topology became
the preferred mode of cabling and topology for Ethernet LANs, and the use of coaxial
cable and the associated network devices such as transceivers obsolete.
Digital Equipment is credited with the introduction of the first multi-port repeater.
Digital was also among the first companies to offer standards-based Ethernet hubs.
Ethernet hubs were utilized to interconnect multiple end stations as the device at the
center of the star Ethernet topology. Several other companies including SynOptics
Communications (spun-out of Xerox PARC in 1985), and a New England-based startup,
Cabletron Systems, Inc. were pioneers in the rapidly growing market for these devices
which were foundational to the widespread adoption of Ethernet LANs. By 1989 both
SynOptics and Cabletron had completed very successful IPOs, and the enterprise segment
of the data communications equipment market was growing at a blistering pace as
companies adopted the new paradigm of distributed computing.
Enterprise LANs and the Internet Collide
As was outlined earlier in this chapter, concurrent with this development and
evolution of enterprise networking was the emergence of the global Internet onto the
scene. A venture-backed startup, Cisco Systems was founded in 1984 by two members of
the computer science department at Stanford University. Cisco Systems was formed to
design and commercialize a special purpose device which provided the internetworking
and routing services, aptly named a "router," to distinguish it from the Gateways that
were utilized previously to interconnect networks. Routers were designed to replace the
general purpose workstation or server-based Gateways used in the early days of the
ARPANET, dedicating hardware and software to the routing function in a standalone,
156
special-purpose platform. The two founders of Cisco saw the proliferation of multiple,
disparate networks on the campus of the University that were unable to "talk" to one
another. Simply described, routers provide the functionality required to interconnect
disparate networks.
Cisco Systems began its life as a company that built routers solely, and provided
highly specialized devices that provided interconnection of LANs. Into the early 1990's,
enterprises connected geographically dispersed LANs through leased lines-dedicated
circuits provided by the telephony service providers. This methodology, and the resulting
private long-haul networks commonly referred to as Wide Area Networks or WANs,
were utilized for connecting LANs across town, across the country and even
internetworking LANs in different countries for the multi-national corporations. At each
end of those circuits was a router that provided logical connection of the LANs, but also
provided a "translation" function between the circuit-switched, TDM-based transport
utilized predominantly by the telephony networks at the time, and the packet-switched,
non-TDM technologies such as Ethernet employed in enterprise LANs. In addition, the
router provided a translation function between different LAN technologies allowing
interconnection of Ethernet to Token Ring for example.
Cisco Systems led the industry with the "multiprotocol" router that not only
allowed the interconnection of different LAN technologies but also enabled the use of
multiple logical network layer protocols (e.g., IP and Novell, DECNet) on a single
physical infrastructure. Multiprotocol routing was a necessity for the largest enterprises
that often found themselves interconnecting LANs constructed by different groups within
the company utilizing different technologies, as well as interconnecting LANs across
circuit-switched LANs. The early days of the race to transition to LANs, PCs and client-
server were sometimes uncoordinated and non-standardized as some resistance or lack of
resources or knowledge prevented the IT departments running mainframe and
minicomputer environments from being able to fully plan and support enterprise-wide
transitions. It was not until the latter part of the 1990s, due in some part to the looming
year 2000 problem that the largest enterprises adopted centralized control and
management of the network infrastructure of the enterprise, and established vendor and
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other internal standards. Many companies have yet to complete standardization of their
local area network environments.
In addition, as the telecommunications service providers faced increasing demand
for data services by their coveted corporate customers, the resulting build-out of the
infrastructure they required was highly router-centric and increasingly they turned to
Cisco for the equipment and know-how to build out of their own packet-switched
infrastructures. By the time Cisco completed its IPO in 1990, it was widely regarded as
the leader in the equipment and technology knowledge in the wide area networking and
Internet infrastructure and protocols. While many of the new data communications
equipment startups as well as many of the other established computing companies
continued to focus on the interconnection of computers within the enterprise, Cisco was
developing a unique competency and market share in the WAN and Service Provider data
communications infrastructure segments. It participated heavily in the Internet
community and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) which provided the
standardization efforts for the Internet. To this day, Cisco has a commanding share of the
routers at the core of the Internet as this paper is completed in 2005.
One can make the argument Cisco Systems enjoyed a rather privileged
perspective on what was happening in both the enterprise and service provider data
communications market segments that few other companies in the space had the benefit
of. The connection that the company had with the development of the Internet combined
with its exposure to the trends in the development of large enterprise networking, one
could argue put them in an advantaged position to "connect the dots" very early on. I
have heard many industry insiders, including Dr. Metcalfe claim that they were aware
very early on of the power of the Internet, yet did little to capitalize on this development
in their corporate strategies to the extent that Cisco did as was illustrated in the body of
the thesis.
There were other router-focused startups, such as Wellfleet Communications, and
several others. Many entrants have tried to displace Cisco's control of the routing market,
Juniper most recently and with arguably the best success so far. More than any of the
other players I would argue, Cisco had an almost unique vantage point for foreseeing not
only the universal adoption of increasingly high-speed data networks by firms of every
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size, but more importantly the emergence of the Internet as the primary public global
telecommunications network infrastructure. The implications the two considered together
would have on the evolution of the data communications industry I believe were clear to
Cisco, and they developed a strategy for exploiting these two forces and executing on that
strategy far better than others. The execution to date of their strategy to be the leading
player in the enterprise and service provider markets has been nothing short of
extraordinary.
While many companies such as 3Com, Cabletron and SynOptics remained
focused on innovations in devices to facilitate interconnection of devices within an
enterprise, and some direct competition from Wellfleet Communications, Cisco found
itself with feet in two very exciting camps. It expertly triangulated the intelligence that
such a convergence of enterprise computing and the Internet was in the offing. While it
was building devices that facilitated interconnection of enterprise LANs and was closely
following the trends in that segment, it was also actively participating in and driving the
creation of a global, next-generation network that would become the public Internet. It
participated at virtually every level in both these segments.
Beginning in 1993, Cisco Systems undertook an aggressive strategy of expansion
via acquisition to include just about every data communications equipment and software
component required for local area, wide area and Internet connectivity for every
imaginable market segment: enterprises of all sizes, service providers and most recently
the home segment of the market.
At the time of the initiation of the expansion by Cisco, I was employed by
Cabletron Systems which had established itself as one of the leading data
communications companies, sharing dominant market share in the wiring hub space with
SynOptics. I vividly recall how Cisco was perceived within Cabletron as Cisco expanded
its product line beyond routers. Cabletron in 1994 had no routing technology of its own;
in fact it had an OEM relationship with Cisco at the time which allowed it to offer routing
technology in its own products which customers were requesting at an increasing rate.
Routing is by its nature one of the more complex technologies utilized in data
communications. In the early and mid-1990s it was further complicated by the existence
of multiple network-layer protocols, multiple routing protocols and rather arcane,
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command-line interfaces. At this juncture, the number of routers in an enterprise network
was very small compared to hubs-at the time, a hub port was required for each station
connected to the network. One or two routers might be employed to connect the entire
LAN, several hundred stations, to remote sites via leased or early Internet connections.
The vast number of ports, and manufacturers' revenue was in hubs, not routers at the time
although gross margins on routers which had a large software component were incredibly
attractive; the bill of materials even for the largest enterprise network infrastructure was
heavily weighted toward the wiring closet and the hubs that provided interconnectivity
for the end stations.
This chapter has focused heavily on Ethernet while making some mention of
Token Ring, and a few others of the original LAN technologies. It is important to note
that through the period of the mid-1990s the eventual emergence of Ethernet as the
predominant technology or "dominant design" for enterprise LANs was far from certain.
Standardization and rapid adoption of Ethernet however for all intents and purposes set a
precedent that proprietary networking protocols were doomed to obscurity. Several
efforts by manufacturers to develop and standardize alternatives to Ethernet, along with
an almost steady stream of revisions and expansions to the Ethernet standard itself were
initiated by the established firms and a raft of new startups all vying to be added to the
"Big Four" data communications companies as Cisco, Cabletron, 3Com and Bay
Networks (resulting from the merger of SynOptics and Wellfleet Communications) had
come be called by 1994.
In the 1994 timeframe, many enterprises were contemplating upgrades to their
networks. As was outlined previously, the first standard Ethernet LANs were based on a
10Mbps data rate, and because of the bus nature of the protocol the first Ethernet LANs
shared the available bandwidth with all stations connected to the segment. Initially
10Mbps seemed like a great deal of bandwidth despite the fact that it was effectively
shared by all users on the same LAN segment, but as the number of nodes attached to the
LANs continued to increase, and application sharing and networked database applications
such as ERP emerged, the LANs of large enterprises became increasingly bandwidth
constrained. Many of the established companies and a steady-stream of new entrants all
began to participate what became to be known as the race for "speeds and feeds."
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Existing technologies such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) which was well
known in the telecommunications service provider space was "adapted" for data LAN
and WAN applications. The ATM Forum was established by manufacturers to create a
consortium of companies including industry stalwart IBM and many startups such as Fore
Systems (eventually acquired by Marconi) as well as Cisco (organically and through
acquisition of' ATM companies such as Light Stream) to pursue industry standards for the
adaptation of ATM for high-speed enterprise network technology alternative to Ethernet.
Digital Equipment Corporation put forth its own high-speed technology, Fiber
Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) which was standardized by the IEEE. Even the Token
Ring standard was increased from 4Mbps to 16Mbps in the early 1990s. Hewlett Packard
attempted to introduce an Ethernet-like technology it called O1VG-AnyLAN as an
alternative to a higher-speed Ethernet variant. In the backdrop of these developments,
continued development of the Ethernet standard and related, complementary technologies
also continued at a rapid pace, driven by the incumbents and startups and in close parallel,
incorporation in the IEEE standards.
Among the most important developments for Ethernet was the development of a
disruptive technology: Ethernet switching. Several startups had emerged that were
exploiting rapid improvements in silicon technology and an extension of the IEEE 802.1
bridging technology (originally developed by Digital Equipment Corporation) to
effectively provide dedicated bandwidth on each port of a wiring closet device at a price
point and level of complexity that was acceptable to the market. At roughly the same time,
a working group of the IEEE was already in work on a new version of the Ethernet
standard to add a new variant that increased the speed to 100 Mbps per second-a ten
fold increase in performance for the Ethernet standard. This increase in speed
immediately put Ethernet on the same footing as FDDI, again trading off some effective
bandwidth utilization for significantly reduced complexity while maintaining the use of
twisted-pair cabling. The pace of innovation in the market place was intense in this
period.
When combined with the switching technology and a staggering pace of cost
reductions that followed rapid market adoption, Ethernet LAN switching eventually
eclipsed all other technologies in the Enterprise LAN and potentially beyond. The
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standard has been expanded include both 1Gbps and 10Gbps variants and distances over
single mode fiber optic cable of up to 40 kilometers has been achieved. The industry is
currently pursuing a 40Gbps variant of Ethernet. Ethernet is now a serious contender for
the service provider networks, potentially resulting in an "all Ethernet" IP network in the
near future. In addition, as a function of improvement in silicon performance and cost
reductions combined with the emergence of TCP/IP as the predominant network layer
protocol on enterprise LANs, as it always has been on the Internet, switch vendors have
expanded the functionality of their enterprise LAN switches to include Layer 3 routing
support, effectively enabling routing functionality to every port at increasingly lower
price points. The combination of Gigabit Ethernet and Layer 3 switching led to a new
wave of startups that focused completely on layer 3 Gigabit Ethernet switches, two of
which remain as independent companies (Foundry and Extreme Networks) and several
others that were acquired by the incumbents. The relatively recent standardization of the
10Gigabit Ethernet variant has resulted in new startups as well, ForcelO Networks is one
example.
Cisco Systems Dominates the Enterprise Segment
The acquisition by Cisco Systems of two Ethernet switching companies propelled
the company beyond offering only routing solutions and into competing directly for the
enterprise wiring closet segment of the market, first dominated by SynOptics and
Cabletron. In effectively displacing these two market leaders, LAN switching revenues
have provided the lion's share of Cisco's staggering growth through the 1990s and to the
current timeframe. Moving into the lucrative adjacent segment to complement its
command of the service provider and enterprise routing segment was directly responsible
for Cisco's rapid growth and eventual domination of most enterprise data communication
market segments. It achieved its dominating market share in these segments in less than
ten years following these initial acquisitions and the continuing string of nearly 100
acquired companies by Cisco continuing to the present day. Cisco has been at the
forefront driving trends in the industry such as the convergence around Ethernet and IP,
not to mention the current drive to migrate other communications such as voice, video
and storage onto IP packet switched networks and wireless. Cisco's incredibly aggressive
A & D strategy, its ability to foresee and arguably drive trends in the market, and its go-
162
to-market strategy including the effective use of intermediated and other indirect
channels to generate over 90 percent of its sales has established the company today as the
"one stop shop" for the majority of the data communications equipment required for the
converged network infrastructure for the enterprise, service provider and now the home
segments of the market has established it as one the most successful companies of the
Internet age. Figure A1.1 below depicts Cisco Systems expansion of its product line:
1988 - 1990 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1996 1997- 1998 1999 - 2001
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Source: Going the Distance: Why Some Companies Dominate and Others
Fail, Kevin Kennedy and Mary More, Prentice Hall, 2003.
Figure AI.1: Cisco Systems: Product Line Evolution
At the time of this writing in the spring of 2005, Cisco's market capitalization is
approximately $116B, and the company has grown its annual sales from $1.9B and
approximately four thousand employees to over $22B in annual revenues and thirty-four
thousand employees in 2004. The market capitalization of the rest of the "big four", now
part of larger firms or have spun-out parts of the company (3Com spun-out Palm for
example) are not nearly as reflective of success. 3Com Corporations market capitalization
is now at $1.4B and in the late 1990s very publicly ceded the large enterprise segment of
the market, turning over its large enterprise customers to layer-3 switching startup
Extreme Networks. Bay Networks is now part of Nortel Networks, the stalwart of the
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legacy telephony equipment manufacturers that commands a market cap of $13B in the
wake of accounting regularities related to revenue recognition that continue to plague
Nortel today. Cabletron spun-out three smaller companies outside its core competency in
enterprise data communications infrastructure in 2001. The enterprise networking
focused component, called Enterasys Networks, commands a mere $175M market
capitalization today and is likely to be among the next to disappear through acquisition as
the industry consolidates. The two US-based publicly traded companies mentioned earlier
that grew out of the Gigabit Ethernet Layer 3 switching wave in the later 1990s, Foundry
Networks and Extreme Networks have market capitalizations of $1.4B and $782M
respectively. The market capitalizations of the "Big Four" plus the two upstarts combined
are only about 15% of that commanded by Cisco at today's market prices.
Attempts to slow the Cisco juggernaut by the stalwarts of the telecommunications
equipment manufacturers such as Nortel through its acquisition of Bay Networks already
covered, and a spate of acquisitions by Lucent Technologies that no doubt led at least in
part to that company's recent brush with bankruptcy, have been very ineffective and
arguably almost disastrous for both companies. Even Alcatel has tried and failed with its
acquisition of a small Ethernet LAN switching companies, Xylan, and one of the early
and more successful LAN/WAN ATM startups, Newbridge Networks. Digital Equipment
Corporation, after taking part in the initial standardization had a modicum of market
success with its Ethernet and FDDI equipment offerings primarily through mining its
installed-base of very loyal DEC customers. However, as the inherent limitations of
farming that base were reached, the Digital Networking Products Group was sold to
Cabletron immediately preceding the acquisition of the remainder of DEC to Compaq.
Efforts by other giants such as IBM after the demise of Token Ring have been more of
the "if you can't beat them, join them" category, with many firms for all intents and
purposes abandoning the data communications equipment space directly in favor of
becoming high-end intermediaries for Cisco Systems. After the failure of the VG
AnyLAN effort to unseat Ethernet during the transition from 10Mbps to 100Mbps
technology, Hewlett Packard's Networking division pursued OEM relationships with
other manufacturers including Foundry Networks for its high-end enterprise Ethernet
Layer 3 switches, and has utilized the emergence of Taiwan-based OEM/ODM data
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communications equipment manufacturers to offer enterprise-class Ethernet switching
solutions for the small and medium business (SMB) segment with a small amount of
success.
In 2003, Cisco commanded dominant market shares in all the key segments of
the enterprise data networking market. Figure A1.2 at the top of the next page provides a
graphic representation of the relative market shares of the vendors in the most critical
segments of the enterprise data communications market. Note the share positions of the
other former "Big Four:" 3Com, Nortel, Cabletron (ETS in the graphic, representing
Cabletron's new moniker, Enterasys Networks.) As was examined in more detail in the
body of this thesis one of the key strategies used by Cisco in orchestrating this success
was the highly effective use of intermediated channels sales strategy that it executed in
conjunction with its movement into the wiring closet segment of the market.
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Figure A1.2: Cisco Market Share in Major Enterprise Segments, 2003
Trends Driving the Industry Today
As the industry entered the twenty first century, several important trends driven
primarily through the convergence toward IP and the various flavors of Ethernet have
emerged. As more and more it appears that IP-based, packet switched networks utilizing
the IEEE Ethernet and LAN standards have won, enterprise data communications is
coming into a new stage of its evolution. The standards are well documented and there
are now legions of engineers in many regions of the world that have had packet switching
and TCP/IP included in their formal education, not to mention many that years of
experience building these devices and the associated operating and management software
applications previous to and during the Internet boom in the late 1990s. As the standards
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have emerged and converged, several silicon companies such as Broadcom and Marvel
have implemented many of the features required for Ethernet and IP switching and
routing in their mass produced silicon-specialized ASICs that perform much of the
enterprise Ethernet switching/routing functionality, the "engines" that drive modern data
communications equipment. Previous to the emergence of this off-the-shelf silicon, the
development of these ASICs was accomplished through many man-years of effort and at
great expense by the pioneers in Ethernet switching and routing. The effort to develop
these customized ASICs and the operating firmware provided the primary basis of
differentiation of these devices early in the history of the data communications equipment
industry. The off-the-shelf silicon solutions often referred to as "merchant" silicon have
revolutionized the design and manufacture of some enterprise data communications
equipment. These solutions are referred to as "merchant" in the sense that this silicon and
the device-level drivers to access the functionality are now available off the shelf from
Broadcom, Marvel and many others today-the basic building blocks of data
communications systems has been effectively commoditized and has become readily
available to potential new entrants. What was once a significant barrier to entry even in
the presence of public and open standards has essentially been removed by the
appearance of merchant silicon for building switches and switch-routers.
Standards for more than the protocol operation "on the wire" such as Ethernet
have been established by the data communications components industry. Standard
interfaces and APIs that enable components within a single system (e.g., switch or router)
from different manufacture to interoperate, even entire subsystems such as Gigabit
Interface Controllers (GBICs) have been specified so that these subsystems interoperate
in many different devices from many different vendors. This has enabled the merchant
silicon vendors such as Broadcom and Marvel to not only provide the ASICs and other
components to system developers, but a more complete solution known in the industry as
a "reference design." The reference design is basically a recipe for building a complete
ILAN switch or other data communications system using the merchant silicon vendors'
hardware components and low-level software drivers.
Contract electronics manufacturers (often referred to as "CMs") with design
capabilities and operations in low-cost manufacturing geographies, several based in
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Taiwan such as Delta Electronics and Accton were approached by the merchant silicon
providers with their reference designs. Initially the merchant silicon vendors focused on
the less complex, standalone layer 2 Ethernet switches and encouraged the CMs to build
turn-key systems for the US-based data communication vendors and others eager to enter
the enterprise data communications market to be private-labeled and sold under their
brands. These OEM systems were at first suitable primarily for the lowest end of the
market: SOHO (Small Office, Home Office) and small-medium business segments of the
market which demanded lower levels of features, functionality and performance. By the
late 1990s, the drive to build LANs and enterprise networks had spread to every
imaginable geography, and many countries demanded low-functionality and performance
solutions at price points to hard for many of the US-based companies to achieve
profitably, not to mention their engineering competencies were centered around pushing
the performance and feature barrier, not building "good enough" solutions.
The Taiwan-based OEMs took in the merchant silicon vendors' reference designs,
sometimes modifying them to reduce the cost of manufacturing and developed the
higher-level software applications in accordance with the open IEEE and IETF standards.
This operating software was required in order to create a complete, turnkey solution that
worked in conjunction with the systems hardware they designed and manufactured
according to the merchant silicon vendor's reference designs. Basic cosmetic
modifications were made to the enclosures and user interfaces to achieve common look
and feel with data communications vendors adding these OEM products into their lines.
The price-points the Taiwan-based OEMs could achieve due to the locations of their
plants and economies of scale were very appealing and more importantly, the leading US-
based vendors were able to focus engineering resources on their offerings for the much
more demanding and lucrative larger US enterprise customers, and increasingly on
keeping up with Cisco. The idea of a turn-key low-end solution that could be expected to
earn a healthy margin with little cost or effort to design or support these solutions was of
interest to many of the established US-based data communications vendors.
The first efforts by the Taiwan contract manufacturers were as one familiar with
the complexity of enterprise networking equipment might suspect, fairly poor in many
respects with their operating software being remarkably poor. Despite focusing on what
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was the low-end of the market, many vendors that established OEM relationships with
the Taiwanese vendors early on with the expectation of getting a turn-key solution
experienced serious shortcomings in features and functionality, performance, software
and hardware quality and many other aspects directly affecting the salability of these
products. In some cases reliance on these early offerings for an entry-level product line
met with disastrous results on long standing customer relationships built over years on
the offerings of the manufacturer that were designed and manufactured in house. Simply
put, the expectation that these vendors could produce a market-ready device with little
attention from the experienced vendor was a huge miscalculation. A few vendors
recognized this early on and developed "hybrid" models and resorted to using their own
operating firmware, assisting the Taiwanese companies with manufacturing expertise,
quality systems, software testing and even supply chain expertise-essentially providing
these CMs with guidance that got them up the learning curve much faster, always aware
that the combination of open standards, widely available merchant silicon had the
potential for significantly accelerating the pace of commoditization.
In addition to the emergence of the merchant silicon vendors, and partly resultant
from the difficulties the Taiwan-based OEMs have had with developing high quality
operating software, several startups emerged that specialized on building operating
software specifically for the systems built using the merchant silicon reference designs.
The emergence of "merchant software" companies such as LVL7 and RadLAN (which
was acquired by Marvel) that offered specialization in enterprise networking device
firmware is another interesting and potentially impactful development in the continuing
evolution of this market. In light of the rapid development of open source LINUX as a
real time operating system (RTOS) with many of the operating system level functions
required for use in data communications equipment built-in, making it a very viable
substitute for embedded system development. Not to mention, as Cisco had become so
dominant in the industry and with it the abundance of trained and certified Cisco experts,
the Cisco user interface had become a de facto standard. Vendors had and continue to
leverage "Cisco-like" command line interfaces that leverage the abundance of trained and
experienced Cisco network professionals. What had been a point of differentiation
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between vendors at one time, an easier and more intuitive command structure had
become "standardized" on the Cisco interface.
The emergence of the merchant silicon companies that leveraged many of the
results of the evolution discussed earlier since as open standardization of protocols and
essentially a universal user interface, held the promise of the availability of true turnkey
solution for the established vendors and more importantly for new market entrants.
Professionally developed and high-quality operating software that could be married to
hardware that was increasingly attaining higher levels of quality, stability and
performance that compared favorably with offerings from the incumbent vendors yet at
relatively lower price points has resulted in relatively low technical barriers to entry at
this juncture. In addition, there has been for some time the development of primarily
software expertise in the data communications space for some time. Many offshore
software development companies in India and other geographies such as Wipro and Tata
have large numbers of consulting engineers that have worked with the leading US
vendors on both system operating software as well as network management software.
These firms specialize in providing engineering expertise on a project basis for both new
product development as well as sustaining engineering.
As time has gone on, the Taiwan-based companies have in fact got more
sophisticated and improved quality, features and functionality and their ability to support
their OEM partners. In addition, several of the leaders have added chassis-based and
stackable enterprise Ethernet switching solutions as well as 802.11 wireless LAN
equipment to their offerings. These CMs have leveraged increasingly available merchant
silicon and reference designs while receiving engineering support directly from the
silicon vendors as that space grew more competitive. The Taiwanese manufactures
introduced their own private-labeled data communications offerings in the Asian and
other markets several years ago (Accton under the SMC name, and D-Link under its own
name) and have undoubtedly accelerated their progression up the learning curves via
supporting users directly. The operating software developed in Taiwan is getting better
and has expanded to include layer 3 switching support, and with the emergence of the
merchant software manufacturers there are now choices for companies looking to add
Ethernet LAN switches and wireless LAN equipment by outsourcing the development to
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one or more partners. Data communications equipment at the low end of the market is
beginning to commoditize. Prices and margins are under pressure even for the industry
leaders. One would argue that for the hardware, and even the basic software functionality
that the technology barriers to entry have been effectively removed by the establishment
of the standards, the growth of engineering experience and expertise and the emergence
of merchant silicon and software.
Another development is worth noting at this juncture: Recently the giant Chinese
telecommunications manufacturer, Huawei has entered the data communications
equipment space, allied with 3Com and by 2003 had established marketing share in low-
end and midrange enterprise routers, an area which Cisco has held 90% or greater market
share historically. Huawei's entry into the space was almost immediately responded to by
Cisco with a law suit in US courts accusing the Chinese giant of infringing Cisco's IOS,
the operating software of Cisco Systems switches and routers protected by copyright. The
suit was later dropped, but clearly what was primarily a market dominated by the US
firms previously mentioned is now being challenged by entrants from many geographies
both indirectly via firms partnering with the ODM/OEM partners, and now directly with
the entry by Huawei.
Many of the dynamics outlined in the latter parts of this chapter are still playing
out such as the effects of competition from outside the United States for the large
enterprise segment of the business. Although many of the factors necessary for the
continued comnmoditization of this equipment is in place, many components used in the
largest enterprise and service provider networks in the world are still produced by only a
few companies that continue to enjoy very healthy margins. In the past several years the
incumbent vendors have become much less focused on differentiating on "speeds and
feeds" and "better technology" as Ethernet has become the standard of choice, and wire-
speed performance has become the industry norm.
Summary
Increasingly differentiation in the market has turned toward much more focus on
value-add functionality such as support for quality of service, suitability of the
infrastructure for voice, video and storage and most recently, security. Cisco has of
course been able to expand the scope of its offering to include all the infrastructure
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components required for IP voice (including IP handsets and the equivalent of IP PBXs in
its enterprise line), IP video and IP storage providing it the depth of solution and
expertise that it has always used masterfully in its go-to-market activities. Other vendors
have stressed the importance of "best-of-breed" solutions and have avoided expanding
into this highly specialized equipment and focusing on providing an infrastructure that is
enabled with quality of service and other features and functionality that support these
next generation applications, allowing customers to chose the other elements from the
vendor or vendors that best meet their needs. All vendors however have been compelled
to speak to the security issue and focus engineering resources on improving the security
of their offerings since the events of September 11, 2001 in New York City.
The dynamic driving continued evolution of the market is that increasingly the
hardware is becoming commoditized, as are the majority of the features described in the
standards that are implemented through software. Whatever uniqueness can be achieved
today is achieved through software functionality, or what is typically called extensions to
the standards-that is, vendors find ways of enhancing the functionality specified by the
standards by adding features in the specialized ASIC hardware that remains custom-built
and are exposed to the user through the operating software. Again, these features have
been concentrated around additional functionality and features, such as security and
quality of service for reliable support of voice and video, and not around performance or
"speeds and feeds." Often these differences can be hard to tie to a demonstrable customer
benefit with a quantifiable Return on Investment (ROI) which has become imperative in
the wake of the bubble, or extremely hard to implement or both.
Increasingly the players in the enterprise data communications equipment market
are being forced to rely less and less on their uniqueness while placing much more
emphasis on accumulating and developing their complementary assets such as channels
to market. As illustrated in the body of this thesis, one of the most important
complementary assets is a large and loyal intermediary channel with the ever increasing
potential of an attack from below-the low cost providers coming from China and
Taiwan made possible in large part by the standards themselves and the increasing
commoditization of the silicon required in enterprise data communications equipment.
Although the equipment itself may continue to commoditize rapidly, the level of
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complexity inherent in these offerings makes the potential for a shift to direct-to-
customer selling of this equipment somewhat unlikely in the near term. This observation
suggests that the remaining manufacturers, particularly those that have well developed
intermediary channel programs, will strive to prevent access to the channels by their
established competitors as well as the new entrants.
As was outlined earlier in this appendix, in the most lucrative segments of this
market it is increasingly less about "buying boxes" for the customer, and much more
about attaining complete solutions to their IT needs. Increasingly they need trusted
advisors that can not only specify equipment that provides the features, functionality and
performance that is needed to solve business problems. Unlike the home user that can
order a wireless LAN access point router online, configure his device and connect it to
the DSL or cable MODEM and be up and running with a home LAN, the staff
responsible for the enterprise network which provides the "plumbing" for transporting the
information and applications that are the lifeblood of the modern enterprise need a variety
of value-add services into the foreseeable future. Like the firms in the data
communications equipment market discussed in depth in the body of this thesis, firms in
industries with related dynamics where there is a level of complexity and a customer
demand for solutions, it is imperative to develop the necessary competencies to
effectively and profitably utilize intermediaries.
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Appendix 2: Market Drivers and the Emergence of
Intermediated Channels for the Enterprise Data
Communications Market
Introduction
The previous appendix provided a relatively detailed overview of the general
evolution of the enterprise data communications equipment market. The focus of this
appendix will be how the industry evolution drove the development of intermediaries that
specialized on the services associated with the new computing paradigm and how
industry- and firm-level attributes drove the go-to-market strategies of two types of data
communications manufacturers.
As the previous appendix outlined, the enterprise data communications equipment
market as it exists today has undergone a very rapid evolution over its roughly twenty
year existence. An analysis of that evolution exposes several key characteristics of
industry structure and competitive dynamics that are common to other high technology
markets and will likely impinge on other similar markets that develop in the future. These
characteristics of the evolution of the market are important in a discussion of the
employment of intermediated channels as will be outlined in this appendix.
Open Standards Impact on Market Evolution
One of the core determinants of the rapid evolution of the data communications
market was the role of industry standards. As the last chapter pointed out, at the time of
the discovery of Ethernet data communications technologies were generally proprietary
and closed. Multi-vendor interoperability could only be achieved through technology
licensing agreements or reverse engineering, which was heavily frowned upon by the
giants of the industry at the time. This precedent was set primarily by the mainframe
manufacturers and continued into the mini-computer era and was characterized by strictly
proprietary data communications infrastructure (down to the cables and connectors) and
extended to the communications protocols. The decision by Dr. Metcalfe outlined in the
previous appendix to radically depart from that precedent and vigorously pursue open,
industry-wide standardization was in this author's opinion a major inflection point in the
evolution of this industry that is often overlooked. Theoretically, the early
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Xerox/Metcalfe fundamental patents on the Ethernet technology could have potentially
been closely-held and exploited by some entity in developing a local area networking
solution for personal computers and other devices via a proprietary implementation.
Clearly such a move could have had major implications in the adoption rate and the
emergence of Ethernet variants as the dominant design, but the world will never know
due to the efforts led primarily by Dr. Metcalfe and other pioneers to make Ethernet an
open standard such that multi-vendor interoperability was possible practically from day
one. That decision unleashed a wave of innovation and entry by entrepreneurial firms and
a set of competitive dynamics that were truly new and arguably set the stage for the
future of markets where open, public standards are foundational.
At the same time a similar progression was occurring for internetworking
protocols and the devices that implemented these protocols, the routers that were used for
connecting LANs and for building private WANs. Initially there were multiple
proprietary internetworking protocol implementations by Novell, Microsoft and several
others mentioned previously. The rise of the Internet into commercial uses and more
importantly the rather unique evolution of the Internet community, most notably the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the strongly engrained Internet culture of
".consensus and running code" resulted in firm commitments of that community to
standardization and publication in the public domain of all Internet protocols. Very
similarly to what occurred with Ethernet as the datalink technology of choice, the open
by design TCP/IP communications protocols eventually became predominant as the
dominant design for all digital communications, both wired and wireless going into this
millennium.
This embrace in the market of industry standards and the resulting convergence
on Ethernet and IP is a thesis topic in and of itself, and a full treatment of these dynamics
is far beyond the scope of this paper. What is important to this discussion is the end
result: in the relatively short amount of time elapsing from the discovery of Ethernet to
the time this thesis is being written, data communications and enterprise computing has
undergone an irreversible sea change that has extended the applications of these
innovations now to all forms of electronic digital communications, changing the nature of
telecommunications forever. Vast technological innovations occurred during this period
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with the introduction of microprocessor-based desktop computing, client-server
applications, the transition from cell to packet-based high speed digital data
communications, the move toward incredibly high capacity fiber optics transport
replacing traditional electrical transmission over copper cabling, and many more too
numerous to mention.
These huge technological innovations in communications technology were
accompanied by an even more radical fundamental market change: what was once strictly
the domain of proprietary protocols and closed, non-interoperable implementations,
tightly-held by a very small number of large firms with oligopoly market powers
(arguably closer to monopoly as evidenced by the anti-trust actions against IBM in the
early 1970s) had been opened up to what became a torrent of new entrants beginning in
the late 1980s and extending into the 1990s. Open standards in data communications
infrastructure opened up a Pandora's Box, unleashing competitive forces on the core
businesses on the industry icons such as Bell Labs (Lucent Technologies), IBM, Digital
Equipment Corporation and many others that few would or could have foreseen. The full
extent of the impact of this inflection point on all the telecommunications equipment
providers, from those with their history tied to the invention of the telephones and
electronic communication and computing, to the upstarts of the 80s and 90s such as Cisco
Systems and 3Com Corporation is still far from being fully played out. Consolidation in
the space will likely take several more years, and making any firm predictions at this
point as to what firms survive and which become a footnote is impossible.
Competition in the Presence of Industry Standards
In the new age of data communications resulting from Ethernet, TCP/IP and the
myriad other open, public standards that have become the foundation for the data
communications companies capture value from innovation differently than the
information technology firms that preceded them. The mainframe and minicomputer
manufacturers created proprietary protocols, interfaces, connectors, etc. to purposely
ensure that the primary system components (mainframe or minicomputer itself) were
interconnected with the peripherals in a non-standard and therefore non-interoperable
fashion. Consumers had little or no choice in building-out legacy computing
infrastructures; they simply bought all components from the vendor, and often at very
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high premiums even for low-technology items such as cables. Certainly at the very
beginning of the Ethernet/IP revolution, even given the open standards only a small
number of firms had the requisite absorptive capacity to utilize the standards in creating
marketable solutions but that lead was significantly shortened as will be explained.
As was mentioned in the last chapter, standardization of Ethernet and Internet
protocols were designed to accelerate the adoption, to maximize the network effects of
universal interoperability ala Metcalfe's Law introduced in the previous chapter. The
IEEE and IETF standards themselves were and are essentially "cookbooks" that enable
any entity with access to the requisite engineering skills who wanted to build the
components necessary to build standards-based Ethernet networks and connect devices to
it to do so. The publication of open standards effectively lowered slightly the barriers to
entry into the space initially. Lowered because the standards specified the operation of
the protocol "on the wire," essentially the parameters and specifications required to
ensure interoperability and compatibility. A great amount of the details of the
implementation early on in the evolution of the technologies were left up to the engineers
and their ingenuity in the implementation. The standards did not necessarily specify
"how" early on, the focus was clearly on "what" the devices had to do to comply with the
standard and interoperate with other compliant devices.
Accordingly, designing and building the hardware and software components
required to meet these specifications and operate correctly as peripherals to PCs and other
devices was far from straightforward and a highly complex engineering task in spite of
the publication of the IEEE and IETF standards. The early versions of these standards
still left potential entrants with significant learning curves for the design and manufacture
of data communications equipment. These learning curves resulted in significant barriers
to entry, hence a concentration of the early data communications firms in the Silicon
Valley and Boston's "128 belt." It was precisely the details of the implementation that
were in fact the last bastions of uniqueness that the vendors used for differentiation and
value capture in the very early days of the standards-based data communications market.
Capacity, performance, stability, reliability, scalability and ease of use-all while
maintaining compliance with the standard "on the wire" were the focus on innovative
efforts in this phase of industry evolution. More importantly possibly was the intangible
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value of standards and standards compliance for the purposes of signaling to customers
early on. As LAN internetworking began to gain momentum, the standards effort
signaled to enterprise customers the coming of the end of the proprietary interconnect era.
Small startup firms utilized standards compliance and participation in the standards body
very effectively to combat the "credibility gap" that often plagues small technology
startups as they try to sell to the largest enterprises.
More pertinent to the discussion in this paper was how the most astute
competitors in enterprise data communications recognized the medium and long term
implications of standardization in the data communications markets: that the window for
value capture through uniqueness was small and short-lived. The more astute competitors
among the data communications equipment manufacturers rapidly applied their resources
toward developing complementary assets in building brand, supply chain excellence, and
last but certainly not least in relative importance to this thesis, to the exploitation of
intermediated channels and multi-channel management in general. As has been outlined
in the body of the thesis, the utilization of intermediated channels for the purposes of
rapidly scaling up an increasingly global sales effort while providing complementary
services can be one means to gain competitive advantage in the presence of open
standards. Certainly the facile use of multiple channels to market by a high technology
company can enable it to take market share and remain highly profitable, sometimes at
the expense of competitors who are not able to rise to the challenges of managing
intermediated channels. As the thesis outlines this was certainly a factor in Cisco Systems
dominance of the enterprise data communications equipment market. For the most astute
management teams of the new data communications equipment manufacturers it became
very clear that the nature of this market was going to make it very hard to scale a direct
sales strategy to effectively capture leading market share worldwide. This was further
complicated by the demand from the customer base that the manufacturer's offerings be
accompanied by value-add services, across multiple industry verticals and enterprises of a
wide variety of sizes and internal skills and competencies required to implement and
maintain the new technologies.
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Enter the Data Communications Equipment Intermediaries
The emergence of PCs and client-server computing had another very interesting
impact on the way enterprises purchased their information system infrastructures. In the
mainframe and minicomputer eras, the vendors and a relatively small network of
complementors provided what was essentially and end-to-end solution for these
computing infrastructures. The manufacturers provided just about every component,
sometimes down to the furniture used for building the legacy computing infrastructure. In
addition to the hardware and software components, the vendors and their partners
provided services including design, installation, training and software customization. In
essence, the manufacturers provided "one stop" shopping for acquiring, installing,
operating and maintaining the infrastructure. It is also important to note that in the eras of
the mainframe and minicomputer, the cost and complexity of these information systems,
the mainframe in particular, put these solutions out of reach for many enterprises.
In the brave new era of PCs, LANs, WANs and client-server computing these
characteristics were no longer the case. PCs, networks and file and print servers were
affordable for the smallest firms. In even the simplest environments, the new solutions
were multi-vendor by design. Particularly early on, enterprises were purchasing routers
from one vendor and LAN hubs from another, NICs, PCs, servers, printers, cabling and
equipment racks-often from several different vendors in order to construct their new
computing infrastructures.
This presented a whole new set of complexities for IT operations seriously
considering implementing the new paradigm for enterprise computing. It was no longer a
matter of picking a vendor-now it was a matter of selecting technologies as well as
vendors, and most importantly finding help with the integration of disparate devices from
different vendors, technologies, command lines, protocols, interfacing with the service
providers that provided WAN services. Where the legacy vendors had provided volumes
of documentation, and very well organized and executed training programs, the upstart
data communications manufacturers focused a great deal of their resources on leading the
standards bodies, innovation to drive that leadership, differentiation and delivering their
products. Often documentation was scarce or rapidly obsolete and training was hard to
come. It is a vast understatement to say that the move to the new paradigm of enterprise
computing was a shock to the system of most IT managers, for organizations that had an
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existing IT department. Many small and medium sized businesses had no IT
infrastructure or people to run it. Increasingly enterprise customers began demanding
"one throat to choke," one organization that would integrate the entire system and stand
behind it over time as the startups often came and went quickly, many times via merger
or acquisition with other players or simply just went away.
As was outlined in the previous appendix, heterogeneity of demand for data
communications equipment was predominant early on even as the standards were being
established and began to gain traction. Ethernet was not the only solution available. As
3Com and the other new data communications entrants had begun shipping and installing
standards-based Ethernet products, enterprise customers had many choices as was
outlined in the earlier chapter-Ethernet and IP were far from their eventual
establishment as the "dominant designs." Many enterprises looked to their incumbent
information technology providers to lead them through this transition-many IBM
accounts for example turned to IBM itself for Token Ring LAN solutions, before and
after the standardization of Token Ring, to interconnect the PCs they were adding to their
infrastructures. As is typically seen with industries in ferment, there were many new
entrants at the dawn of the era offering a wide variety of products, some based on
Ethernet and others promoting the aforementioned alternative LAN technologies and
internetworking protocols, proprietary and standards-based, competing for the attention
of increasingly overwhelmed, understaffed and under-skilled IT staffs. The IT staffs of
the largest enterprises that were trying to keep their mainframe operations up and running
while dealing with the onslaught of the new technology were stretched thin. As was
mentioned in the previous appendix, for many enterprises the transition to the new
computing paradigm was far from orderly-many enterprises ended up with a patchwork
of solutions: different LAN technologies and cabling, different NOS solutions, etc. The
fact that the transition was not orderly or standardized significantly increased the
complexity. Many enterprises were forced to refresh their infrastructures in different
segments of their intranets long before they were obsolete or fully depreciated in order to
facilitate connectivity or gain efficiencies by standardization. This coupled with a very
fast pace of innovation created a bonanza of enterprise buying for not only the data
communications equipment vendors, but for a growing number of companies that
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complemented the manufacturers with value-added services they bundled with the
hardware and software being developed and sold by the enterprise data communications
manufacturers..
The heterogeneity of demand and plethora of potential solutions early on in the
transition from the mainframe and minicomputer era to the PC and client server eras had
another side effect in the market that is very pertinent to the discussion of intermediated
channels: it led to the establishment of large and vibrant community of a new category of
information technology service firms that assisted customers with the complexities of the
new paradigm of enterprise computing, designing, implementing and operating these new,
multi-vendor computing infrastructures consisting of very complex local and wide area
networks and the devices they connected. These organizations typically referred to as
'Value Added Resellers (VARs), Systems Integrators (SIs) and data communications
consultants were primarily service-providing firms. They bundled their services offerings
with hardware and software from multiple manufacturers to offer more complete
solutions to business customers. These firms began to appear alongside the data
communication startups such as 3Com and SynOptics which relied almost entirely on
indirect channels to market.
Many firms that previously provided enterprise telephony system services
expanded into the data services business as the cable plant structure for enterprise LANs
was very similar to that used for enterprise telephony systems such as Private Branch
Exchanges (PBX) and key systems. Early on, extending cable plants certified at high data
rates required for LAN connectivity to all the workspaces PCs were suddenly appearing
in was a huge challenge in and of itself. In existing buildings that had not been designed
to accommodate cabling it was exceptionally difficult. The voice VARs not only were
structured cabling experts, they were already familiar with the technologies used for
WANs early on (e.g., voice circuits utilized for transport of data). N
Many more startup data communication service companies were formed that
specialized purely in data communications services, recognizing early on that the
enterprise computing paradigm was shifting-that PCs on every desktop and the data
communications infrastructure that required was creating a very lucrative services
opportunity across the globe. Many of these firms that had been originated to take
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advantage of these opportunities locally found themselves expanding rapidly to become
regional providers, and some even expanded into providing services internationally.
There was often vertical market specialization as the needs for service specialization
varied amongst the industries that were adopting the LAN and WAN technologies, and
more importantly the software applications that were being run over them. Some VARs
focused on specific verticals, and their reputations grew within the IT organizations of
firms in those vertical markets.
By the early 1990s the larger IT services and consulting firms that had emerged
and grown up alongside the mainframe manufacturers took notice of the emergence of
the desktop PC applications, and the overall paradigm shift to client-server computing
and enterprise internetworking. Companies such as EDS, Unisys and even the "Big Five"
management consulting firms that were previously providing IT consulting services for
mainframe computing, all established additions to their practices and began offering
services to the large enterprises who were struggling with managing their increasingly
urgent deployment of PCs, LANs and WANs and client-server computing infrastructures
and applications. In many cases the addition of these services was done via acquisition of
the larger regional systems integrators who had developed the experience, skills and best-
practices required including several that had become dominant in specific verticals.8 5 The
enterprise computing environment, previously contained to relatively small, climate and
access controlled areas behind glass walls was now expanding to just about every
conceivable corner of the enterprise. This was causing a great deal of problems for the IT
staffs of the large multinationals that were not staffed to deal with this unbridled system
scale and scope expansion. Many of the large, prestigious consultants and system
integrators were only too happy to try and help with this transition, and many acquired
the necessary skills "on the job" as they developed their practices.
These intermediary firms represented a viable channel to market for the data
communications equipment manufacturers as their skill set grew, and the demand for data
communications equipment began to spread to small and medium businesses.
85 One specific example is the acquisition of Shared Medical Systems Corp. by Siemens Medical
Engineering Group, Inc. announced in May of 2000. At the time of the acquisition SMS had annual sales of
$1 .2B and 7600 employees. In July of 2002, IBM acquired PWC Consulting including the global
technology services and business consulting unit for $3.5B.
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Many of the data communications equipment manufacturers themselves plunged
headlong into the services business, possibly realizing the huge potential service
opportunities early on or perhaps out of necessity. Essentially all of the players added call
centers to provide technical support to their customers for issues specific to their fielded
equipment (which were abundant in the early days in the area of interoperability and
stability). The data communications equipment manufacturers discovered a very lucrative
opportunity to provide contract maintenance offerings along with the equipment. These
maintenance contracts were essentially extended warranties that allowed customers
access to the technical phone support centers, software upgrades to the operating
firmware running on the equipment which was frequently updated for both bug fixes and
feature enhancements, as well as advanced replacement for equipment that failed in the
field. The maintenance contracts were written against individual pieces of equipment or
on a complete system and were priced based on a percentage of the original list price of
the equipment and provided coverage on an annual basis.
Other manufacturers went further and added additional post-sales service
offerings, enabling customers to buy design and implementation services resulting in
essentially turnkey data communications infrastructures, built-out of course with the
manufacturer's offerings at the core of the solution. In essence, firms that added these
services essentially competed directly with the VARs and system integrators that had
partnered with the company's competitors. Cabletron is an example of such a firm that
added a post-sales service operation that provided design, installation and maintenance
services for its customers. Its direct competitor SynOptics avoided the development of
sales and services capabilities internally, opting instead to tap into the many
intermediaries that had emerged as discussed in the previous section.
The addition of a service capability, internal or otherwise, was of course partially
out of necessity. Despite the rapid emergence of the standards, there was an incredible
shortage of people who knew how the gear from the various manufacturers worked, how
to configure PCs to operate on LANs, and to keep the increasingly mission-critical
network systems operating round-the-clock. Companies such as 3Com, Cabletron and
SynOptics Communications and many others faced the realities of the early phases of the
Technology Adoption Lifecycle of the disruptive LAN technology as was discussed in
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chapter three of the thesis. As demand for data communications equipment spread
beyond the technology-savvy innovators, increasingly the manufacturers found it
necessary to offer more services around their offerings to ease adoption.
At this juncture it is worth documenting a very important element to the
development of complementary assets by the various players I found through my research
for this thesis that I had not considered previously. The Big Four of data
communications: Cisco, 3Com, Cabletron and Bay Networks, provided enterprise data
communications products-the equipment and software that was used to build-out the
"plumbing" of enterprise communications infrastructures. There was however some
amount of market specialization prior to the 1993-1994 timeframe when SynOptics and
Wellfleet Communications merged to form Bay Networks and Cisco Systems began its
flurry of acquisitions by expanding into LAN switching as discussed in appendix one.
As was detailed in that appendix, 3Com initially focused on the segment that
provided LAN connectivity for the LAN environment as did Cabletron and SynOptics
Communications, which was initially spun-out of Xerox PARC in 1985 to pursue
opportunities in providing fiber optic Ethernet equipment. Eventually SynOptics
expanded into Ethernet, Token Ring and FDDI LAN equipment and competed fiercely
with Cabletron and 3Com in the LAN hub space. For the purposes of this discussion, the
enterprise data communications equipment manufacturers were effectively segmented
into two primary subsets in this timeframe; there were the LAN equipment-focused
companies such as 3Com, Cabletron and SynOptics Communications, and the WAN or
router-focused companies, Cisco Systems and Wellfleet.
Prior to the explosion of awareness of the innovations in business practices made
possible by the Internet it is important to recall that the role of the router and routing
(Layer 3 switching) was very different from what it eventually became for enterprise
networks. Routers and routing, prior to the emergence of the commercial uses of the
Internet were used primarily in larger enterprises to connect multiple LANs on the same
campus, to interconnect disparate LAN topologies (e.g., Ethernet, Token Ring, and
legacy proprietary networks including mainframes), and to interconnect locations across
long distances using private WAN links leased from service providers over the legacy
telephony network. What is essential to understanding is that the numbers of routers in
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even the largest enterprise networks were relatively small, and often they resided in a
small number of the largest enterprise data centers. Into the early 1990s, routing was
considered highly complex and due to the nature of routing implementations being
primarily software-based, performance was limited relative to the LAN infrastructures at
the locations they interconnected.
LAN equipment is vastly different in contrast to routers, and not just in technical
function. Because LANs extended to every area in the enterprise the personal computer
and other networked assets were spreading to, just about every conceivable corner of
many enterprises, the scale and scope of the enterprise LAN equipment market was
radically different. Prior to the incorporation of an Ethernet controller on the
motherboards of PCs and other devices, every network node needed an Ethernet
controller (NIC) in order to connect to the Ethernet LAN. In the medium and large
enterprises, the telecommunications closets on every floor of an office building that held
the equipment required for the voice network had LAN equipment added to support the
data network. Initially that equipment consisted of wiring hubs and then eventually LAN
switches, a port connecting one device to the network. Today the largest enterprises may
have 500 or more LAN ports in a single closet. LAN equipment was distributed
essentially everywhere connectivity to the enterprise network was provided, and was not
relegated to the data centers and in reach from within the glassed-in network operations
centers.
The companies that focused on wiring hubs such as Cabletron and SynOptics
faced a far different challenge because of the inherent nature of their target markets.
Providing the infrastructure that connected potentially thousands of devices, the wiring
hubs that resided in the wiring closets providing the intra-enterprise "plumbing" was
inherently more complex due to the pervasiveness of the LANs themselves. The wiring
hub manufacturers were faced with a significantly more complex customer-facing
function. That challenge started with the cable plant itself, extended to centralized
termination in the wiring closets and at the individual device. Although LAN
infrastructure devices provided a relatively less complex functionality to in comparison to
routing, in the pre-Internet period when multiprotocol routing was still common, there
were still significant LAN design issues as well as configuration complexity to be dealt
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with. Not to mention a large, campus enterprise LANs required a very large number of
LAN infrastructure devices and large building or campus installation projects were often
very complex through all the phases. It was impossible for the LAN-focused companies
to manage large enterprise accounts with a small team consisting of an account executive
and a sales engineer. In order to sell effectively to a large enterprise, the LAN companies
had to have a means to service the needs for complex post-sales support as they tried in
earnest to develop an installed base of customers and brand awareness.
Another related and important characteristic of the LAN equipment market was
SKU proliferation. As some readers will recall, throughout the late eighties and early
1990s before onboard Ethernet controllers became standard equipment on PCs there was
a series of peripheral bus standards not to mention significant evolution of the PC
operating systems. This led to a large number of NICs and software drivers supported by
their manufacturers-there was not a single universal NIC. At the same time the
evolution of the Ethernet standard beyond the first version was incredibly rapid. As the
supported cable types specified by the standards expanded from thick coaxial, to thin
coaxial, to twisted pair to fiber optics, Ethernet hubs became modularized, supporting
many of these variants in a single chassis. Many of the largest enterprises found
themselves supporting a wide variety of disparate cabling, PCs and LAN technologies,
from multiple vendors and often supporting multiple technologies before Ethernet and IP
became dominant. Suffice it to say the days of transition from the old mainframe and
minicomputer environments to the new client-server infrastructures, not to mention the
shake-out of technologies and the insatiable quest for more and more bandwidth made
this a fairly complex space to sell and support customers in. In order to provide flexibility
for customers, many of the LAN equipment manufacturers added the ability to support
multiple cable types and technologies in a single hub, and devices to connect disparate
technologies at the link layer (to preclude the need for routing). These capabilities created
an explosion of SKUs and added complexity to specification of a solution. New parts
with new capabilities were being added rapidly as new customer requirements emerged in
the field and hardware solutions were developed by the engineering groups of the LAN-
focused companies to address them. This was a very important difference between the
routing companies such as Cisco and Wellfleet and the LAN companies such as
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Cabletron and SynOptics: new functionality was added to routers primarily through the
software services running on the hardware while LAN equipment often required new
hardware to address new challenges.
These characteristic differences in the markets for routers and LAN equipment,
and how the different members of the Big Four data communications equipment
manufacturers went to market undoubtedly influenced their individual corporate
strategies immensely. Clearly continuing to innovate to keep up in the "speeds and feeds"
and "features and functions" race was the cost of admission although the ability to
differentiate products on these performance and feature attributes has become more
difficult and complementary assets increasingly have become the primary means of
capturing value in the enterprise data communications market as commoditization of the
technologies and products continues to this day. It is important to outline how these
fundamental differences potentially influenced or shaped the strategies and tactics these
companies pursued in building complementary assets such as the ability to effectively
employ intermediated channels.
As was alluded to earlier in the paper, much of the brand- and market share-
building efforts occurred early on in the router business were focused on the service
providers who were buying large volumes of routers in order to support customers all
over the world their efforts construct global private WANs. Cisco Systems clearly had a
first-mover advantage in this space. The proximity to and participation of many Cisco
engineers in the early efforts to build-out the public Internet and establish the Internet
protocols provided a significant first mover advantage for Cisco in terms of market share
and market evolution intelligence discussed in the previous appendix. More importantly
as the number of Cisco routers and the service providers' points of presence (POPs--the
first hop from a company's data center to the edge of the Internet core, controlled by the
long-distance carriers) continued to expand rapidly, there were potential indirect network
externalities that induced enterprises to choose Cisco routers as well.
There were two primary inducements early of for enterprises to purchase Cisco
routers for their WAN and core routing functionality: 1. Ensure interoperability (although
standards theoretically ensured that) and, 2. Leverage the technical knowledge of the
technicians at the service provider in setting up and maintaining the customer premise
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equipment, which was often the responsibility of the customer early on. Troubleshooting
these links required cooperation by both ends of the link-the service provider and
enterprise technical personnel spoke often as private WANs became increasingly more
common for the global multinationals.
Routing configuration and the management of routed infrastructures was and
continues to be to this day very complex. The earliest routing implementations were
primarily in software early on and therefore somewhat unstable in the early iterations of
routers. The product lines of the router companies were relatively small early on, with
several base platforms varying primarily in their capacity, a variety of physical interfaces
supporting connectivity to different LAN and WAN network types, and some software
options typically. Because the first routers were essentially special purpose computers
running highly specialized software, the gross margins were very, very attractive and
fueled incredible organic growth for the market share leader.
It is worth noting that the learning curve for building multi-protocol routers was
very steep into the mid-1990s, hence the relatively small numbers of entrants.
Configuration and management of enterprise multiprotocol routers and private WANs
was an art form. Trained and experienced technicians were very hard to find and the
router companies such as Cisco Systems spent a lot of time, attention and resources
providing training to the service providers and some large enterprises, getting operators
of the equipment up the router operators' learning curve which was steep as well. This
training undoubtedly included some amount of vendor indoctrination which significantly
strengthened their position with this relatively small set of very large service provider and
strategic enterprise customers adopting what became to be known as the Internet
technologies. This turned out to be an incredibly fortuitous decision on the part of some
router vendors as the commercial potential of the Internet for firms of all sizes became
apparent. Familiarity built within the service provider community proved very valuable
for obvious reasons-there was a propensity to recommend devices that the technicians
knew well and had field experience with and possibly have completed formal training
and certification for. The service providers linking enterprises via private WANs and
eventually the public internet became key influencers of enterprise router purchasing
decisions. Eventually the service providers evolved into one of the most important
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intermediated channels for the early routing-focused companies such as Cisco Systems
into the enterprise data communication markets.
Much of the complexity of routing was around the configuration of the devices to
interface properly with the legacy TDM technologies. The technical staffs of the service
providers had a great deal of experience managing devices with arcane, command-line
interfaces, UNIX and UNIX-like operating systems, scripting and the other tools of the
trade that transferred fairly well into the configuration and management of routers. The
service providers were technically well suited to lead their enterprise customers through
the transition.
One final important point to make about routing related to its complexity and its
impact on the hierarchy that exists within enterprise IT departments. In my experience in
the field there was in the early 1990s and continues to be today a readily distinguishable
order or hierarchy within the technical IT staffs of enterprises: the technical staffs
responsible for routing and the closely related technologies are typically at the top of that
hierarchy. That is, there is an order of advancement that typically moves from being
responsible for LAN equipment early and progressing over time into positions of
responsibility for routing and the Internet and WAN connections. It is likely because of
the skills required to function in this role and the complexity alluded to in the previous
paragraphs, and of course the mission critical status firms' connectivity to the "outside
world" has eventually attained, and a myriad of other issues beyond the scope of this
paper. The point to take away is that the router people within an enterprise are generally
the most senior technicians in these organizations, and even as the role of CIO evolved,
these members of the IT department had a tremendous amount of clout and input on
decisions regarding choice of technology and vendor in the enterprise infrastructure.
Summary
This appendix built on the general overview of the history of the data
communications equipment market provided in the last appendix to outline in more detail
how open standards influenced the evolution of the market and the industry. The fact that
the industry relied heavily upon open standards was a primary driver of the evolution of
the market. Of equal importance was the transformation to multi-vendor solutions.
Because the standards made it increasingly difficult for the manufacturers to differentiate
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their offerings with uniqueness, complementary assets such as brand and channels to
market played a very important role in the establishment of dominant market share.
These attributes were the driving force behind the emergence of services firms
that provided integration and other services around the offerings of the data
communications equipment manufacturers. Manufacturers were faced by increasing
demands from customers to provide increasing amounts of value-added services around
their offerings. The emergence of potential intermediated channel partners presented a
decision point for the firms competing in the defined segments to either continue to go to
market via a direct channel, or chose to utilize intermediated channels. The latter part of
the appendix established some key differences of the segments of the enterprise data
communications market that existed into the mid-1990s and outlined the characteristics
of the target markets and customers,. For the purposes of the thesis the evolution of the
market and characteristic differences faced by the competitors had an incredibly
important impact on how and when intermediated channels eventually became a crucial
element of the go-to-market strategy.
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